had acquired property in 1870 under a deed to her, her heirs and assigns," to and for their sole and only use forever," joined in the agreement for the purpose of its being carried out and charged her land to the extent of $1,000.

Held, that in such a conveyance the word "sole" may or may not mean 66 separate" according to the context, but in this case

the wife's land was charged.

A. W. Aytoun-Finlay, for the plaintiff.

Hoyles, Q.C., for the defendants.

[2ND NOVEMBER, 1891.

SWEETLAND v. NEVILLE.

Husband and wife—Wife's separate estate-Money in savings bank—Gift of

husband.

Where it appeared that a married woman, on the day of entering into a money bond, had deposited in her name in the Postoffice Savings Bank a certain sum of money which the evidence showed was money given to her by her husband, but of which as against her husband she seemed to have the absolute disposal by his consent and wish :

Held, that this was sufficient on which to found a proprietary judgment against the wife, though it was not shown that the bond was not executed at an earlier hour than that at which the money was deposited.

G. H. Henderson, for the plaintiff.
Robert Lees, Q.C., for the defendant.

[FERGUSON, J., 7TH NOVEMBER, 1891.

JUDSON v. CITY OF TORONTO.

Municipal corporations—Ridge of ice on sidewalk—Accident—Negligence— Liability.

The plaintiff was injured by slipping upon a ridge of ice, on a sidewalk opposite a vacant lot. The ridge ran lengthwise of the

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sidewalk, and about the middle of it, and was about four inches high along its middle line, and with a base of about fifteen to eighteen inches wide, the slope of its side being a sharp inclination. The rest of the sidewalk was clear, having had all snowfalls removed from it by the defendants' men, who, however, having no proper implements for removing the ridge of ice, had allowed it to remain. It appeared that the ridge was formed by people travelling along the sidewalk after snow had fallen, in a sort of path or line, before the snow had been shovelled off. defendants had full notice of the existence of this ridge.

The

Held, that they were responsible in damages to the plaintiff.

J. A. Macdonald, for the plaintiff.

H. M. Mowat, for the defendants.

IN CHAMBERS.

[BOYD, C., 17TH NOVEMBER, 1891.

In re WILLIAMS AND MCKINNON.

Administrator ad litem-Rule 311-Devolution of Estates Act-Real estateApplication before action.

Rule 311, though in existence, as s. 11 of 47 V. c. 13, before the passing of the Devolution of Estates Act, may be applied as to realty falling under the operation of that Act.

If it appears that there is no personalty, or personalty of such trifling amount as will not suffice to answer the claims made in respect of the deceased's real estate, against which litigation is brought or is impending, administration ad litem may be granted under the Rule, limited to the real estate in question.

An application for the appointment of an administrator ad litem is properly made before action.

Hoyles, Q.C., for the applicant.
J. Hoskin, Q.C., for the infants.

VAUGHAN ROAD CO. V. FISHER.

Consolidation of actions-Identity of issues-Test action-Staying proceedings-Separate assessments of damages.

Four actions were brought by the same plaintiffs against different defendants for damages for trespass in refusing to pay toll and forcing past the toll-gates. The pleadings were identical, and the main issue was common to all the actions, but it was admitted that if the plaintiffs had a substantial cause of action, there must be a separate assessment of damages in each case.

Upon a motion by the defendants to consolidate the actions :Held, that one of the actions should be tried as a test for all, and that all proceedings in the other actions should be stayed till the test action should have been determined, after which the assessments should proceed according to the result on the main question; or if the defendants would each submit to pay the largest amount of damages that might be awarded in the test action, that all proceedings should be stayed in all actions except that in which the plaintiffs expected to recover the largest amount, and such action should be alone litigated.

C. W. Kerr, for the plaintiffs.

A. G. F. Lawrence, for the defendants.

[GALT, C.J., 12TH OCTOBER, 1891.

In re COE v. COE.

Prohibition--Division Court-Appeal to, from magistrates' order under 51 V. c. 23-Notice of appeal—“Cause or matter"--Amendment.

