Housing of Working Classes : House Closed for Human Habitation under Byelaw-Subsequent Where a local authority, in pursuance of a byelaw, have made an order closing a building unfit for human habitation, and prohibiting its use for such habitation, they are not precluded, even if the building remained closed, from subsequently taking proceedings to obtain a closing order under the Housing of the Working Classes Acts, 1890 & 1903, in respect of the same premises. Slight v. Portsmouth Corporation (K. B. D., 9 May, 1906), 95 L. T. 356; 70 J. P. 359; 4 L. G. R. 635. Premises consisting of Separate Cubicles and of Dining Rooms, &c., used in common-Liability to Inhabited House Duty-Housing of Working Classes Act, 1890, Part III.; Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1890, s. 26 (2); Revenue Act, 1903, s. 11 (1). Premises erected by the London County Council under Part III. of the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 70), for the purpose of providing accommodation for men of the working classes, consisted of 343 separate sleeping rooms or cubicles arranged on three upper landings round a central hall or covered yard, together with reading and dining-rooms, scullery, lavatories, baths and wash-houses, catering department, offices, quarters for superintendent and staff. A charge of 6d. a night was made for each sleeping room and use of the other apartments and offices except the quarters for superintendent and staff, and many of the occupants had used the same cubicle for several years continuously. Certain rules and regulations were made for the management of the premises. Held that the separate cubicles were not separate dwelling-houses within the meaning of section 26 (2) of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 8), and section 11 (1) of the Revenue Act, 1903, (3 Edw. 7, c. 46), and that the premises were therefore not exempt from inhabited house duty. London County Council v. Cook (K. B. D., 8 Dec., 1905), [1906] 1 K. B. 278; 75 L. J. K. B. 187; 93 L. T. 836 ; 54 W. R. 403; 70 J. P. 105; 4 L. G. R. 153; 22 T. L. R. 125. Income Tax-see "Sewers and Drains." Legal Proceedings:-see also "Borrowing," "Fire Engines,” · Highways (1) (2) (3),” “ Motor Cars," " Pollution of Rivers," "Rates and Rating (1) (3),” ""Sale of Food and Drugs Acts,” "Unsound Food," 29 66 Weights and Measures." Case stated by Justices-Copy sent to Respondent's Solicitors and Service accepted by them-No Written Notice of Appeal-Jurisdiction to Entertain Appeal-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857, s. 2. When after hearing and determination by the justices of any دو information or complaint a case is on application to the justices stated and signed by them, the applicant is, by section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 43), required within 3 days after receiving the case to transmit the same to the High Court," first giving notice in writing of such appeal with a copy of the case to the respondent. A copy of such a case was sent tc the respondents' solicitors who endorsed it "we accept service hereof on behalf of the respondents"; and no express notice of the appeal was given. Held that the appeal could not be heard in the absence of written notice. Rust v. St. Botolph, Bishopsgate, Churchwardens and Overseers (K. B. D., 17 Jan., 1906), 94 L. T., 575. Limitation of Actions-see" Fire Engines," "Highways (1)." Loan- -see "Borrowing." Manorial Market-Extent of Franchise-Dedication of Neu From time immemorial the lord of the manor of Stepney had helc a market in High Street, Whitechapel, in that manor. At some time subsequent to 1840 two adjoining streets not used for market purposes were widened under a local Act, and in 1870 a further street, entirely new, was made in the neighbourhood under another local Act. The local Acts did not mention the market rights, but the market was in fact held in these adjoining streets shortly after they were widened and made, as well as in High Street, and certain tramway Acts contained provisions preventing the companies interfering with the right of salesmen to place market carts in the several streets during market hours. Held that these facts justified a presumption (a) that the lord's market