"It is indeed a mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a person, for certain purposes, in contemplation of law, and has been recognized as such by the decisions of this ing & Ky. Rd. Co. v. Benwood Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710, 2 L. R. A. 680, 8 S. E. 453, 5 R. R. & Corp. L. J. 324. As to right of corporations to exercise power of eminent domain, see the following cases: United States: Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Southern R. Co., 89 Fed. 190. Georgia: Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Min. Co., 119 Ga. 354, 46 S. E. 422; Gardner v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co., 117 Ga. 522, 43 S. E. 863. Kansas: Dillon v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 67 Kan. 687, 74 Pac. 251. Illinois: Aurora & G. R. Co. v. Harvey, 178 Ill. 477, 53 N. E. 331. Louisiana: Lawrence v. Morgan's Louisiana & Tex. R. & S. Co., 39 La. Ann. 427, 2 So. 69. Montana: State v. District Court of Tenth Judicial Dist. of Meagher County, 34 Mont. 535, 88 Pac. 44. Nebraska: State, Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Scott, 22 Neb. 628, 36 N. W. 121. Ohio: Ohio State v. Toledo Ry. & Terminal Co., 28 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 321. Pennsylvania: See Philadelphia M. & S. St. Ry. Co., In re, 203 Pa. 354, 53 Atl. 191. New York: East Canada Creek Elect. Light & Power Co., In re, 99 N. Y. S. Supp. 109, 49 Misc. 565. Virginia: Zircle v. Southern Ry. Co. (Va.), 45 S. E. 802. Washington: State v. CentraliaChehalis Elect. Ry. & Power Co., 42 Wash. 632, 85 Pac. 344. Corporation cannot disable itself from performance of its public duties or neglect or refuse to perform them, or arbitrarily discontinue operations as in case of a railroad or street railway or other quasi-public company. United States: Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 35 L. ed. 55, 11 Sup. Ct. 478, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 607, 9 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 342, 43 Alb. L. J. 328; Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore, 130 U. S. 396, 397, 32 L. ed. 788, 9 Sup. Ct. 389; Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co., 101 U, S. 71, 83, 84, per Miller, J.; M'Cutcheon v. Merx Capsule Co., 71 Fed. 787, 793, per Lurton, C. J. Connecticut: Driscoll v. Norwich & Worcester Rd. Co., 65 Conn. 230, 32 Atl. 354. Illinois: Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 121 Ill. 530, 13 N. E. 169, per Magruder, J.; Balsley v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Rd. Co., 119 Ill. 68, 72, 73, 8 N. E. 859; Peoria & Rock Island Ry. Co. v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 68 Ill. 489. Nebraska: Chollette v. Omaha & Republican Valley Rd. Co., 26 Neb. 159, 4 L. R. A. 135, 41 N. W. 1106. New Jersey: State, Bridgeton v. Bridgeton & M. Traction Co., 62 N. J. L. 592, 43 Atl. 715, 45 L. R. A. 837. 76 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (38 U. S.) 519, 588, 10 L. ed. 274. When corporations are and are not persons, see the following cases: § 65. To What Extent Corporations Are "Persons " Under Statutes. If it is within the intent and meaning of a statute that the word "person" should include corporations it will undoubtedly be so held, thus the term "any person or persons" in a crimes statute relating to the destruction of a vessel extends to corporations and bodies politic as well as to natural persons.77 And unless excepted they are also included in the word "persons" in statutes as to grants and conveyances of property.78 If a statute relating to priority of payment by any person insolvent specially designates the class intended, it does not include a trading corporation not so specified." So corporations are to be deemed and considered persons within the act of Congress, 1797, giving a priority of debts to the United States.80 They are also persons under Pennsylvania: Lehigh Bridge v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 4 Rawle California: Douglas v. Pacific Mail Georgia: London v. Coleman, 59 Indiana: White v. State, 69 Ind. 273. Kentucky: Louisville, City of, v. Commonwealth, 1 Duer (62 Ky.), 295, 85 Am. Dec. 624. Louisiana: Factors & Traders Ins. Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co., 37 La. Ann. 233; Jeffries v. Belleville Iron Works Co., 15 La. Ann. 19. Massachusetts: Proprietors of Jeffries Neck Pasture v. Ipswich, 153 Mass. 42, 26 N. E. 239. Virginia: Miller v. Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. (Va.) 110; Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 26 Gratt. (Va.) 1. Wisconsin: Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351. 77 United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.) 392, 6 L. ed. 502. See cases in note to § 64, herein. "The word 'person' when used in this act, includes an individual and a firm or copartnership." Public Service Commissions Law of N. Y., Laws 1907, chap. 429, art. 1, § 2. Commonwealth is not a person under a covenant by grantor to defend title Nebraska: Chapman v. Brewer, 43 in deed to shore and tideland botNeb. 