III.

There is a regular sequence of events in the action of inanimate upon animate bodies, where the vital principle is active.

That there is the same sequence of events by the action of inanimate upon animate bodies, where the vital principle is active, is obvious. If any person doubt this, let him put his hand into the fire, and his doubt will be removed. It is thus we see that there is a regular sequence of events by the action of inanimate upon animate bodies, whether the vital principle is dormant or active.

IV.

There is the same sequence of events in the action of animate bodies upon each other, of mind upon mind.

To excite jealousy in Othello, Iago proceeded with as much regularity as the husbandman in sowing his seed, and his harvest was as certain.

Iago. I will in Cassio's lodging lose this napkin
And let him find it. Trifles light as air

Are to the jealous confirmations strong
As proofs of holy writ.

He proceeded in his fiendish plan step by step, and, administering from time to time fuel to the passion which he had excited, he calculated with confidence upon events succeeding according to his wishes, and his calculations were correct.

The handkerchief acted with as much certainty upon the mind of Othello as a magnet upon a needle, and it ended in the murder of his wife and his suicide.

A party of Europeans landed in New South Wales, and sat down under a tree, near a creek, and were preparing with spirits of wine to warm their food. At the moment when they were about to enjoy this intended refreshment, they were suddenly surprised by a party of the natives, who, in a canoe, had crossed the creek and were approaching in a warlike attitude. The captain of the Europeans instantly put a light to the spirits of wine and, at its sudden blaze, he held up the light as if to burn the creek;-the savages instantly retreated.

It appears, therefore, that there is the same sequence of events in the action of mind upon mind.

It has been supposed that there is not the same certainty in the sequence of events in the animate as in the inanimate world: that, although the loadstone will invariably attract a needle, the same motive will not invariably generate action in a human being. Of the truth of this position no doubt can be entertained. The question is, what inference is to be deduced from it? and the answer is easy.

In inanimate nature, the agent and patient continue the same for centuries. Man is con

stantly varying both from himself and from other men. He varies from himself at every period of his life, from the infant, the school-boy with shining morning face, the lover, the soldier, the justice, the slippered pantaloon. That he varies from other men, who can doubt? Perhaps no two beings differ more from each other than two human beings. How different are men of different nations: the Spaniard, the Frenchman, the Italian, the Englishman, the Scotchman, the Irishman; or men in the same country, as Quakers, Presbyterians, Catholics, Protestants.

There is, therefore, the same obedience to causes, the same necessity in the action of human beings as in the action of inanimate bodies, the same in man as in a magnet; and consequently the words free will are without meaning, or with a meaning seldom rightly understood: and the opinion expressed in the celebrated lines of the poet

"And binding nature fast in fate,

Left free the human will,"

is unintelligible jargon.

Such is the regular sequence of events through all nature, animate and inanimate. This is what we mean by cause and effect. We give the name of cause to the object which we believe to be the invariable antecedent of a particular change; we give the name of effect to that invariable conse→ quent.

The most important results flow from this sequence of events.

I.

All the order and happiness in the world depends upon the regular sequence of events.

If I give food to the hungry man, it is in the regular course of events that it should nourish him, and it thus contributes to his happiness. The farmer sows the field, because he foresees that in regular order, after the expiration of a certain term, a crop will arise. When the harvest arrives he reaps the grain, because he foresees, that in regular order, he shall be able to sell his corn when he takes it into the market. If I engage a labourer, he expects that, in the regular course of events, I shall pay him his wages. The idea of moral discipline proceeds entirely upon this principle. If I carefully persuade, exhort, and exhibit motives to another, it is because I believe that motives have a tendency to influence his conduct. If I reward or punish him, either with a view to his own improvement, or as an example to others, it is because I believe that rewards and punishments are calculated to affect the dispositions and practices of mankind.*

The blessings which will result from the regular

*Godwin.

sequence of events, will be evident by a moment's consideration of the misery attendant upon an interruption of this regularity. Suppose, for instance, that, calculating upon the nutritious effect of food, it was to have the effect of poison, or that sugar had the effect of arsenic, or that fire instead of exhilarating by a genial warmth, had the violent effects of gunpowder, or that at the moment of attack gunpowder ceased to be inflammable, is it not obvious what misery would result?

There is not anything new in this doctrine. It has been inculcated from the earliest period by all teachers of truth. "Since the time," says Hooker, "that God did first proclaim the edicts of his law upon the world, heaven and earth have hearkened unto his voice, and their labours have been to do his will. He made a law for the rain he gave his decree unto the sea that the waters should not pass his commandment. Now if nature should intermit her course and leave altogether, though it were for a while, the observation of her own laws: if those principal and mother elements of the world, whereof all things in this lower world are made, should lose the qualities which now they have; if the frame of that heavenly arch erected over our heads, should loosen and dissolve itself; if the celestial spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubility turn themselves any way as it