agitation of the mind, as a literary controversy, a law-suit, a contested election, and, above all, gaming; the passion for which, in men of fortune and liberal minds, is only to be accounted for on this principle.

THIRDLY: Neither does happiness consist in greatness, rank, or elevated station.

The pleasure of success is exquisite; so also is
the anxiety of the pursuit, and the pain of disap-
pointment;-and what is the worst part of the
account, the pleasure is short-lived.
We soon
cease to look back upon those whom we have left
behind; new contests are engaged in; new pros-
pects unfold themselves; a succession of struggles
is kept up, whilst there is a rival left within the
compass of our views and profession; and when
there is none, the pleasure with the pursuit is at
an end.

II. We have seen what happiness does not consist in. We are next to consider in what it does consist.

And

Were it true that all superiority afforded pleasure, it would follow, that by how much we were the greater, that is, the more persons we were superior to, in the same proportion, so far as depended upon this cause, we should be the happier; but so it is, that no superiority yields any satisfaction, save that which we possess or obtain over those with whom we immediately compare our- In the conduct of life, the great matter is, to selves. The shepherd perceives no pleasure in know beforehand, what will please us, and what his superiority over his dog; the farmer, in his pleasure will hold out. So far as we know this, superiority over the shepherd; the lord, in his our choice will be justified by the event. superiority over the farmer; nor the king, lastly, this knowledge is more scarce and difficult than in his superiority over the lord. Superiority, at first sight it may seem to be: for sometimes, where there is no competition, is seldom contem- pleasures, which are wonderfully alluring and plated; what most men are quite unconscious of flattering in the prospect, turn out in the possession But if the same shepherd can run, fight, or extremely insipid; or do not hold out as we exwrestle better than the peasants of his village; if pected: at other times, pleasures start up which the farmer can show better cattle, if he keep a never entered into our calculation; and which we better horse, or be supposed to have a longer purse, might have missed of by not foreseeing:—whence than any farmer in the hundred; if the lord have we have reason to believe, that we actually do miss more interest in an election, greater favour at of many pleasures from the same cause. I say, to court, a better house, or a larger estate than any know beforehand;" for, after the experiment is nobleman in the country; if the king possess a tried, it is commonly impracticable to retreat or more extensive territory, a more powerful fleet or change; beside that shifting and changing is apt army, a more splendid establishment, more loyal to generate a habit of restlessness, which is desubjects, or more weight and authority in adjust-structive of the happiness of every condition. ing the affairs of nations, than any prince in Europe; in all these cases, the parties feel an actual satisfaction in their superiority.

Now the conclusion that follows from hence is this; that the pleasures of ambition, which are supposed to be peculiar to high stations, are in reality common to all conditions. The farrier who shoes a horse better, and who is in greater request for his skill, than any man within ten miles of him, possesses, for all that I can see, the delight of distinction and of excelling, as truly and substantially as the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, who have filled Europe with the reputation of their wisdom, their valour, or their knowledge.

No superiority appears to be of any account, but superiority over a rival. This, it is manifest, may exist wherever rivalships do; and rivalships fall out amongst men of all ranks and degrees. The object of emulation, the dignity or magnitude of this object, makes no difference; as it is not what either possesses that constitutes the pleasure, but what one possesses more than the other.

Philosophy smiles at the contempt with which the rich and great speak of the petty strifes and competitions of the poor; not reflecting that these strifes and competitions are just as reasonable as their own, and the pleasure, which success affords, the same.

66

By the reason of the original diversity of taste, capacity, and constitution, observable in the human species, and the still greater variety, which habit and fashion have introduced in these particulars, it is impossible to propose any plan of happiness, which will succeed to all, or any method of life which is universally eligible or practicable.

All that can be said is, that there remains a presumption in favour of those conditions of life, in which men generally appear most cheerful and contented. For though the apparent happiness of mankind be not always a true measure of their real happiness, it is the best measure we have.

Taking this for my guide, I am inclined to believe that happiness consists,

I. In the exercise of the social affections.

Those persons commonly possess good spirits, who have about them many objects of affection and endearment, as wife, children, kindred, friends. And to the want of these may be imputed the peevishness of monks, and of such as lead a monastic life.

Of the same nature with the indulgence of our domestic affections, and equally refreshing to the spirits, is the pleasure which results from acts of bounty and beneficence, exercised either in giving money, or imparting to those who want it, the assistance of our skill and profession.