890. tom. Feurer v. Stewart, 83 Fed. 793. New York: La Farge v. Exchange Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 352; State v. Woram, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 33. Ohio: Norris v. State, 25 Ohio St. 217, 18 Am. Rep. 291; State v. Cincinnati Fertilizer Co., 24 Ohio St. 611. 78 State v. Nashville University, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 157. 79 Commonwealth v. Phoenix Bank, 11 Met. 129. 80 Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 102, 9 L. ed. 1017. taxation statutes; 81 and are also within a law providing for attachments.82 § 66. Corporations as "Persons" Under Constitution of United States. Again, corporations are persons within the meaning of the clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States concerning the deprivation of property and concerning the equal protection of the laws.83 It is held, however, within this amendment of the Constitution, that "due process of law" protects natural and not artificial persons in their "liberty." " 84 § 67. Corporations as "Citizens" for Federal Jurisdic 81 People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 382, 8 Am. Dec. 243; International Life Ins. Co. v. Commr. of Taxes, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 318. Is an individual under a tax law. Otis Co. v. Ware, 8 Gray (Mass.), 509. 82 Planters' & M. Bank v. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404; Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep, 22 Ill. 9. 83 United States: Smyth v. Eames, 169 U. S. 466, 522, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. 418; Covington & Lex. Turnpike R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 592, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. 198; Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Rd. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. 255, 35 L. ed. 1051, 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 595, aff'g s. c., 27 S. C. 385, 4 S. E. 49; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585, 17 Wash. L. Rep. 34, 39 Alb. L. J. 166, 5 R. R. & Corp. L. J. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 207; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 32 L. ed. 107; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, 32 L. ed. 109; Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. 737, 31 L. ed. 65; Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, Fed. Cas. No. 10,336. California: Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co., 127 Cal. 4, 59 Pac. 304. Iowa: McGuire v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. (Iowa), 108 N. W. 902. Maine: Hammond Beef & P. Co. v. Best, 91 Me. 431, 40 Atl. 338. Ohio: Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 655, 658, 1 Ohio Dec. 390. Tennessee: Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S. W. 115. See Lake Shore & Mich. Southern Ry. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 690, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. 565; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 259, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 43 L. ed. 432; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154, 17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L. ed. 666. Compare State v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 18 R. I. 16, 25 Atl. 49; Central Pac. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 60 Cal. 35. 84 Western Turf Assn. v. Greenburg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. 384, aff'g 148 Cal. 126, 82 Pac. 684. See Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co. v. Lightheiser, 168 Ind. 438, 78 N. E. 1033. tional Purposes-Not "Citizens" Under Constitution of United States.-Corporations are for purposes of jurisdiction in the Federal courts conclusively presumed to be citizens of the State in which created.85 And a national bank is held, in an early case in Nevada, to be for jurisdictional purposes, a citizen of the State wherein it is located.86 Corporations are 85 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 224, 41 L. ed. 965, 17 Sup. Ct. 604, per Brewer, J. See St. Louis, City of, v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (78 U. S.) 423, 20 L. ed. 192; §§ 52, 53, herein. 