By s. 15 of R. S. O. c. 139, which by s. 11 of 51 V. c. 23 is to regulate appeals to Division Courts from magistrates' orders for payment of maintenance moneys by husbands to wives, it is provided that the appellant shall give to the opposite party a notice in writing of his appeal, and of the cause or matter thereof, eight days, at least, before the holding of the Court at which the appeal is to be heard.

Where a notice of appeal was given in time but did not state any "cause or matter" of the appeal:

Held, on a motion for prohibition, that the Judge presiding at the Division Court had no power to allow the notice to be amended.

E. A. Forster, for the plaintiff.

Douglas Armour, for the defendant.

[STREET, J., 30TH NOVEMBER, 1891.

WAIT v. SAGER.

Creditors' Relief Act-R. S. O. c. 65, s, 4, s-s. 3—Sheriff's interpleader -Claim by chattel mortgagee · Claimant abandoning — Rights of claimant under execution subsequently obtained.

Certain goods of the defendant seized by a sheriff under the plaintiffs' execution were claimed by a chattel mortgagee, whereupon an interpleader issue was directed. The goods were sold under the interpleader order by the sheriff, who deducted his fees from the proceeds, and by consent retained the residue in his hands pending the result of the issue, and entered it as held under the Creditors' Relief Act. The claimant never delivered any issue and abandoned the interpleader proceedings. He obtained judgment against the defendant, and about six weeks after the making of the interpleader order placed an execution in the sheriff's hands.

The plaintiffs contended that the claimant should not be allowed to participate as an execution creditor in the proceeds of the goods.

Held, that he should not be barred of his rights as an execution creditor because before he had attained that status he had asserted a right in a different capacity.

Whatever might have been the effect, had his claim been insisted upon, of s. 4, s-s. 3, of the Creditors' Relief Act, R. S. O. c. 65, none should follow the fact that a claim was made and abandoned before it became necessary to contest it.

A. H. Baird, for the plaintiffs.

A. D. Hardy, for the sheriff.
Heyd, for the claimant.

[4TH DECEMBER, 1891.

In re BANK OF OTTAWA v. WADE.

Prohibition-Division Court-Judge reserving judgment without naming day or hour-Prejudice-Consent-Waiver.

Motion by one Gorman, the claimant in an interpleader in the 4th Division Court in the county of Carleton, for prohibition to the County Judge and the clerk of the Court to restrain further action for the enforcing of a judgment in favour of the plaintiffs, on the ground that the Judge had reserved his judgment without fixing a day and hour for delivering it, as required by s. 144 of the Division Courts Act, R. S. O. c. 51.

It appeared that after the conclusion of the evidence the Judge, with the consent of the counsel, adjourned the argument to his Chambers, where it was heard on the 16th May, 1891, the applicant, his solicitor, and the solicitor of the plaintiffs being all present. At the close of the argument the Judge stated to the above persons that he could not then name a time for delivering judgment, but that he would send it to the clerk when it was ready and would notify the counsel. The judgment was delivered to the clerk of the Division Court on the 14th October, and he at once notified the parties by registered letter. The Judge also wrote to the counsel that he had delivered it. On the 26th October the claimant's solicitor wrote to the plaintiffs' solicitor saying, "I have just now received copy judgment herein* The claimant will appeal against the judgment. I must ask you to consent to an extension of one week for the appeal The claimant, in answer to the affidavits in which these facts were set up, merely swore that he never gave any consent to the postponement of the judgment to a future day, but did not otherwise deny the statements in them, nor did his solicitor in the affidavit made by him.

*

*

*

*

The motion was argued before STREET, J., in Chambers on the 1st December, 1891.

C. J. Holman, for the claimant, Gorman.

Aylesworth, Q.C., for the plaintiffs.

Re Tipling v. Cole, 21 O. R. 276; Re McPherson v. McPhee, ib. 280; and before the Divisional Court, ante p. 330; Re McGregor