proceeded against employer for penalties for an unfenced fly-wheel. This was on July 22, for an offence that had taken place July 1. The employer argued that in March the inspector had also found it not properly secure, and that as he had not then summoned him he was out of time, as proceedings had to be taken within three months from the date of the offence. This ingenious plea failed." Taking this view of the law in Baddeley v. Granville, 19 Q. B. D. 423, Mr. Justice Wills held a breach of statutory obligation evidence of negligence (m); and more, that where there was a breach of such obligation the maxim Injuria non fit volenti did not apply, and knowledge of the servant was not a defence, and further he expressed his opinion that even an express contract by a servant with his master not to hold him liable for a breach of statutory requirements would be void as against public policy. However, as Britton v. G. W. Cotton Co. has been followed by the case of Groves and Winborne, (1898) 2 Q. B. 402, and the recent case of Britannic Merthyr Coal Co. v. David, (1910) A. C. 74, we may take it that breach of statutory duties, at any rate in regard to matters the subject of this work, will subject the employer to the same liabilities as any other act of actionable negligence. As regards this last case, it is not as satisfactory an exposition of the law as it might be. In a strong judgment, Lord Halsbury gives good reasons on the facts for supporting the decision of the Court of Appeal, but, as he adds:-" Yet, though I am agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the majority of the Court of Appeal, I am by no means prepared to adopt the reasoning by which that conclusion is arrived at. Indeed, it is not too much to say that I dissent from some of the propositions involved in that judgment." Therefore, whilst the facts decided may afford an analogy to guide us in similar cases, we cannot congratulate ourselves on having principles laid down which are particularly illuminating. (m) See also Blamires v. L. & Y. R., L. R. 8 Ex. 283, where the failure to adopt precautions approved by the Legislature was held evidence of negligence. As to the weight and extent of such evidence see Gorris v. Scott, L. R. 9 Ex. 125. As regards third parties, see Lankaster v. Miller, 4 B. W. C. C. 80. BOOK THE SECOND. THE LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS UNDER THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 1880. 43 & 44 VICT. C. 42. CHAPTER II. THE ACT IN DETAIL (a). AN ACT to extend and regulate the liability of employers to make compensation for personal injuries suffered by workmen in their service. (7th Sept., 1880.) Be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons in this present Parliament assembled and by the authority of the same as follows: Section 1. Where after the commencement of this Amendment. Act personal injury is caused to a workman (b) (1.) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer; or (a) Act in extenso, Appendix F. (b) See cases in sect. 8, p. 60, as to who are workmen, &c. of law. Sect. 1. Exceptions to (2.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has any superintendence entrusted to him whilst in the exercise of such superintendence; or (3.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman at the time of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform where such injury resulted from his having so conformed; or (4.) By reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer done or made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that behalf; or (5.) By reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway; the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal personal representatives of the workman, and any person entitled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer nor engaged in his work. Section 2.-A workman shall not be entitled under this Act to any right of compensation or remedy against the employer in any of the following cases; that is to say, (1.) Under sub-sect. 1 of sect. 1, unless the defect therein mentioned arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer, or of some person in the service of the employer, and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were Sect. 2. proper condition. in (2.) Under sub-sect. 4 of sect. 1, unless the injury resulted from some impropriety or defect in the rules, bye-laws, or instructions therein mentioned; provided that where a rule or bye-law has been approved or has been accepted as a proper rule or bye-law by one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, or by the Board of Trade or any other department of the Government under or by virtue of any Act of Parliament, it shall not be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be an improper or defective rule or bye-law. (3.) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which caused his injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give or cause to be given information thereof to the employer or some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or such superior already knew of the said defect or negligence. General effect. The effect of the above sect. 1, as qualified by sect. 2, is in the Sects. I and 2. cases to which it applies to negative the doctrine of common employment before discussed, and the implied contract on the part of the servant to take the known risks of the employment. It has been held, Griffiths v. Dudley (Earl of), 9 Q. B. D. 357, that it does not apply to express contracts, and that it is neither contrary to the Act nor against public policy for a workman to contract himself out of the benefit of the Act. Such contracts need not be in writing, and may be gathered from notices, &c. posted about the buildings, provided they have been brought to the workmen's knowledge before engagement, Carus v. Eastwood, 32 L. T. N. S. 855. If a workman so contracts himself out of the Act his representatives, in case of his death, will be equally bound, Griffiths v. Dudley (supra). If the workman be an infant there will be the |