Held, on appeal, that the plaintiff was estopped from recovery against the defendants by his delay in not notifying them of the forgery of which he had knowledge two years before he brought his action. Barker, Q.C., for the plaintiff. Ex parte BELYEA. Justice of the peace-Summary conviction of the defendant in his absenceHabeas corpus--Adjournment. This was an application to quash a summary conviction for an assault. At the hearing an agent of the applicant appeared bfore the magistrate and stated that the applicant was confined in the gaol of the county, which was situated in the same town at which the case was being tried, and asked the magistrate for a habeas corpus to bring the applicant before his Court. The magistrate said he had no power to grant such a writ, proceeded with the case, and convicted the applicant in his absence. Held, that the magistrate ought to have adjourned his Court to give the applicant an opportunity to appear before him at the trial. C. A. Palmer, Q.C., for the applicant. R. LeB. Tweedie, contra. Ex parte JONES. Canada Temperance Act-"Keeping for sale"-Lease of premises to another -Certiorari. This was an application for a certiorari to quash a conviction for keeping intoxicating liquor for sale contrary to the Canada Temperance Act. At the trial of the charge the applicant, who was a hotel keeper at the town of St. Stephen, put in evidence and proved a lease of the premises to a person in the city of St. John, and also gave evidence that he had been accustomed to pay for liquor. Held, that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction and that the rule to quash the same must be discharged. Mac Monagle, for the applicant. W. C. H. Grimmer, contra. LANTALUM v. OLSEN. Special bail-Delay in proceeding against-Discharge. This was an application to enter an exoneretur on the special bail piece in this case. The defendant had not filed his declaration for seven months after the arrest. Held, that, in view of the above fact, and as the affidavits used did not disclose a bona fide intention on the part of the plaintiff to go on with the suit, the bail were entitled to their release. C. A. Palmer, Q.C., for the plaintiff. J. A. Belyea, for the defendant. HALE v. HILYARD. Costs-Replevin-Trial before sheriff-C. S. c. 37, s. 204. The defendants claimed the property replevied and on the trial before the sheriff of the county and a jury succeeded in their claim. The costs of the sheriff's trial and the jury fees were taxed to the defendants under C. S. c. 37, s. 204. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants were not entitled to these costs and moved to review the taxation. Held, that the successful parties in replevin were entitled to the costs of the proceedings before the sheriff and the expenses of the jury. J. A. Vanwart, Q.C., for the plaintiffs. MANITOBA. En the Queen's Bench. [TAYLOR, C.J., 7TH NOVEMBER, 1891.. In re LAKE WINNIPEG TRANSPORTATION CO. PAULSON'S CLAIM. Company-Winding-up-Claim by servant-Leave to sue company granted under C. S. Man. c. 9, s. 276-Directors. In the winding-up of the above-named company the claimant. made a claim for arrears of wages due to him. The company was incorporated under the Manitoba Joint Stock Companies' Incorporation Act, C. S. c. 9, division 7; s. 276 of which provides that the directors of the company shall be jointly and severally liable to the labourers, servants, and apprentices thereof, for all debts not exceeding one year's wages due for services performed for the company whilst they are such directors respectively; but no director is to be liable in an action therefor unless the company has been sued therefor within one year after the debt became due, nor unless such director is sued within one year from the time within which he ceased to be such director, nor before an execution against the company has been returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part. The claimant asked leave to bring an action against the company, so that, if the execution on any judgment against the company was returned unsatisfied he might proceed to sue the directors. Held, that leave should be given the claimant to proceed with his action against the company, but giving such leave would not preclude the raising of any defence by the directors, should they be sued, which might be open to them. Wade, for the claimant. Mathers, for the liquidator. HAY v. NIXON. Parties-Real Property Act—Parties to issue--Transfer of applicant's interest. Nixon made an application to have a parcel of land brought under the provisions of the Real Property Act and for a certificate of title. In consequence of that application notice was served upon Hay, who thereupon filed a caveat, which he followed up with a petition. Nixon's application to bring the land under the Real Property Act directed the certificate of title for the land to be issued in the name of Whyte. The question was raised who should be plaintiff in the issue, Nixon or Whyte, or whether Whyte should be added as a party and they should both be plaintiffs. Held, that an order should be made adding Whyte as a plaintiff and directing an issue to try whether he was entitled as against Hay, reserving in the usual way the question of costs and all other matters. Clearly Whyte should be a party; for, if the direction given by Nixon was in proper form and regular, it, as soon as filed, transferred all Nixon's interest to him and he alone was entitled to the land. But Nixon was the person who set the proceedings in motion; it was in consequence of the application filed by him and of the notice served at his instance upon Hay that the latter filed the caveat, followed it up with the petition, and incurred costs. Hay was entitled to have him retained as a party so that he might have the benefit of any remedy against him for costs, should the issue be decided in favour of the caveator. C. P. Wilson, for the caveator. Aikins, Q.C., for the caveatee and Whyte. [19TH NOVEMBER, 1891. In re LAKE WINNIPEG TRANSPORTATION CO. Costs-Company-Winding-up-Costs of person appointed to represent creditors. By Rule 59 of the Rules made by the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, on 27th March, 1886, relative to the practice in winding up companies, it is provided that the Court or a Judge may from time to time appoint any one or more of the contributories, or creditors, to represent before him, at the expense of the company or otherwise as it shall seem proper, all or any class of the contributories or creditors upon any question. An order was made under this Rule appointing T. C. & Co. and T. K. & Co. to represent the creditors. Held, that while it might be that the costs of an attendance by the creditors' representative should not be allowed in every matter which came up, he should be liberally dealt with, and his costs should be allowed whenever it was not undoubtedly an unnecessary attendance. The solicitor acting for the representative must exercise a discretion as to the matters upon which he will attend; and where costs should be allowed, it would be well for the Judge to note that at the time, so that difficulties might not afterwards arise on taxation. Mathers, for the liquidator. Darley, for creditors. [26TH NOVEMBER, 1891. In re LAKE WINNIPEG TRANSPORTATION CO. THOMPSON'S CLAIM. Company-Winding up-Privileged claim for costs. Thompson, Codville, & Co., creditors of the above named company, had obtained judgment against the company, and execution was in the sheriff's hands a month before the winding-up order was made. On an application to settle claims and priorities Thompson, Codville, & Co. made a claim. under the Winding-up Act, R. S. C. c. 129, s. 66, that they should be allowed to rank as privileged creditors to the extent of the costs of their judgment and execution. Held, following the former practice in insolvency cases, that the creditors were entitled to priority for their costs of judgment and execution. Darley, for the creditors. Mathers, for the liquidator. |