was also a man of considerable civil experience, of wide statesmanlike views,' and of no small amount of discernment with regard to both men and events. He was for twenty years, intermittently, the chief figure in Canadian life; and his work here is consequently the main feature of what biographers agree in considering a somewhat distinguished career.

3

Personally he was a man of infinitely more dignity than Murray, one who often left with his contemporaries the impression of a somewhat reserved and frigid nature. His self-control may be illustrated by the testimony of an eye witness to one of the most trying events of his life the abandoning of Montreal to the Americans in 1776. His attitude toward the revolution was a most unbending one, and is clearly shown in a letter to Dartmouth during the seige of Montreal, in which he refers to the threatening communication of Montgomery in regard to alleged ill-treatment of American prisoners, and adds, "I shall treat all their threats with a silent contempt, and in this persevere, were I certain of falling into their hands the following week, not thinking myself at liberty to treat otherwise those who are traitors to the King, without His Majesty's express commands." Yet after the remnant of the American force had retreated from the walls of Quebec in the spring of 1776, leaving behind them many sick and wounded ("dispersed in the adjacent woods and parishes"), we find him issuing a proclamation to the local officials to make diligent search for such persons and to afford them all possible relief, reassuring them by the promise that as soon as their health should be restored they would

1 For some acute general remarks on the tendencies of American government, see letter to Shelbourne, Jan. 20, 1768. (Can. Arch., Q. 5-1, p. 370.)

2 Lt. Gov. Hamilton to Dartmouth, Aug. 29, 1776. (Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 212.) Has been "exceedingly struck by the unmoved temper and firmness of the general. Though deserted by the most ungrateful race under the sun, though a general without troops, and at the eve of quitting Montreal to give entrance to lawless rebels his mind appeared unshaken though undoubtedly wrung to the soul."

Can. Arch., Q. 11, p. 267. (Oct. 28, 1775.)

be set at liberty.' In October, 1776, writing to Burgoyne in reference to a recent victory over the rebels, he says that inasmuch as it is over fellow subjects it is no ground for rejoicing. The attitude of Carleton in regard to Burgoyne's expedition throws further honorable light on his character. For though deeply mortified by the slight to himself in the transfer of the command on this occasion to Burgoyne, we have the latter's most emphatic testimony to his zealous and strenuous efforts to make the expedition a success. The traits of Carleton's character which seem to have made most impression upon those who had to do with him in Canada were his justice and impartiality, testimony to these recurring from all quarters. Of a more even and balanced nature than Murray he made neither such bitter enemies nor such warm friends.

Carleton had the great advantage over Murray, so far as his relations with the home government were concerned, of coming to his government more fully and directly informed as to the trend of Imperial views in regard to Canada. The Board of Trade when advising Murray's recall had at length taken the state of the province into consideration, and had drawn up a paper of recommendations with which Carleton was of course conversant. Though nominally Murray's subordinate for the first two years, there was no official relation between the two, and apparently a strained personal one,— the natural consequence of the fact that Carleton really displaced Murray and was supposed to represent an opposite policy. The former has sometimes the air of censuring the conduct of his predecessor, and his first steps on arriving in the province were considered by some to have been dictated by hostility to Murray's friends in the Council. But however this may have been we find that Carleton did not escape the most

1 A promise that was fulfilled, over 1,200 being sent home on parole. See Carleton to Germaine, Aug. 10, 1776. (Can. Arch., Q. 12, p. 135.) For the strongly favorable impression made on these troops by Carleton see Journals of the invaders.