8 Davis v. Cooke, 9 Nev. 134. The court, per Belknap, J., said: "It is urged by respondent in justification of the ruling of the District Court upon defendant's motion for removal that as the First National Bank of Nevada was incorporated under an act of the Congress of the United States it is a citizen of the United States, and cannot be treated as a citizen of this State for jurisdictional purposes. This question was thoroughly investigated by Judge Blatchford in the case of the Manufacturers' National Bank v. Banck, 2 Abb. (U.S.) 232. The various provisions, in respect to the 'location' of banking associations incorporated under the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, entitled, 'An act to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof,' are there discussed. By the sixth section of the act it is provided that the persons uniting to form a banking association under the act shall specify in an organization certificate the place where its operations of discount and deposit are to be carried on, designating the State, territory or district, and also the particular county and city, town or village. And by the eighth section it is provided that its usual business shall be transacted at an office or banking house located at the place specified in its organization certificate. The ninth section provides that the affairs of such banking association shall be managed by a board of directors, at least three-fourths of whom shall have resided in the State, territory or district in which such association is located one year next preceding their election as directors, and be residents of the same during their continuance in office. Further sections speak of the place where the association is 'located' and 'established.' 'It is quite apparent from all of these statutory provisions,' says Judge Blatchford, 'that Congress regards a national banking association as being "located" at the place specified in its organization certificate. If such place is a place in a State, the association is located in the State. It is, indeed, located at but one place in the State; but when it is so located, it is regarded as located in the State. The requirement that at least threefourths of the directors of the association shall be residents, during their continuance in office, in the State in which the association is located, especially indicates an intention on the part of Congress to regard the association as belonging to such State. Three-fourths of the legal representatives of the unknown associates forming the corporation, with which repre not, however, citizens within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, under that clause which provides that the sentatives any person dealing with the corporation must deal, are required to reside in the State where the corporation is "located." A corporation existing by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States must be considered a citizen of the United States. But a citizen of the United States, resident in any State in the Union, is a citizen of that State, Gassies v. Ballou, 6 Pet. (31 U. S.) 761, 8 L. ed. 573. The residence of the National Bank being in Nevada, it follows that it is a citizen of Nevada." See also Cooke v. State National Bank of Boston, 52 N. Y. 96, to the same point where the court, per Church, Ch. J., also says: "As an original question, it seems clear that the residence and citizenship of a corporation should be determined without regard to the residence of its corporators. No valid reason is perceived for applying the presumption, or, if applied, it furnishes no ground for the doctrine that the suit is by the corporators in their personal capacity. Although they have an interest in the suit, they are not parties in any legal sense, and their interests are merged in the corporate body. But I cannot agree with the counsel for the plaintiff, that if the doctrine of presumption is to be maintained it would not apply to these banking associations. Their location and place of business are fixed by the law of their creation. They are made inhabitants of States for the purposes of taxation, and a majority of their managing officers are required by law to reside in the States of their respective location. I see no reason why this artificial presumption should not as well apply to them as if incorporated by state authority, especially as in this case where a state bank by virtue of the statute was transmuted from a state to a national bank. The day before the change it is admitted that the presumption would apply, while the day after it is insisted that it would not, although the change was in form only, and not in substance. Independent of this presumption, these banks should be deemed citizens of the States where by law they are located, within this clause of the constitution, and this does not impair the decisions in this State, holding that they are foreign corporations under our attachments laws, although located here, because these decisions are based upon the statutory definition of foreign corporations." See in this connection, Blake v. McClung, at end of note to this section; Chatham National Bank of New York v. Merchants' National Bank of West Virginia, 4 Thomp. & Cook (N. Y.), 196. At the present time under the Removal Statute (Acts of Congress, Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 508, 509) a suit between citizens of different States may be removed to the Federal court though neither party is a resident of the State in which the suit is brought. Examine the following cases: Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552, 43 L. ed. 1081, 19 Sup. Ct. 817; Memphis & Charleston R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 2 Sup. Ct. 432, 27 L. ed. 518; Foulk v. Gray (U. S. C. C.), 120 Fed. 156; |