erence.

in the Province for their defection to have made any diffAt no time as I have shown, could they have thrown into the scale the weight of more than their own small number. Indeed there is strong reason to believe that if they had embraced the colonial cause, that fact alone would have done much to place the mass of the people on the opposing side.

As to the clergy the same course of argument applies, with the addition of the fact that the church in Canada was convinced of the intolerant temper of the colonists in regard to their religion, and was well aware that at the most it could not hope in that connection for as much as it had enjoyed in Quebec from the conquest. There is no reason whatever to believe that in any event would the clergy in those earlier years have refrained from active opposition to the continental cause.

It must therefore be concluded that the Quebec Act had added no element of strength to the British cause in the Province; that on the contrary, while it had confirmed the allegiance of those whose allegiance needed no confirmation, it had been the main cause of the disaffection of those who otherwise would have been at least quiescent.

B.

The Failure of the American Expeditions.

If the conclusion reached above be correct, we are confronted with a difficulty in the utter failure of the expedition. It might not unreasonably be concluded that such a failure bears strongly against the position I have taken; that if the Canadians were thus so favorably disposed toward the invaders, the utmost vigor and ability on the part of the few British defenders would have been wholly inadequate to the prevention of the definite attachment of the Province to the Revolutionary cause. To answer this objection it will be necessary to view the enterprise from the American side to see if any other factors enter into the situation. Such I think will be found to be the case; it

will be found that not only did the revolutionists fail to make any effective use of the Canadian alliance, but that by the mismanagement and misconduct of both officers and men, the Canadians were from the first impressed with the incapacity of their would-be emancipators, and were gradually driven by actual ill-treatment to neutrality if not to hostility. The favorable moment was let slip and did not return. With the spring of 1776 not only was the British force strengthened to a degree which enforced caution upon the most hostile of the peasantry, but by that time that peasantry had had its revolutionary fervour cooled by treatment as arbitrary and injurious as anything that could be expected from the dreaded revival of the conditions of the old régime. The evidence on this point leaves us wondering, not at the cooling off of the Canadians, but at the retention by them of any degree of respect for or sympathy with the revolutionary cause. That a very considerable degree was retained is shown above, and the fact testifies to the strength of the original feeling; but until the Franco-American alliance it did not again in all probability reach sufficient vigor to afford any likelihood of active manifestation.

It is not my intention to enter upon any full consideration of the invasion of Canada by the Revolutionary forces in 1775-6; full accounts already exist for all parts of this enterprise except for that Canadian side which it is here attempted to supply. The general causes assigned for the failure of the movement are well-known, and it is assumed that sufficient explanation thereof is given under the heads of such apparently unavoidable drawbacks as disease among the troops, short terms of enlistment, lack of ready money. Even if these difficulties had existed in the degree usually stated, it would be rash to assume that the responsibility of the authorities for the disaster is thereby much reduced. But the extent of these obstacles can be shown to have been greatly exaggerated. The degree of disease among

the troops would have been found a comparatively small factor if disease alone had interfered with their efficiency; the lack of specie was at no time a fatal defect. It seems very evident that Congress never made efforts adequate to the degree of importance attached to the enterprise by leading military authorities.' What that degree was is shown by many emphatic utterances. Washington, in his Instructions to Arnold, September 14, 1775, especially impresses upon him that the command is "of the utmost importance to the interest and liberties of America," and that upon it the safety of the whole continent may depend; further adjuring him solemnly to pay every regard to the attitude of the Canadians, "bearing in mind that if they are averse to it, [i. e., the expedition], and will not coöperate, or at least willingly acquiesce, it must fail of success. In this case you are by no means to prosecute the attempt. The expense of the expedition and the disappointment are not to be put in competition with the dangerous consequences which may ensue from irritating them against us, and detaching them from that neutrality which they have adopted. "In the following October, R. H. Lee writes to Washington of the expedition: "The ministerial dependence on Canada is so great that no object can be of greater importance to North America than to defeat them there. It appears to me that we must have that country with us this winter, cost what it may."

