important feature of the Quebec Act,- that withholding of a representative legislative assembly which was evidently considered by the revolutionary fathers as the main feature of the "arbitrary government" they viewed with such apprehension. That such an apprehension on this ground was most natural and reasonable cannot be denied; on the other hand it will appear from our examination that the skirts of the legislators can on this point be even more effectually cleared of guilt than on the others. I have already shown that the fundamental proclamation of 1763 and the later documents by which the civil government was established, promise and presuppose the early institution of a representative body, no notice being taken of the religious difficulties that lay in the way. The whole of the matter at this early stage is one of the strongest proofs of the unconsidered and hasty character of the first steps taken with regard to Canada. In considering the latter phases of it our chief interest lies in the gradual development of English governmental opinion on the point, and in the tracing of the causes which led to the determination of 1774 against representative institutions.

The matter seems to have been first seriously taken up by the Board of Trade in that report of September 2, 1765,1 which I have noticed above as recommending a faint degree of return to the old laws. In regard to an assembly we find in it, as is to be expected, a decidedly favorable tone. It states that "the situation and circumstances of the colony have not hitherto been thought to admit of a House of Representatives," but that the only objection they can find is the difficulty in regard to admitting Catholics as members; a difficulty however which they think might be obviated by such a division of electoral districts as would enable the Catholic electors to choose resident Protestants, there be

1 Can. Arch., B. 8, p. 12.

*For it is to be remarked that the more the English system was abandoned and the French reverted to, the more remote and unfitted would the idea of an Assembly becom

ing no law denying the franchise to Roman Catholics.1 Such a settlement they think would "give great satisfaction to your Majesty's new, as well as natural-born subjects; every object of civil government which the limited powers of the governor and Council cannot extend would be fully answered, and above all that essential and important one of establishing by an equal taxation a permanent and constitutional revenue." This does not seem to us a very liberal provision, but probably in the then state of the laws and of public feeling in England and the colonies, it was thought the extreme limit that could be granted. The statement as to revenue brings to our notice a strong and constant ground for the establishment of representative institutions, the relief that could thereby be most easily afforded to the English taxpayer.

The general course of events subsequent to this report I have considered elsewhere, and it would seem that the recommendations concerning an Assembly were regarded as of subordinate interest, no reference whatever being apparently made to them. The language of the later instructions to Murray and Carleton, and the narrow legislative power to which the Government and Council continued to be restricted, show however that the idea of settled Government without an Assembly had not yet seriously entered the mind of the home authorities. Indeed the careful directions concerning legislation with an Assembly at a time when it was recognized that the future constitution of the Province must be settled soon by Parliamentary enactment would indicate that the calling of an Assembly before that settlement was considered not improbable. The instructions issued to Carleton in 1768 give minute directions for the framing of legislation "when an Assembly shall be summoned and met in such manner as you in your discretion shall think most proper, or as shall be hereafter di

1 Note that this is the idea finally adopted by the British party in Canada.

rected and appointed." They go on however to make more general provisions of such a character as to show that, while there was apparently no thought of withholding an Assembly, the relations with such bodies in the other colonies had inspired the determination to take special precautions in regard to new establishments. A significant article directs that in all enactments, "for the levying of money or imposing fines, forfeiture or penalties, express mention be made that the same is granted or reserved to us . for the public uses of the Province and the support of the Government thereof, . and that a clause be inserted declaring that the money arising by the operation of the said law or Ordinances shall be accounted for unto us in this Kingdom and to our Commission of the Treasury or our High Treasurer for the time being, and audited by our Auditor General." * The 11th Article puts restrictions on legislation of an unusual nature or affecting British commerce, such laws not to go into operation till approved by the Home Government. The 12th, stated in the preamble to be occasioned by the practices of some of the other Provinces, makes provision against the evading, through temporary laws, etc., of the control of the home authorities. The 14th is concerned with the prevention of the assumption of too great privileges by members of the Assembly or Council, (said also to be occasioned by experiences with the other Provinces), and the prevention of self-adjournment of the Assembly, together with a very noticeable clause granting the Council "the like power of framing money bills as the Assembly."