Another main article of human happiness is, Our position is, that happiness does not consist II. The exercise of our faculties, either of body in greatness. And this position we make out by or mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end. showing, that even what are supposed to be pecu- It seems to be true, that no plenitude of present liar advantages of greatness, the pleasures of am- gratifications can make the possessor happy for a bition and superiority, are in reality common to continuance, unless he have something in reserve, all conditions. But whether the pursuits of am--something to hope for, and look forward to.bition be ever wise, whether they contribute more This I conclude to be the case, from comparing to the happiness or misery of the pursuers, is a the alacrity and spirits of men who are engaged different question; and a question concerning in any pursuit which interests them, with the dewhich we may be allowed to entertain great doubt.jection and ennui of almost all, who are either

born to so much that they want nothing more, or who have used up their satisfactions too soon, and drained the sources of them.

It is this intolerable vacuity of mind, which carries the rich and great to the horse-course and the gaming-table; and often engages them in contests and pursuits, of which the success bears no proportion to the solicitude and expense with which it is sought. An election for a disputed borough shall cost the parties twenty or thirty thousand pounds each, to say nothing of the anxiety, humiliation, and fatigue, of the canvass; when, a seat in the house of commons, of exactly the same value, may be had for a tenth part of the money, and with no trouble. I do not mention this to blame the rich and great (perhaps they cannot do better,) but in confirmation of what I have advanced.

or business before us, we are commonly happy, whatever the object or business be; when the mind is absent, and the thoughts are wandering to something else than what is passing in the place in which we are, we are often miserable. III. Happiness depends upon the prudent constitution of the habits.

The art in which the secret of human happiness in a great measure consists, is to set the habits in such a manner, that every change may be a change for the better. The habits themselves are much the same; for, whatever is made habitual, becomes smooth, and easy, and nearly indifferent. The return to an old habit is likewise easy, whatever the habit be. Therefore the advantage is with those habits which allow of an indulgence in the deviation from them. The luxurious receive no greater pleasures from their dainties, than the peasant does from his bread and cheese: but the peasant, whenever he goes abroad, finds a feast; whereas the epicure must be well entertained, to escape disgust. Those who spend every day at cards, and those who go every day to plough,

Hope, which thus appears to be of so much importance to our happiness, is of two kinds;where there is something to be done towards attaining the object of our hope, and where there is nothing to be done. The first alone is of any value; the latter being apt to corrupt into impa-pass their time much alike: intent upon what tience, having no power but to sit still and wait, which soon grows tiresome.

The doctrine delivered under this head, may be readily admitted; but how to provide ourselves with a succession of pleasurable engagements, is the difficulty. This requires two things: judgment in the choice of ends adapted to our opportunities; and a command of imagination, so as to be able, when the judgment has made choice of an end, to transfer a pleasure to the means: after which, the end may be forgotten as soon as we will.

Hence those pleasures are most valuable, not which are most exquisite in the fruition, but which are most productive of engagement and activity in the pursuit.

they are about, wanting nothing, regretting nothing, they are both for the time in a state of ease: but then, whatever suspends the occupation of the card-player, distresses him; whereas to the labourer, every interruption is a refreshment: and this appears in the different effects that Sunday produces upon the two, which proves a day of recreation to the one, but a lamentable burthen to the other. The man who has learned to live alone, feels his spirits enlivened whenever he enters into company, and takes his leave without regret; another, who has long been accustomed to a crowd, or continual successsion of company, experiences in company no elevation of spirits, nor any greater satisfaction, than what the man of a retired life finds in his chimney-corner. So far their conditions are equal; but let a change of place, fortune, or situation, separate the companion from his circle, his visitors, his club, common-room, or coffee-house; and the difference and advantage in the choice and constitution of the two habits will show itself. Solitude comes to the one, clothed with melancholy; to the other, it brings liberty and quiet. You will see the one fretful and restless, at a loss how to dispose of his time, till the hour come round when he may forget himself in

A man who is in earnest in his endeavours after the happiness of a future state, has, in this respect, an advantage over all the world: for, he has constantly before his eyes an object of supreme importance, productive of perpetual engagement and activity, and of which the pursuit (which can be said of no pursuit besides) lasts him to his life's end. Yet even he must have many ends, besides the far end: but then they will conduct to that, be subordinate, and in some way or other capable of being referred to that, and derive their satisfac-bed; the other easy and satisfied, taking up his tion, or an addition of satisfaction, from that.