2

It has been impossible for me to enter on a close examination of the responsibility of Congress with regard to its earlier insufficient support of the expedition. A severe view will be found expressed in very pointed terms in Lossing's Schuyler (II. 55-7). Congress is there charged with general ignorance as to the military operations, and especially with a failure to apprehend the great importance of the Canadian ones. Its efforts were spasmodic and its promises rarely fulfilled; it replied to reports of the desperate condition of things with indefinite resolutions which sounded like mockery. In the dread of a standing army it had adopted the ruinous policy of short enlistments; persisting in this even when the evil effects had been fully felt. While appreciating the difficulties of the situation, it seems to me that there are very strong grounds for these reproaches. With regard to enlistment, Richard Smith makes the following diary entry of proceedings in Congress January 19, 1776: "A motion that the new troops be inlisted for 3 years or as long as the war shall continue was opposed by the Northern Colonie and carried in the negative." (Amer. Hist. Rev., April, 1896, p. 494.)

24 Amer. Arch., III., 765.

14 Amer. Arch., III. 1137.

And four days later' Washington impresses upon Schuyler, who was about to lead the western part of the force, that "The more I reflect upon the importance of your expedition, the greater is my concern lest it should sink under insuperable difficulties. I look upon the interests and salvation of our bleeding country, in a great degree to depend upon your success. To Arnold in the following January he states that "To whomsover it [i. e., Quebec and in consequence Canada], belongs, in their favour probably will the balance turn. If it is in ours, success, I think, will most certainly crown our virtuous struggles; if it is in theirs, the contest at least will be doubtful, hazardous, and bloody." That Congress shared in this opinion at a later stage at least is shown by a letter from the President to Gen. Thomas, May 24, 1776, in which it is stated that Canada is "an object of the last importance to the welfare of the United Colonies. Should our troops retire before the Enemy and entirely evacuate that Province, it is not in human wisdom to foretell the consequences." On the same day Congress forwarded to the Commissioners in Canada all the hard money it had been able to procure;' sending in addition about three weeks later $20,000 in specie and $190,000 in paper. These funds might earlier have had an important effect that now was impossible; that the main obstacle was not now at least of a financial character may be seen from the statement to Congress by the Commissioners at Montreal, in May, that though there was plenty wheat and flour in the country, "it was with difficulty that either could be procured a few days ago, for ready money." It cannot be questioned of course that the money problem was present from the first, and that it had an important bearing. The journals of the Arnold expedi

14 Amer. Arch. p. 1196 (Oct. 26, 1776).

2 Ibid., IV. 874.

3 Ibid., VI. 558.

4 Ibid., p. 580.

Ibid., p. 587.

tion show that however friendly the Canadians had been at the first contact, they were even then thriftily endeavoring to turn an honest penny from the necessities of the troops;1 insisting in some cases on the immediate payment of hard cash. But this dislike of paper money is easy to understand quite apart from any special distrust of the Americans, if we remember the ruinous experiences of the Province with it under the French régime, and the losses thus experienced since the war in spite of all the efforts of the English Government. However friendly in feeling, the Canadians were not anxious to run much risk either of person or property. But that they did risk something, and that the failure of ready money alone would not have seemed to them a fatal drawback, is very evident. The American force could not have existed in amity a month if the Canadians had not accepted promises, written and spoken, in lieu of hard cash; it was not until even these promises had failed and past ones had been disgracefully repudiated, that in combination with other matters, the financial element became serious. February 21, 1776, Wooster informs the President of Congress that he should soon, in the absence of specie, be forced to "lay the country under contribution; there is no other alternative. We have not by us one half money enough to answer the pressing demands of the country people to whom we are indebted."3 About a week later (March 4), Arnold issued a Proclamation giving paper money currency, "declaring those enemies who refuse it." "Many (he says), received it willingly, but the greater part were averse to taking it." The supply even of paper was however apparently soon exhausted, and we hear of the inhabitants being forced to accept receipts for services or supplies in the

1 See especially Wild's Journal (Nov. 5, 1775), Dearborne's (Nov. 6), Thayer's (Nov. 5). * See on this subject the paper by Mr. Breckenridge in the Chicago Journal of Political Economy June, 1893, pp. 406–31.

$4 Amer. Arch., IV. 1470.

Arnold to Deane, Ibid., V. 549.