The special import of these provisions will be noticed later. Following up the main inquiry, we find in the Canada Report of Solicitor-General Wedderburn, December, 1772, the next important reference to the subject, and the one which

It is to be noted that a clause of the same tenor as this though not in quite the same language is in the instructions of 1765 to Sir H. Moore, of New York (Colonial Office Records, London).

sets forth most clearly the main ostensible grounds on which the Assembly was finally withheld. His conclusion is that it is at present wholly inexpedient to establish the institution in Quebec; for, although admitting that legislation could be properly attended to only by such a body, he considers the difficulties in its formation too great to be overcome. Into such an Assembly the Roman Catholic French Canadians, in the capacity both of electors and of members, must or must not be admitted. To admit them as members would be a dangerous and unconstitutional experiment, and would lead to inexhaustible dissensions between them and the old subjects; while to exclude them would cause a feeling of inequality, and a fear of being exposed to injustice. On the other hand the question of the franchise was involved in equal difficulties; for the denial of it to the Canadians would leave the Assembly no more representative than a Council, while to extend it to them indiscriminately as landholders would be offensive to the upper class among them, and not beneficial to the lower."

1 It will of course at once occur to the reader that in Granada, seven years before, the experiment had been tried. But, as is shown above (pp. 444-7), the results had not been of a kind to encourage a repetition of it; for government there had been from that date involved thereby in the greatest difficulties, through just such "inexhaustible dissensions" as Wedderbourne must now have had in mind. The conditions further of Canada and Grenada were very different; the difference being of a kind to cause even greater difficulties to be apprehended in the former. The temper of the English party had already been shown. They were however but a very small factor as compared with the mass of the French Canadians; and the British government had therefore to bear in mind not only inevitable dissensions between the two races, but also the imperilling of the safety of the new Province with a discontented English element and a popular House almost entirely French. In Grenada there could be very little danger, and if trouble did arise it would be confined to the Island and could scarcely have dangerous connec tions outside. The use of the word unconstitutional by Wedderbourne shows also perhaps that he had in mind the vigorous attacks made, (it is true on somewhat different grounds), on the Administration for the step in Grenada.

2 In this latter sentence we see the weak point of an otherwise cogent statement. But it is to be remembered that Wedderbourne was preparing his report on information furnished by Carleton, one of the main features of whose policy was to represent the great importance of attaching the noblesse and maintaining them in their imagined influence over the lower classes. The idea as to the privilege of the suffrage not benefiting the people was based on representations as to the ignorance and political incapacity of the latter, and the probability that under representative institutions they would only fall into the hands of demagogues or of English creditors.

On these grounds Wedderbourne advises that instead of an assembly, the legislative power should be granted with. important restraints to a Council considerably enlarged and made more independent of the Governor.

For these opinions the provincial officials were no doubt mainly responsible. Carleton was strongly set against an Assembly, as not adapted to the province and as not desired by the Canadians. Masères also seems to consider a very liberally framed Council the best plan, (a purely Protestant Assembly being manifestly impossible), for some years to come. The latter's advice on this matter to the British party in Quebec is of much interest. Just before the Quebec Bill was introduced he writes to the representatives of the party, (whose agent he was), that he is not yet sure of the sentiments of the Ministry on the point, but conjectures that they are of opinion that the province is not yet ripe for an assembly and are therefore inclined to establish instead a nominated Council with larger powers; that his own opinion is that such a Council would be better for the Province for several years to come than an assembly into which "Papists" should be admitted; that the only objection he sees to a Protestant Assembly is the danger of offending the more numerous Catholics; but that if this difficulty be got over by some compromise, (as by granting the suffrage to the French Canadians), he would be very glad to see an assembly granted, "as indeed I suppose it would in that case be." He proceeds then to advise, as in his opinion likely to be more helpful in the procuring of their object than any other step, that the petitioners should declare that they "conceive the British Parliament to have a complete legislative authority over the Province of Quebec, and that such authority will continue after the establishment of an assembly," and that they are willing "that every member of such future assemblies should be required to recognize the said supreme authority in every article whatsoever both of legislation