Engagement is every thing: the more significant, however, our engagements are, the better: such as the planning of laws, institutions, manufactures, charities, improvements, public works; and the endeavouring, by our interest, address, solicitations, and activity, to carry them into effect; or, upon a smaller scale, the procuring of a maintenance and fortune for our families by a course of industry and application to our callings, which forms and gives motion to the common occupations of life; training up a child; prosecuting a scheme for his future establishment; making ourselves masters of a language or a science; improving or managing an estate; labouring after a piece of preferment; and, lastly, any engagement, which is innocent, is better than none; as the writing of a book, the building of a house, the laying out of a garden, the digging of a fish-pond, even the raising of a cucumber or a tulip.

Whilst our minds are taken up with the objects
E

book or his pipe, as soon as he finds himself alone; ready to admit any little amusement that casts up, or to turn his hands and attention to the first business that presents itself; or content, without either, to sit still, and let his train of thought glide indolently through his brain, without much use, perhaps, or pleasure, but without hankering after any thing better, and without irritation. A reader, who has inured himself to books of science and argumentation, if a novel, a well-written pamphlet, an article of news, a narrative of a curious voyage, or a journal of a traveller, fall in his way, sits down to the repast with relish; enjoys his entertainment while it lasts, and can return, when it is over, to his graver reading, without distaste. Another, with whom nothing will go down but works of humour and pleasantry, or whose curiosity must be interested by perpetual novelty, will consume a bookseller's window in half a forenoon; during which time he is rather in search of diversion than diverted; and as books to his taste are

(

So far as circumstances of fortune conduce to happiness, it is not the income which any man possesses, but the increase of income, that affords the pleasure. Two persons, of whom one begins with a hundred, and advances his income to a thousand pounds a year, and the other sets off with a thousand and dwindles down to a hundred, may, in the course of their time, have the receipt and spending of the same sum of money: yet their satisfaction, so far as fortune is concerned in it, will be very different; the series and sum total of their incomes being the same, it makes a wide difference at which end they begin.

IV. Happiness consists in health.

By health I understand, as well freedom from bodily distempers, as that tranquillity, firmness, and alacrity of mind, which we call good spirits; and which may properly enough be included in our notion of health, as depending commonly upon the same causes, and yielding to the same management, as our bodily constitution.

| Benevolence proposes good ends; prudence suggests the best means of attaining them; fortitude enables us to encounter the difficulties, dangers, and discouragements, which stand in our way in the pursuit of these ends; temperance repels and overcomes the passions that obstruct it. Benevolence, for instance, prompts us to undertake the cause of an oppressed orphan; prudence suggests the best means of going about it; fortitude enables us to confront the danger, and bear up against the loss, disgrace, or repulse, that may attend our undertaking; and temperance keeps under the love of money, of ease, or amusement, which might divert us from it.

Virtue is distinguished by others into two branches only, prudence and benevolence: prudence, attention to our own interest; benevolence, to that of our fellow-creatures: both directed to the same end, the increase of happiness in nature; and taking equal concern in the future as in the present.

The four CARDINAL virtues are, prudence, for titude, temperance and justice.

But the division of virtue, to which we are in modern times most accustomed, is into duties;Towards God; as piety, reverence, resignation, gratitude, &c.

Towards other men (or relative duties;) as justice, charity, fidelity, loyalty, &c.

Towards ourselves; as chastity, sobriety, tem

Health, in this sense, is the one thing needful. Therefore no pains, expense, self-denial, or restraint, to which we subject ourselves for the sake of health, is too much. Whether it require us to relinquish lucrative situations, to abstain from favourite indulgences, to control intemperate pas-perance, preservation of life, care of health, &c. sions, or undergo tedious regimens; whatever difficulties it lays us under, a man, who pursues his happiness rationally and resolutely, will be content to submit.

When we are in perfect health and spirits, we feel in ourselves a happiness independent of any particular outward gratification whatever, and of which we can give no account. This is an enjoyment which the Deity has annexed to life; and it probably constitutes, in a great measure, the happiness of infants and brutes, especially of the lower and sedentary orders of animals, as of oysters, periwinkles, and the like; for which I have sometimes been at a loss to find out amusement.

