Opinion of the Court. closure sale there was collusion between Buckner the surety, and Hall the administrator, yet the testimony wholly fails to substantiate the claim. The specific charge is, that when the property was offered for sale, a bid from a reliable party was made of thirty thousand dollars, a sum which would have paid off the mortgage debts, and left money enough in the estate of Mrs. Hall to have paid all the debts of her estate, including the obligation, assumed by her as part of the consideration for the Mounds plantation, to pay the debts of the estate of King; that notwithstanding this advantageous bid, Hall bid thirty-one thousand dollars without having the means of making good such bid, and in collusion with Buckner, for the purpose of preventing a sale; that, failing to make good his bid, the sale was first postponed by order of Buckner's attorney, and thereafter stayed by an injunction suit brought by Montgomery and Delony, the other sureties on the bond, and all for the purpose of enabling Buckner to finally acquire title to the plantation at less than its real value. The facts are, as developed by the testimony, that there was no collusion between Buckner and Hall, and no understanding between them in reference to the property; that the foreclosure suits of Aivey & Co. and Buckner were perfectly proper proceedings for the collection of their debts, commenced only after default in payment of interest and principal, and prosecuted in the ordinary way, without undue haste. At the first sale, and that was before Buckner had commenced his foreclosure suit, it is true that the bidding was as alleged; yet Hall's bid was made on his own responsibility, without suggestion from Buckner, and upon what proved to be an unjustifiable expectation that he could arrange with Aivey & Co., or some other parties, for securing the money on the property. When the second sale took place, Buckner was the highest bidder; and this sale was made after the ordinary advertisement, and under no circumstances of oppression or wrong. So far as respects the delay in the sale, caused by the injunction proceedings, it is enough to say that Buckner had nothing to do with that; and, of course, cannot be held responsible for anything that resulted therefrom. The party who had made the Opinion of the Court. bid of thirty thousand dollars at the first sale, on further examination of the property, and in view of the change of circumstances, did not care to enter into competition at the second sale; and so the property was sold for only twenty-two thousand dollars, an amount which was all absorbed in the mortgage debts. It must also be borne in mind that the foreclosure proceedings were public and judicial; that no party to those proceedings owed any duty in respect thereto to the complainants; and if the mortgage property was worth more than the mortgage debts, and if they had any interest in having it realize its full value, it was their right and duty to attend the sale, and either bid themselves the full value or secure others to make such bid. So, concluding this branch of the case, it is clear that the complainants, as heirs, by withdrawing this property from the custody of the administrator, released him and his sureties from further responsibility in respect to it; that the subsequent taking possession of this property by the administrator, as executor and devisee of Mrs. Hall, the purchaser from the heirs, did not restore the liability of the sureties on his bond; that any wrong practised by him in reference to the property thereafter, was a personal wrong, and one for which his sureties were not responsible; that the foreclosure proceedings were fairly conducted; and that the ill result which followed from Hall's excessive and unfulfilled bid was not the result of any collusion or agreement between him and the surety Buckner, and therefore was not an ill result for which Buckner, as purchaser at the last sale, can be held responsible. In respect to this branch of the case, therefore, the ruling was properly against the complainants. Passing to the other, it is nothing but an action at law on an administrator's bond, to recover the value of property unnecessarily and improperly sold by him, and damages which resulted from such sale. It is, in no proper sense, a bill for an accounting. It distinctly charges that the administrator twice wrongfully sold the overflow lands; that the complainants succeeded in having the first sale set aside, on the payment of $1200 to the purchasers; that they had no notice of the Opinion of the Court. second sale, and hence were unable to contest it; and they, therefore, seek to recover the value of the land thus improperly and finally sold, and the $1200 which they had to pay on account of the first sale. But, waiving any question as to whether this branch of the case was improperly joined with that in which a trust was sought to be established in respect to the Mounds plantation, we are of the opinion that the ruling of the Circuit Court was correct on it also, by itself considered. It is indisputable that Mrs. Hall did not pay, as she agreed, the debts of the estate of King; and that the foreclosure sale swept away her entire estate. There remained, therefore, debts due from the estate of King not paid by the heirs, or the purchaser from them of the Mounds plantation. Those creditors had a right to demand the sale of the overflow lands, the remaining property of the estate, for the payment of their claims. The fact that