the thickness of a goose quill, came through a covered glass tube in the roof, and down through the well of the staircase, the lower end connected with the iron spear of a lamp. On the staircase opposite to my chamber door the wire was divided, the ends separated about six inches, a little bell on each end, and between the bells a little brass ball, suspended by a silk thread, to play between and strike the bells, when clouds passed with electricity in them." Thus the philosopher searches for the true cause, and, if he fail in the discovery, he does not despair, but rests content with the conviction that, sooner or later, it will be made. He knows that land exists, although he is surrounded by sea. "I have held up a light" said Lord Bacon, "in the obscurity of philosophy, which will be seen centuries after I am dead." V. Intelligence looks through the immediate to the remote cause "It looks through nature up to nature's God." The philosopher who discovered the immediate cause of lightning was not unmindful of the power which "dwelleth in thick darkness and sendeth out lightnings like arrows." The philosopher who discovered the immediate cause of the rainbow, raised his thoughts to Him, "who placeth his bow in the heavens. Very beautiful is it in the brightness thereof, and the hand of the Almighty hath bended it." When a vessel is carried away by a torrent; when a hurricane carries before it all the trees of the forest; when lightning strikes the cottage, the immediate cause of the calamity is obvious, and with this ignorance is content; not so intelligence. "Who is it that causes the river to rise in the high mountains and to empty itself into the ocean? who is it that causes to blow the loud winds of .winter, and that calms them again in the summer? who is it that raises up the shade of the lofty forests, and blasts them with the lightning at his pleasure." Such are the meditations of intelligence. So true is the admonition of Lord Bacon, "It is an assured truth and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves unto the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but, when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of providence, then according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair.” Such, then, is the nature of knowledge, or the understanding the properties of creatures, and the names by which they are called; or, in other words, the knowledge of Cause and Effect. § 2. KNOWLEDGE HOW ACQUIRED. Knowledge is acquired by three modes, 1st. By our senses, as by putting a finger in the fire, &c. 2ndly. By the communication of others, as a parent informs his child that an adder or a rattlesnake will bite and that their bite is venomous; or that a lamb is mild, and an hyæna savage. 3rdly. By our own reasoning upon impressions made by either or both of these different modes; as Newton, when the apple fell upon his head, inquired into the cause of this falling body, and whether from the same cause the planets do not revolve in their orbits; or as Bacon, when he heard sweet music, said, "Is this species of pleasure confined to the ear? does not the quavering upon a stop in music give the same delight to the ear that the playing of light upon the water, or the sparkling of a diamond, gives to the eye? 'Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus." " 4thly. As our opinions are formed by the separate action of our senses, of the communication of others, or our own reasoning, it is obvious that they may be formed by the joint action of all, or any two of these causes, as Browne, in his Religio Medici, when speaking of his religious sentiments, says, "For my religion, though there be several circumstances that might persuade the world I have none at all, as the general scandal of my profession, the natural course of my studies, the indifferency of my discourse and behaviour in matters of religion, neither violently defending one nor with common ardour or contention opposing another, yet in despight hereof I dare without usurpation assume the honourable style of a christian: not that I merely owe this title to the font, my education, or clime wherein I was born, as being bred up either to confirm those principles my parents instilled into my unwary understanding, or by a general consent proceed in the religion of my country; but having in my riper years and confirmed judgment seen and examined all, I find myself obliged, by the principles of grace and the law of mine own reason, to embrace no other name than this. Neither doth herein my zeal so far make me forget the general charity I owe unto humanity, as rather to hate than pity Turks, Infidels, and Jews, rather contenting myself to enjoy that happy style than maligning those who refuse so glorious a title. But because |