The above account of human happiness will justify the two following conclusions, which, although found in most books of morality, have seldom, I think, been supported by any sufficient

reasons:

FIRST, That happiness is pretty equally distributed amongst the different orders of civil society:

SECONDLY, That vice has no advantage over virtue, even with respect to this world's happi

ness.

CHAPTER VII.
Virtue.

VIRTUE is "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."

According to which definition, "the good of mankind" is the subject; the "will of God," the rule; and "everlasting happiness," the motive, of human virtue.

More of these distinctions have been proposed, which it is not worth while to set down.

I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulation of human conduct; unconnected indeed with each other, but very worthy of attention; and which fall as properly under the title of this chapter as of any future one.

I. Mankind act more from habit than reflec

tion.

It is on few only and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of pre-established habit. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigences of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is oftentimes little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man, who has to reason about his duty, when the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an

error.

If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits; Where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, in the forming and contracting of these habits.

And hence results a rule of life of considerable importance, viz. that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit. We will explain ourselves by an example or two: -A beggar, with the appearance of extreme disVirtue has been divided by some moralists into tress, asks our charity. If we come to argue the benevolence, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. | matter, whether the distress be real, whether it be

not brought upon himself, whether it be of public | advertency; of a prompt obedience to the judgadvantage to admit such application, whether it be ment occurring, or of yielding to the first impulse not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether of passion; of extending our views to the future, it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether or of resting upon the present; of apprehending, the money can be well spared, or might not be methodising, reasoning; of indolence and dilatoribetter applied; when these considerations are put ness; of vanity, self-conceit, melancholy, partiality; together, it may appear very doubtful, whether we of fretfulness, suspicion, captiousness; censoriousought or ought not to give any thing. But when ness; of pride, ambition, covetousness; of overwe reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites reaching, intriguing, projecting; in a word, there our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the is not a quality or function, either of body or mind, utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tender- which does not feel the influence of this great law ness of mind; that it is a quality, cherished by of animated nature. indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition; when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner's; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.

II. The Christian religion hath not ascertained the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation.

This has been made an objection to Christianity; but without reason. For as all revelation, however imparted originally, must be transmitted by A man of confirmed good habits, will act in the ordinary vehicle of language, it behoves those the same manner without any consideration at all. who make the objection, to show that any form of This may serve for one instance; another is the words could be devised, that might express this following:-A man has been brought up from his quantity; or that it is possible to constitute a intancy with a dread of lying. An occasion pre- standard of moral attainments, accommodated to sents itself where, at the expense of a little vera- the almost infinite diversity which subsists in the city, he may divert his company, set off his own capacities and opportunities of different men. wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage It seems most agreeable to our conceptions of the partiality of all about him. This is not a justice, and is consonant enough to the language small temptation. And when he looks at the of scripture,* to suppose, that there are prepared other side of the question, he sees no mischief that for us rewards and punishments, of all possible can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any degrees, from the most exalted happiness down to man's reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to extreme misery; so that "our labour is never in any man's interest. Were there nothing further vain;" whatever advancement we make in virtue, to be considered, it would be difficult to show why we procure a proportionable accession of future a man under such circumstances might not in-happiness; as, on the other hand, every accumudulge his humour. But when he reflects that his lation of vice is the "treasuring up so much wrath scruples about lying have hitherto preserved him against the day of wrath." It has been said, that free from this vice; that occasions like the present it can never be a just economy of Providence, to will return, where the inducement may be equally admit one part of mankind into heaven, and constrong, but the indulgence much less innocent; demn the other to hell; since there must be very that his scruples will wear away by a few trans- little to choose, between the worst man who is gressions, and leave him subject to one of the received into heaven, and the best who is excluded. meanest and most pernicious of all bad habits,-a And how know we, it might be answered, but that habit of lying, whenever it will serve his turn: there may be as little to choose in the conditions? when all this, I say, is considered, a wise man will forego the present, or a much greater pleasure, rather than lay the foundation of a character so vicious and contemptible.

Without entering into a detail of Scripture morality, which would anticipate our subject, the following general positions may be advanced, I think, with safety.

