Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session ...
United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976 - 416 من الصفحات
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action agree amendment American Answer appropriate approval argument arrangements Assistant authority believe bill Chairman clause Committee concerning concluded concurrent resolution conduct Congress congressional consent considered Constitution consultation cooperation decisions delegation Department disapproval discussion effect enacted enter established example executive agreements executive branch exercise fact force foreign affairs foreign policy Foreign Relations framers give hearings House important independent intent international agreements involved issue Justice kind language legislative legislative veto LEIGH limited matter means ment military national commitment necessary negotiation Office particular passed practice present President Presidential prior problem procedure Professor proposed pursuant question reason referred regulation Representatives require respect responsibility Scalia seems Senate separation of powers specific statement statute Subcommittee submitted suggested tion treaty United veto vote ZABLOCKI
الصفحة 413 - The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
الصفحة 4 - For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section — (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die ; and (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the 60-day period.
الصفحة 213 - In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation.
الصفحة 306 - He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands.
الصفحة 31 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
الصفحة 108 - TITLE I Sec. 101. In order to carry out the policies and accomplish the objectives set forth in section 2 of this Act, the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies.
الصفحة 244 - President by an exertion of legislative power; but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations...
الصفحة 410 - Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days...
الصفحة 34 - It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.