a hostile landing, ought not, perhaps, to be questioned. Any other construction would evidence a sort of Carthagenian faith, and that paltering, in a double sense, which would be at war with all international comity. The power of the Executive should be coextensive with the evil intended to be remedied. Had the expedition landed, we may even go a step further, and admit that reinforcements from our country might have been cut off-but it is a high and delicate trust and likely to be abused. Here the duties of neutrality would have been religiously observed and accomplished, and any expression of sympathy or incidental aid, even the slightest, extended toward the captain-general, in preventing or suppressing an intended revolt, or in making captives, would be a gross and arbitrary assumption of power, which could be tolerated in no administration a single hour. There are no proofs of anything like this against the federal authorities, and we are to presume they did their duty.

The United States and Spain have entered into three treaties, viz.: those of 1795, 1802 and 1819. By the first the parties mutually stipulate against their citizens taking commissions from any foreign prince or State, with whom the other party shall be at war, to privateer upon such other party. This treaty is in restriction of the international rights of the parties, which allowed neutrals to afford aid equally to belligerents. In this respect the stipulation must be construed strictly. In 1795, the European States were embroiled in wars seemingly interminable, and any treaties framed must have had direct reference to them. There were no wars upon our continent. The Spanish colonies had shown no sign of rebellion. Could these have been within the immediate contemplation of the treaty? It is clear they were not within its letter. The treaty cannot be applied to privateers in the service of the revolted colonists. These are not "States" and "princes." The terms imply organized sovereignties, and have a significance well defined and understood. It is too late to enter into their discussion. The Supreme Court, in the case of Gelston vs. Hoyt (3) Wheaton, 323), excludes their application to revolutionary governments not recognized by our own.

But if the late expedition against Cuba was not in violation of the treaty with Spain, are its projectors punishable under our own laws? There are various statutes providing for our neutral obligations. In 1790, some of the points were embraced. The act of 1794 included many particulars. It uses the words of the Spanish treaty, "foreign princes or States," in whose service only, expeditions against friendly powers are made unlawful. Foreigners, arriving in the country in armed ships, may enlist their own countrymen without violating the

act. Augmenting foreign ships of war in our ports, by adding additional guns, is prohibited. Armed expeditions from our ports are unlawful, and the President may use the land and naval forces to arrest, &c.

The act of 1794 was limited to two years, it being not thought necessary to extend it beyond the particular mischief experienced, especially as it was not likely to be a popular act, and tended to increase, unduly, executive power. The European wars still existing, the act was, in 1797, prolonged for three years, and, in 1800, made perpetualso slowly did it grow into favor with the legislature. Another act, in 1797, prohibits citizens, in the service of others, from fitting out privateers abroad against friendly powers. Was this changed in 1817, and made less general? In 1817, the terms of the act of 1794 are enlarged by the introduction of "colony, district or people." The collector is authorized to seize vessels seeking an infraction, and hold them until he can communicate with the President of the United States, unless such vessels give bond they will not violate the laws. Therefore, under this act, as well as by the law of nations, the sailing of private armed vessels was not prohibited.* We naturally ask why the statute adopted the enlarging terms "colony, district or people?" It is pretended they grew out of the decision in Gelston vs. Hoyt; but this decision was not made until the year after, though the subjectmatter had been under discussion in the State and Federal courts. Was it intended to include every possible case, and were the terms adopted adequate to that end? We are told, by Wheaton, page 476, the object was to reach the case of such unacknowledged States as the South American colonies of Spain, which had not been provided for in the original law. The British government adopted, the year after, in imitation of this statute, but evidently going much further, and to provide for similar cases, the words "colony or district assuming the powers of a government." Therefore, though the late Cuba expedition be considered within the intention of the statute, should the Supreme Court adhere to the principles of the Gelston decision, "colony, district or people" must be interpreted organized existences, having institutions and laws, though, as yet, unrecognized, and not mere individual factions or incoherent masses, and the men who fitted out the expedition and enlisted under the standard of Lopez, were not in the service of any of the parties within the statute. Strictness of interpretation, in penal matters, might very well go this length. The Engglish words "assuming the powers,' &c., reach the whole case.

* See the cases under the act of 1794, in a note appended, by the editor, to the Statutes at Large of the United States, published, a few years ago, under the patronage of Congress.

Another question, under the act of 1718, is, whether, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, any person has begun, or set on foot, or provided the means for, any military expedition, or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against any foreign prince or State, colony, district, &c.? Legal ingenuity and subtilty may easily be exercised here. The military expedition, as such, was not begun in the United States, because no organization took place until the parties were beyond our jurisdiction; and it was not carried on from the United States, for a like reason. There is no law of Congress to prevent American citizens from emigrating to any foreign territory, and from there "setting on foot" an armed expedition, or privateering, against a nation with whom we are at peace-the statute of 1797 having been repealed by that of 1818, which last applies only to privateering against our own commerce. The Spanish treaty, referring only to "princes or States," cannot, under the rule of the Supreme Court, apply.