There needs no other proof of this, than the consideration, that a brute would be as proper an object of reward as such a man, and that, if the case were so, the penal sanctions of religion could

From what has been said, may be explained 1. That a state of happiness is not to be expectalso the nature of habitual virtue. By the defi-ed by those who are conscious of no moral or nition of virtue, placed at the beginning of this religious rule: I mean those who cannot with chapter, it appears, that the good of mankind is truth say, that they have been prompted to one the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlast-action, or withholden from one gratification, by ing happiness the motive and end, of all virtue. any regard to virtue or religion, either immediate Yet, in fact, a man shall perform many an act of or habitual. virtue without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thought. How is this to be understood? In the same manner as that a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious, at every turn, of a particular regard to his master's will, or of an express attention to his master's interest: indeed, your best old servants are of this sort: but then he must have served for a length of time under the actual direction of these motives, to bring to this: in which service, his merit and virtue consist.

There are habits, not only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of some other things, which are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and called so: but of every modification of action, speech, and thought. Man is a bundle of habits.

There are habits of industry, attention, vigilance,

*"He which soweth sparingly, shall reap also spar ingly; and he which soweth bountifully, shall reap also bountifully" 2 Cor. ix. 6.-" And that servant which did according to his will, shail be beaten with many knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither stripes; but he that knew not, shall be beaten with few stripes." Luke xii. 47, 48.-"Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ; verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward;" to wit, intimating that there is in reserve a proportionable reward for even the smallest act of virtue. Mark ix. 41.-See also the parable of the pounds, Luke xix. 16, &c.; where he whose pound had gained ten pounds, was placed over ten cities: and he whose pound had gained five pounds, was placed over five cities.

have no place.
you make such a one as this happy or rather
indeed, religion itself, both natural and revealed,
would cease to have either use or authority.

By

2. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those, who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any one sin, or neglect of one known duty.

For, whom would you punish, if | peared doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject,
whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He
can have no doubt, that it is lawful for him to let
it alone. Here therefore is a case, in which one
side is doubtful, and the other side safe.
virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue
the safe side, that is, to forbear from offering
violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon
his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

Because, no obedience can proceed upon proper
motives, which is not universal, that is, which is
not directed to every command of God alike, as
they all stand upon the same authority.
Because such an allowance would, in effect,
amount to a toleration of every vice in the world.
And because the strain of Scripture language
excludes any such hope. When our duties are
recited, they are put collectively, that is, as all and
every one of them required in the Christian cha-
racter. "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue
knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to
temperance patience, and to patience godliness,
and to godliness brotherly kindness, and to
brotherly kindness charity."* On the other hand,
when vices are enumerated, they are put disjunc-
tively, that is, as separately and severally exclud-
ing the sinner from heaven. "Neither fornicators,
nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor
abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves,
nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor ex-
tortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of heaven."+

Those texts of Scripture, which seem to lean a contrary way, as that "charity shall cover the multitude of sins;" that "he which converteth a sinner from the error of his way, shall hide a multitude of sins;"s cannot, I think, for the reasons above mentioned, be ex

It is prudent, you allow, to take the safe side. But our observation means something more. We assert that the action concerning which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, or to another, would, in us, whilst this doubt remains upon our minds, be certainly sinful. The case is expressly so adjudged by St. Paul, with whose authority we will for the present rest contented. "I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean.Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth; and he that doubteth, is damned (condemned) if he eat; for whatsoever is not of faith (i. e. not done with a full persuasion of the lawfulness of it) is sin."*

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.

CHAPTER I.

tended to sins deliberately, habitually, and ob- The question Why am I obliged to keep my

stinately persisted in.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

This is expressly laid down by Christ, in the parable of the talents, which supersedes all further reasoning upon the subject. Then he which had received one talent, came and said, Lord, I knew thee that thou art an austere man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed: and I was afraid, and hid thy talent in the earth; lo, there thou hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest, (or, knewest thou?) that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed; thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents; for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath and cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."

III. In every question of conduct, where one side is doubtful, and the other safe; we are bound

to take the safe side.

word?' considered.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is right, says one.-Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another.— Because it is conformable to reason and nature, says a third.-Because it is conformable to truth, says a fourth.-Because it promotes the public good, says a fifth-Because it is required by the will of God, concludes a sixth.

Upon which different accounts, two things are observable:

So

FIRST, that they all ultimately coincide. The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness: the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for example, produce happiness, and others misery; reason is the principle by which we discover or judge of this constitution: truth is this judgment, expressed or drawn out into propositions. that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness on the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth; and such (as will appear by and bye,) is the Divine character, that what promotes the general happiness, is required by the will of God; and what has all the above properties, must needs be right; for, right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

And this is the reason that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, com* Rom. xiv. 14, 22, 23.