franchise extended to the whole manor; and (b) that the widened and new streets were dedicated to the public subject to the exercise of that franchise. DE RUTZEN v. LLOYD (1836) (5 Ad. & E. 456, 459) and ATTORNEYGENERAL V. HORNER (1885) (14 Q. B. D. 245; 11 A: C. 66) applied. Gingell, Son & Foskett, Ltd., v. Stepney Borough Council (K. B. D., 10 July, 1906), [1906] 2 K. B. 468; 75 L. J. K. B. 777; 95 L. T. 146; 70 J. P. 503 ; 4 L. G. R. 1092; 22 T. L. R. 688. Motor Cars: —see also “Streets :—(3) Miscellaneous,” Driving at Speed " Dangerous to Public, having regard to all the The driver of a motor car was convicted before justices under section (1) of the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36), of Motor Cars—continued. driving the car on a certain public highway at a speed which was "dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case." At the hearing of an appeal to the quarter sessions evidence was given by the respondent as to the traffic "which might reasonably be expected to be on the highway," although the admission of any evidence as to hypothetical traffic was objected to by the appellant on the ground that there was no reference to such traffic in the conviction. Held that the evidence was properly admitted. Elwes v. Hopkins (K. B. D., 26 April, 1906), [1906] 2 K. B. 1; 75 L. J. K. B. 450; 94 L. T. 547; 70 J. P. 262; 4 L. G. R. 615. Driving at Speed Dangerous to Public--Summons stating "the same being his Second Offence"-Evidence-Conviction--Motor Car Act, 1903, S. 1 (1). A driver of a motor car was summonsed for driving “at a speed which was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the same being his second offence," and this was read out in court before the justices. Two constables also mentioned that the driver's licence was endorsed, and on these statements being objected to, the chairman cancelled a note he had made, and said the court would take no notice of them. Held that the conviction was good, there having been no reception of evidence which was inadmissible. Cholerton v. Copping (K.B.D., 2 May, 1906), 70 J.P. 484. Limit of Speed--Opinion of One Witness-Evidence of Police- Section 9(1) of the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 35), provides that a person shall not be convicted "for exceeding the limit of speed of 20 miles merely on the opinion of one witness as to the rate of speed." Where a police-sergeant had stationed a constable at a distance from him of a quarter of a mile, and on a signal from the constable that a motor-car was passing the point, the sergeant started his stop watch, and on the car passing him he stopped the watch, and found the time registered to be 31 2-5 seconds. Held that as the sergeant was thus able to state with certainty at what rate the car travelled, there was evidence of fact (and not mere evidence of opinion) on which the justices were entitled, on the evidence of the sergeant alone, to come to a conclusion that the driver of the motorcar ought to be convicted. Plancq v. Marks (K. B. D., 4 March, 216; 4 L. G. R. 503 ; 22 T. L. R. 432. 1906), 94 L. T. 577 ; 70 J. P. Limit of Speed-Refusal of Owner to give Driver's Name and According to the evidence of the police the driver of a motor-car had exceeded the statutory limit of speed and they wrote to the owner of the car for the driver's name and address stating that proceedings would be taken against the driver under section 9 of the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36). The owner did not give the driver's name and address, and an information having been laid against him under section 1 (3) of the Act, was convicted and fined. The conviction did not allege that the driver had committed any offence under section 1 or that the driver had refused his name and address. Held that the conviction was bad as it did not sufficiently allege that the driver had committed an offence under section 1. REX V. HANKEY' ([1905] 2 K B. 687) followed. Rex v. Chancellor; ex parte Hassall (K. B. D., 2 Aug., 1905), 69 J. P. 383; 3 L. G. R. 1012. Speed over Ascertained Distance-Evidence as to Person Driving -Sufficiency of Notice of Intended Prosecution-Motor Car Act, 1903, s. 9 (2). Two constables were stationed at the