To these arguments have been replied: If a regular employment is to be considered of a casual nature because the class of employment to which it belongs is held to be so, where are we to draw the line? Is a man regularly employed the whole of his time cleaning the windows of, say, a large country mansion, to be excluded from the Act, and, if not, on what principle is he to be excepted if he only gives half his time, or a day a week, or even half a day? Then, further, arises the almost insuperable difficulty of classifying employments of a casual nature, to say nothing of the added difficulty that the same employment may be carried on under different conditions in different localities.

But against these difficulties, hypothetical difficulties and other difficulties that might be enumerated, to say nothing of the vast field of fact to be inquired into to determine such employment even in one's own district, we have the express words of the Act, and the actual facts of the case itself. These incline one to the view that it was never intended that in the case of a casual (I use the word deliberately, and, as I believe, in its popular and generally received meaning) employment like that of cleaning windows for a householder, even if once a fortnight, that such householder should incur liabilities running into hundreds of pounds.

To find otherwise is practically to rob this exception in the definition of workman of all significance, and to deprive people in their domestic life of an exemption and a protection the law intended them to have.

Finding thus as to liability, it is unnecessary for me to inquire into the equally difficult question of quantum.

My judgment must therefore be for the respondent with costs, and I shall award accordingly.

County Court Judge's Award.

Heading as in Application.

Having duly considered the matter entrusted to me,

I do hereby make my award as follows:

I award and find-

(1) That the employment of the above-named A.B. was not an employment to which the Act applies.

(2) That the employment was of a casual nature, and that the deceased was employed otherwise than for the purposes of the respondent's trade or business, and I do order that the applicant do recover nothing from the respondent.

And I do order that the applicant do pay to the registrar of this Court, for the use of the respondent, his costs of and incidental to this agreement, such costs, in default of agreement between the parties as to the amount thereof, to be taxed by the registrar under column "C" of the scale of costs in use in the County Court, and to be paid by the applicant to the registrar within fourteen days from the date of his certificate of the result of such taxation. Dated the 27th day of May, 19

Applicant's Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeal.

In the Court of Appeal.

No. of Matter,

In the Matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906,

and

In the Matter of an Arbitration.

Between E.F. (widow), administratrix of A.B., deceased

C.D.

and

Take notice that this Court will be moved at the expiration of fourteen days from the service of this notice, or so soon thereafter as the counsel can be heard, by counsel on behalf of the above-named applicant that the award herein of his Honour Judge dated the 27th day of May, 19, made in favour of the respondent may be set aside, and that in lieu thereof an award may be made in favour of the applicant for 2731., or for such compensation as may be just, or in the alternative that the matter may be sent back to the judge for him to assess the said compensation; and that the respondent may be ordered to pay the costs of the arbitration and the costs of this appeal.

And further take notice that the grounds of this application are that the judge was wrong in law in deciding

(1) that the employment of A.B. was not an employment to which the Act applies;

(2) that the employment was of a casual nature, and that the deceased was employed otherwise than for the purpose of the respondent's trade or business;

And further that the judge was wrong in law--

(3) in directing himself that the fact of employment being regular was not inconsistent with its also being of a casual nature. Dated the 14th day of June,

Y.Z.,

Applicant's Solicitor,

To the above-named Respondent
and to X. his Solicitor.

61, Lady Street, Ludtown.

NOTE.

For simplicity, to keep to one clear point, and to avoid the innumerable ramifications leading out of a case simple as this, I have made several facts agreed which in an actual contest would be better fought out by the respondent.

It is a great mistake to tie one's hands, so that one could not take every point in a higher Court, and one should not too readily dispense with any favourable evidence, because the judge in the first instance is with you, and does not require to hear you further.

Had this case been a real one, it would have illustrated the danger of abandoning any good point through relying too implicitly on what for the time proved a winning one. The respondent ought to have been in the position to have given notice of cross appeal on the ground-(a) there was no evidence that the

adoption of the trading name of the "Universal Window Cleaning Company" by the deceased was a colourable device to evade the Act; (b) that in law there was nothing to prevent a man trading as an independent contractor, even if its express end was to escape being within the Act.

This case illustrates the danger of agreeing too many facts.

Appeal heard and dismissed.

Friday, the 26th day of October, 19

No order taken up by the respondent (u).

Order ultimately taken up by the applicants on their intending to appeal to the House of Lords.

In the Matter of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. In the Matter of an Arbitration in the County Court of

holden

Upon reading the notice of appeal on behalf of the applicant, dated the 14th day of June, 19 and the judge's notes hereon, and upon hearing counsel on both sides. It is ordered that the award of his Honour Judge the judge of the County Court of holden at made in

the matter of this arbitration, the 27th day of May last, in favour of the respondent, do stand, and this appeal be dismissed with costs, to be paid by the said applicant to the said respondent or his solicitor, such costs, if necessary, to be taxed by the Master of the Crown Office.

(a) Application should have been made for security for costs (p. 617).

The Humble Petition and Appeal of E.F., of 281, Lower Brick Street, Ludtown, widow and administratrix of A.B., deceased. YOUR PETITIONER humbly prays that the matter of the order of the Court of Appeal set forth in the schedule hereto may be reviewed before His Majesty the King in his Court of Parliament, and that the said order may be reversed, varied or altered, and that the petitioner may have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King in his Court of Parliament may seem meet; and that the respondent C.D., mentioned in the schedule to the appeal, may be ordered to lodge such printed case as they may be advised and the circumstances of the cause may require in answer to this appeal, and that service of such order on the solicitors in the cause of the said respondent may be deemed good service.

In the Matter of an application under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, 1906, wherein E.F. was applicant and C.D. was respondent.

The order of the Court of Appeal (England) dated the 26th day of October, 19 appealed from is in the words following:

(Here set out Order as already given.)

The award, the appeal from which was by the said order dismissed, is an award of the County Court Judge of in the words following:

(Here set out Award as already given.)

We humbly conceive this to be a proper case to be heard before your Lordships by way of appeal.

Signed by two Counsel

N

T

ZE

1. This is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Appeal (England), Appendix, made on the 26th day of October, 19 dismissing, with costs, an appeal by p. 22. E.F. against an award of the judge of the County Court of holden at Appendix, dated the 27th day of May, 19, in an arbitration under the pp. 5, 6. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, in which the appellant was applicant and the respondent was respondent.

2. The appellant is the widow and administratrix of A.B., deceased, who was at the time of his decease a window cleaner and in the employment of