Again, it is not a violation of international comity for a neutral to export arms, ammunition and provisions, to the enemies of a belligerent friend, except so far as to subject them to confiscation by the neutral power. Their exportation is not forbid by our laws. Chief Justice Marshall admits that an American citizen may, according to the modern usage of nations, engage in foreign service without compromising the neutrality of his government.*

Upon the whole, we incline to the opinion, that neither the sixth section of the act of 1818, under which General Lopez is indicted, nor any other, will be found sufficient, supposing the facts established, to produce a conviction of the parties implicated; and it will be again incumbent upon Congress to provide for the new class of cases to which our complicated relations with neighboring powers are giving rise. It is ever for the interests of justice and sound government, though temporary mischief accrue, that penal statutes and laws, giving so much latitude to the executive branch of government, and of questioned constitutionality, to say the least, be interpreted with the utmost strict

ness.

That this, the second unsuccessful attempt upon Cuba within a few months, is but the beginning of the end which looks to the acquisition of that island, by the United States, can hardly be a subject of debate. American and Spanish blood has been shed, and the bitter feelings of consequence, engendered upon both sides, will long survive the occasion, indulging itself in petty acts of jealousy-in ill-concealed hostility—

* 1 Brock R., 486.

in crimination and recrimination. Already the islanders loudly boast of their heroic onslaught upon the Buena Vista Yankees, and search their vocabulary for every term of opprobrium and contempt to heap upon their heads. Bravely, it must be admitted, almost chivalrously, as they did act, these glorifications are not likely to produce a pleasant tingle upon American ears, unaccustomed to such sounds from others than themselves. It is not improbable that our citizens, now or hereafter in the island, will be subjected to vexatious restrictions, growing out of these matters, and that, in the haughtiness of almost unexpected triumph, the authorities will be guilty of some infractions upon their rights and privileges. The taking of the Georgiana and the Loud, and unlawful detention of their crews and passengers, may already have furnished an instance. In the excited state of public mind, the least pretext would pave the way for other invasions of the island, for which, in a moment, any number of men could be enlisted-and an injury done to American citizens, however slight, would raise a war cry throughout the nation, which even the government could not resist. Besides, where a quarrel becomes, in any sense, desirable, it will not be hard to pick one, as the fable of the wolf and the lamb abundantly proves.

None can doubt, that, at this moment, there is a well fixed and almost universal conviction upon the minds of our people, that the possession of Cuba is indispensable to the proper development and security of the country. We state the fact, without entering into the reasons of it or justifying it, that such a conviction exists. Call it the lust of dominion-the restlesness of democracy-the passion for land and gold, or the desire to render our interior impregnable by commanding the keys of the gulf-the possession of Cuba is still an American sentiment, not to be sure a late, but a growing and strengthening, one. We trust, for the honor of humanity and the faith of treaties, it will lead us into nothing for which our history shall blush.

The path before us, in a state of things like this, is plain. There are honorable means of achieving our purpose, and, if these fail, the purpose itself becomes dishonorable. Let us negotiate with the Cabinet of Madrid, as we did with that of Versailles. Perchance the dangers which environ the island from within and from without--and those formed must not be underrated, if what is said about the restlesness and revolutionary spirit of the creoles requiring such armies and surveil lance to keep them down be true (and the history of Cuba seems to make it probable), nor must the latter be from the considerations we have adverted to, and from the chances of unlawful invasion, or ultimate, open and direct hostilities--will induce the home government to en

tertain propositions of purchase. A liberal figure would undoubtedly be named by our countrymen Spanish pride, to be sure, would be opposed (and this, we know, is without limit), and, to some extent, considering the revenues of the island, Spanish interest; but when that government shall have duly reflected how she has lost the whole of her American possessions but this, in most cases without any equivalent-how difficult the possession of colonies becomes now, even to the strongest maritime powers-how contrary to the spirit of the age, and likely to fall into pieces, is all government exercised over distant possessions, growing rich and powerful-how every other nation has been bound to yield to the times, while even the policy itself, of large colonial possessions, is being daily drawn sensibly into question, by those who claim the largest of such possessions-how impossible, in fine, it would be to retain Cuba, in the event of a general war--it seems, to us, a wise statesman might put off, like Bonaparte, all idle pride and close in, at once, with any terms that shall appear, in every respect, fair and just. Such terms would, undoubtedly, be offered. Should these negotiations fail, honor and the preservation of national faith demand, that we give no countenance to any movements hostile to the cause of Spain.

The records of diplomacy abound with complaints of the violation of neutral duties, by the extension of sympathy or succor, of one sort or another, to one or more of the belligerent parties. Perhaps there are no more difficult and arduous duties than those involved in a conscientious neutrality, and none in whose performance more sleepless vigilance of government is required. We have had discussions of this kind with Mexico, with England, with Spain and with France, and they are never likely to cease until the sympathies and interests of individuals shall have lost their controlling power.

The remark is often ventured, that Great Britain and the other powers of the world will not look on, tranquilly, upon the continual accessions of territory and sovereignty, made or in prospect, by our country. We have already had a protest in the case of Texas, and, what is equivalent, in that of Cuba; and were once indignant with Mr Guizot's "Balance of Power" declarations. This balance power, it is pretended, is an exploded dogma of past times and not again to be revived. We delude ourselves in this. The European States are as little disposed as ever, to suffer the undue and colossal aggrandizement of any power, upon principles as nearly akin to that of self defense in individuals as any principles can be. The world has had enough of the universal domain of the Caesars and the Bonapartes; and our own position and necessities, as one of the great family of natious, will