seventh milestone and two other constables at the third milestone from St. Albans, A motor car traversed the distance between the milestones at the rate of 28 miles an hour, and at the latter milestone, when the car was stopped, the defendant, who was the owner, was driving, and his chauffeur was sitting by his side. The defendant gave no evidence. A notice under section 9 (2) of the Motor Car Act, 1903 (3 Edw. 7, c. 36), of the intention to prosecute, alleged that the defendant committed the offence between Markyate and St. Albans, which are from 10 to 20 miles apart. Held that there was evidence that the defendant was driving the whole way and that the notice of the intended prosecution was sufficient. Beresford v. St. Albans Justices (K. B. D., 24 Oct., 1905), 22 T. L. R. 1. Municipal Corporation :-see also "Borrowing," "Streets :-(3) Miscellaneous.” Proceedings of Borough Council-Consent to Bill in Parliament-Public Duties of Council-Motion for Injunction-Intervention of Attorney-General. A burgess of a borough moved an injunction to restrain the council from giving a consent to any bill in Parliament to authorise the laying down of a tramway within the borough, alleging that the resolution of the council had not been properly passed. Held that the motion must be dismissed, inasmuch as the action, which sought to compel the town council to perform its public duties in a particular way, was one to which the Attorney-General must be a party. EVAN v. AVON CORPORATION (1860) (30 L. J. Ch. 165; 29 Beav. 144) followed. Watson v. Hythe Corporation (Ch. D., 27 Jan., 1906), 70 J. P. 153; 4 L. G. R. 340; 22 T. L. R. 245. 1 See Law and Legislation, 1905, p. 113. New Buildings-see" Byelaws." 66 Nuisances:-see also "Byelaws," "Pollution of Rivers," Sewers and Drains." Pollution of Foreshore by Sewage-Damage to Oyster Beds- Plaintiff was entitled to deposit oysters on a certain part of the foreshore and take them up, and claimed a right to a several fishery. A sewage outfall of the defendants in the neighbourhood of his oyster-beds delivered sewage and water polluted with sewage on to the foreshore and into the water near the beds so as to contaminate the beds, and to cause the oysters therein to become infected and unfit for human food. The sewer was made in 1874 by the rural sanitary authority to whom the defendants succeeded under an Order made in 1894. There was little evidence of such a use of the sewer in 1882 as would have injured the plaintiff; but between 1892 and 1902 the amount of sewage brought down was very largely increased, and there was a change in its quality and time and method of discharge, and additions were made to the sewer itself by the defendants. Held that an action was maintainable by the plaintiff, as he was in occupation of the oyster beds, and that the defendants had no right at common law or by prescription to discharge sewage into the sea so as to cause a nuisance, and having by their acts of commission caused such discharge were liable to the plaintiff in damages GLOSSOP v. HESTON AND ISLEWORTH LOCAL BOARD (1879) (12 Ch. D. 102; 49 L. J. Ch. 89) and ATTORNEY-GENERAL 7'. DORKING GUARDIANS (1881) (20 Ch. D. 595; 51 L. J. Ch. 585) distinguished. Appeal from Chancery Division' (1905) (69 J. P. 42) dismissed. Foster v. Warblington Urban District Council (2 April, 1906), [1906] 1 K. B. 648; 75 L. J. K. B. 514; 94 L. T. 876; 54 W. R. 575; 70 J. P. 233; 4 L. G. R. 735; 22 T. L. R. 421 Pollution of Foreshore by Sewage-Damage to Oyster Beds- A corporation discharged crude sewage into the sea and caused the pollution of the plaintiff's oyster beds to such an extent as to constitute a public nuisance. Held that the corporation were not entitled at common law to discharge the sewage in such a way that it reached the plaintiff's land, and upon the principle of RYLANDS v. FLETCHER (1868) (3 H. L. 330; 33 J. P. 70) and the decisions upon which that case was founded, the corporation must keep their noxious matter from trespassing upon their neighbour's land. Held further that no right had been conferred upon the corporation by statute to discharge the sewage as they did, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an See Law and Legislation, 1905, p. 114. |