Burgoyne to Germaine, May 14, 1777. (Can. Arch., Q. 13, p. 107.)

disastrous part of his predecessor's policy, the partiality for and dependence upon the noblesse. The men, from birth, character, and training, were essentially imbued with the same prejudices and ideas of government, and Carleton was moreover in a degree bound to even greater consideration of the leading French families, from the fact that he was likely to be entrusted with the carrying out of the policy of preserving the institutions of which they were supposed to be the main support. This supposition he brought with him from England, and I have already frequently referred to the fundamental error (as to the relations between noblesse and people), involved in it. It was an error to which can be traced the main defects and failures of his policy and of its outcome, the Quebec Act. I have above credited Carleton with considerable penetration and judicial ability in regard to men and events; but in this matter his prejudices seem to have lulled his judgment to sleep, and he remained contented with an estimate of the people derived from the small and unprogressive body which was nearest him, and which was now every day becoming more and more detached from the real life of the country. He was, moreover, scarcely more just to the English element or more alive to its growing influence over the Canadians than was Murray. His personal stiffness and aristocratic bearing doubtless stood constantly in his way; and as late as 1788, at the beginning of his second term of office, Mabane, one of the oldest and most experienced of the ex-councillors, writes concerning Carleton's ignorance of men and things in the province, his partiality and his unpopularity.' Hence perhaps it may well be doubted whether, though of much broader views than Murray and infinitely superior to him as an administrator, he was really very much better qualified for this particular period of government. His efforts were fatally marred by his misconceptions of the situation.

1 Can. Arch., B. 77. Mabane, it should be said, had had personal difficulties with Carleton in the early days of the governorship.

Having, like Murray, from the first taken the Canadian noblesse under his protection, one of Carleton's first acts was to follow the example of the French government in providing for them to some extent from the public purse. He lost no time, moreover, in urging on the home government the advisability as a matter of policy of utilizing the services of the class in all departments of the public employ. The mistake as to their influence over the people he seems to have laboured under during the whole period, and it explains sufficiently, (without charging him with undue class or professional prejudice), the deference he always paid to their views and wishes. The first striking letter of Carleton on general policy that we meet with, is that of November 25, 1767,' in answer apparently to information as to a late important action of the Privy Council. In this he starts by saying that he takes it for granted "that the natural rights of men,' the British interests on this continent and the securing the King's dominion over this province must ever be the principal points in view in forming its civil constitution and body of laws;" proceeds to advise the attaching of the seigneurs to British interests, (as above), and finally, after a discussion of military requirements, expresses the opinion that all governmental steps should proceed on the assumption that the present predominance of the French-speaking population will not diminish, but increase and strengthen daily; so that, "barring a catastrophe shocking to think of, this country must to the end of time be peopled by the Canadian race," and any new stock transplanted will be sure to be "totally hid and imperceptible among them." Specific recommendations as to laws he does not enter into, but it is easy to see whither his premises will lead him. Hence we are not surprised to find him a month later recommending in the most definite and decided manner the almost entire reten

1 Rep. Can. Arch., 1888, p. 41.

The use of this phrase here is rather suggestive.

tion of French civil law and custom. In this very important letter (to Shelbourne, December 24, 1767,)' he reminds the minister that the Canadians "are not a migration of Britons, who brought with them the laws of England, but a populous and long-established colony," with its own laws and customs, forced to a conditional capitulation. "All this arrangement in one hour we overturned by the Ordinance of the 17th September, 1764, and laws ill-adapted to the genius of the Canadians, to the situation of the province, and to the interests of Great Britain, unknown and unpublished, were introduced in their stead; a sort of severity if I remember right, never before practiced by any conqueror even where the people without capitulation submitted to his will and discretion." Then, after implying that the above Ordinance is both contrary to the terms of the capitulation and beyond the provincial legislative power, and declaring that it "cannot long remain in force without a general confusion and discontent," he proceeds to advise its repeal and the gradual reinstating of the old Canadian laws almost in their entirety. In accordance with this advice he transmits a draft of an ordinance for doing this in regard to landed property. We see, therefore, that Carleton's mind was fully made up on this subject more than six years before the Quebec Act. His views seem if anything to have become only more firmly fixed during the following years. He frequently re-urges the attaching of the noblesse by employment or by other attentions, his confidence as to their influence over the people apparently remaining undisturbed. But the fact that he was absent from the province for the last four years of the period is to be especially noted; for these years were the most important part of it, being those in which political education would, (through the unavoidable influence of the events in the other colonies), be proceeding at the most rapid rate.

The conceptions and misconceptions of Carleton I have

1 Can. Arch., Q. 5-1, p. 316.