these claims were debts of the partnership of King and Hall, and therefore claims against both their estates; or the additional fact, if it be a fact, that Mrs. Hall's estate if properly managed could have paid these claims, and did not pay them through the mismanagement of her executor; in no manner relieved the estate of King from its liabil ity, or prevented the creditors from having the overflow lands sold to satisfy them. The mismanagement, if conceded by Hall as executor of his wife's estate, in no manner affected the question of the liability of the sureties of Hall, as administrator of the estate of King, for a sale of its property. Whatever personal liability Hall may have incurred by the mismanagement of Mrs. Hall's estate, it is no burden resting upon these defendants as sureties on Hall's bond as administrator of King's estate. No liability arises against them, if there were, in fact, unpaid debts against the estate of King, and the property was sold to pay those debts. Now, the real contention of complainants is not that there were no unpaid debts of the estate of King, on account of which these lands were sold, but that Mrs. Hall's estate was also liable for these debts; that Hall, as executor, properly managing that estate, could and should have paid those debts out of that estate; and that Montgomery and Delony, two of Syllabus. the sureties on the administrator's bond, who held these claims, were, by reason of their suretyship, under an equitable obligation to enforce their collection out of Mrs. Hall's estate. But we do not understand that any such obligation was imposed by their suretyship. They did not guarantee Hall's faithful performance of his duty as executor, or become in any manner responsible for what he did as executor. They assumed no obligations in respect to their own claims against the estate of King, either as to the time or manner of their payment. They did not thereby bind themselves to pursue every other joint debtor before asking payment from the King estate. If, by reason of Hall's mismanagement as executor, nothing was left to Mrs. Hall's estate, their claims against the King estate, as one of two joint debtors, were in no manner impaired; and the sale of the overflow lands belonging to the King estate, in satisfaction of their claims, was neither illegal nor improper; and that, in its worst aspect, is all that the testimony develops in respect to this branch of the case. It should also be noticed that Hall's action in respect to these sales was, in fact, compelled by the complainants themselves. They proceeded against him for contempt in not closing up the estate, and it was only in response to such proceedings that he filed his petitions and made the sales with a view of paying the as yet unpaid debts of the King estate. Further comment is unnecessary. The decree of the Circuit Court is correct, and it is Affirmed. WEST v. CAMDEN. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND. No. 278. Argued April 17, 18, 1830.- Decided May 19, 1890. An agreement by a director of a corporation to keep another person permanently in place as an officer of the corporation, is void as against public policy, even though there was not to be any direct private gain to the promisor. 135 507 L-ed 254 48f 157 135 507 L-ed 254 52f 729 135 507 L-ed 254 741 996 135 507 L-ed 254 104f 226 Statement of the Case. A judgment will not be reversed because of an erroneous instruction to the jury, excepted to by the plaintiff, if the plaintiff could not recover in any event. THE case, as stated by the court, was as follows: This is an action at law, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, by William C. West against Johnson N. Camden. The principal count of the declaration alleges that, in December, 1877, the defendant engaged the plaintiff to serve as vice-president of the Baltimore United Oil Company of Baltimore County, a Maryland corporation, in which the defendant was largely interested, and promised, in consideration of the plaintiff's agreement to serve as such officer, and of the conveyance and transfer to the company of the property used by the partnership firm of C. West & Sons, (of which, at the time, the plaintiff was a member,) in its business of refining petroleum and dealing in the same and its products, and the consolidation of the business of that firm with the business of the company, which was greatly beneficial to the company and the defendant, that the plaintiff should be retained permanently in his position as such officer, at the salary of at least $5000 per annum, the expected fulfilment of such promise on the part of the defendant being a material part of the consideration of such transfer and consolidation, and additional to the money consideration for the same; that the transfer and consolidation were carried out shortly thereafter by the plaintiff and the other members of the firm, according to the terms of such agreement; that the plaintiff faithfully discharged the duties of such office, and was duly paid therefor, from the time when his services were so engaged until the 15th of January, 1883, when he was removed from his position, without any sufficient reason, in violation of such promise of the defendant, and notwithstanding he tendered himself to the company and to the defendant as ready and willing to continue the performance of such duties. The damages claimed are $50,000. The defendant pleaded nil debet and non assumpsit. The plaintiff then amended his declaration, by averring that, |