that is made by the President's authority must be made under and by virtue of a precept issued by him, and that, as a necessary consequence, would, even in the rebellious States, call the attention of the President to the name, at least, of the party to be arrested, and would probably lead to an inquiry as to the cause of arrest; but under the provisions of the bill, and under the provisions of the substitute of the senator from Illinois, arrests are to be made by the Secretary of War, or by his order, or by the order of the Secretary of State, with no process issuing directly from the President, and nothing that can be made a matter of record going to show why an arrest has been made.

"I believe that greater opposition has been made, and that opposition has been more effectual, to the party in power because of the exercise of this arbitary and despotic power of arrest than because of any other act that has been committed by the Administration. The loyal citizen is laboring for the maintenance of the Union, because of the value of the constitational rights which that Union has secured to him; but if you take from him this right to personal liberty, this right to be protected in that personal liberty, and not be deprived of it without due process of law, and without an opportunity of knowing the charge upon which he is confined and for which he is said to have forfeited his liberty, will you not make that Government, instead of an object of love, an object of hate?"

Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, followed and thus explained his amendment: "Although the immediate question is between the bill proposed by the senator from Virginia and the substitute which I have offered, I will state as briefly as I can what the provisions of the substitute offered by me are, and wherein they differ from the bill which has passed the House of Representatives. The House of Representatives passed a bill, the first two sections of which provided for the discharge of political prisoners, persons now in confinement by anthority of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of State for what are called political offences. The third section provided for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The sabstitute which I have proposed alters the numbers of the sections. It seemed to me a little more appropriate to provide in the first Section for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and in the other sections for the discharge of the persons who might be arrested. There is no importance in that. It is no matter whether it is the first or the third section; bat as I deemed it advisable to rewrite the which passed the House of Representatives, the second and third sections being, as I thought, somewhat confused and not very clear, and desiring some amendments, I rewrote them. There is no substantial difference between the substitute I have offered and the bill which passed the House of Representatives, VOL. III.-17 A

in the first and second sections, corresponding with the second and third sections of the substitute. There is a substantial difference between the first section, as I propose it, and the third section of the House bill. The third section of the House bill authorized the President of the United States to suspend the writ of habeas corpus until the meeting of Congress. The substitute that I propose authorizes him to suspend the writ of habeas corpus throughout the United States, or any part of it, at any time during the existing rebellion; and that is the difference between the two. The House bill limited the suspension until Congress should meet. The substitute I propose authorizes the suspension wherever the President, by proclamation, shall declare the writ suspended, so long as the proclamation continues in force and the rebellion exists.

"Under this first section, persons arrested, when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, of course cannot be discharged by virtue of the writ of habeas corpus; but the second and third sections provide for the discharge of those persons. They are not to be taken and held indefinitely, without knowing for what and why; but the second and third sections make it the duty of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, immediately upon the passage of the bill, to furnish the judge in each district where the parties reside, or where they may be charged with the commission of an offence, with a list of their names. They are to be laid before the grand jury; and whenever a grand jury shall have assembled in the proper district, and shall have adjourned without finding an indictment or making a presentment of any kind against the party who has been imprisoned, it is made the duty of the judge forthwith to issue an order discharging the prisoner from arrest, and any person resisting that order is to be punished by fine and imprisonment. The judge, however, before discharging the prisoner from arrest, is to take from him an oath of allegiance to the country and to the Constitution of the United States, and is authorized also, if on examination of the facts he deems it advisable, and if the public safety shall seem to demand it, to take from the prisoner a bond conditioned that he will keep the peace toward the United States, and appear from time to time to answer in the court as the court shall direct."

Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, said: "Whether the power is derived from the Constitution or derived from the act of Congress to suspend the writ, it is the best policy to have it declared by Congress that the power exists either under the Constitution or under the act of Congress; and I will state my reason for this opinion. We know very well that the people of the United States are so familar with these terms, "be it enacted," which are used in the passage of laws by their representatives, whom they have chosen, who speak their own

voice, who legislate for them, who declare the popular will, which, as our ancestors maintained, is to them the voice of God, that they submit to an enactment, passed by their rep resentatives, commencing "be it enacted," as the Israelites of old would submit to a "thus saith the Lord." But, sir, when a thing is assumed to be done by the order of any one individual, the Secretary of War or the President, their jealousy of despotic power exercised by an individual is such, that although he may be acting within his clear constitutional power, the people, perhaps, are less likely to acquiesce in an order of the War Department or an order of the President than they are to acquiesce in an enactment of Congress."

Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, opposed the delegation of power to the President, thus: "I suppose this bill does give the power if you can delegate it in this way. If the power exists, certainly those who claim that the power exists in the executive are only making a reflection upon him if they undertake to grant him the power. I suppose this bill does give the power if you can grant it to him. Then comes this objection: can you delegate the legislative authority of this nation to the executive, to be determined upon his discretion and not upon yours? Let those who believe that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is vested in the legislative power reconcile it to themselves, if they can, that they can dispense with their own judgment as to whether the public safety requires that the writ should be suspended, and can delegate that power of legislation, founded on an act of high discretion, to the executive of the nation. Why, sir, you might just as well delegate to him the power to make any appropriations out of the Treasury he saw fit. You might as well delegate to him all your powers of legislation and abdicate your seats in Congress, and do what this and other bills you have passed will do-create a single despotic government in this country. Do it, and in terms you abandon legislation."

Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, said: "Of the two propositions, I favor the one of the senator from Virginia, and I will assign to the Senate very briefly the reasons why I prefer the proposition of the senator from Virginia. The proposition of the senator from Virginia requires that no citizen of the United States during the existence of these troubles shall be arrested except upon oath or affirmation of a loyal citizen of the United States. It further requires that any citizen who may be deprived of his liberty by being arrested shall have the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in order to have the facts concerning the arrests judicially investigated. The proposition of the senator from Illinois is widely different. The amendment proposed by the senator from Illinois, which is offered in lieu of the original bill, authorizes the President of the United States to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in

all cases of political offences. I would ask the learned senator to define what he calls a political offence. There is no definition. You leave it to the discretion of the executive to say what a political offence is. We know that since these unhappy difficulties have existed in this country, persons have been seized in every part of the country upon charge of political offences, and that those offences have been, perhaps, as variant as the names of the persons seized."

Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, replied: "The senator from Kentucky objects that the bill declares that the President of the United States shall have authority by proclamation to suspend the 'privileges of the writ of habeas corpus in all cases of political offences.' He says the term 'political offences' is not a technical term, it has no fixed and definite meaning, and that it is uncertain what it does mean; and he asks, who is to decide what is meant by 'political offences?' Are you to leave it to the President to decide at his discretion? And he thinks this is monstrous. Now, I will compromise with the senator from Kentucky, who is in favor of compromise, and I will strike out of the bill the words, in all cases of political offences,' and then the President will be authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus whenever, in his judgment, the public safety requires it during this rebellion, everywhere and for all offences."

After a considerable debate on political issues, the amendment was adopted, and the bil passed as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Harlan, Harris, Hicks, Howe, King, Lane of Kansas, Morrili, Pomeroy, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Trumbull, Wade, W:!kinson, Wilmot, and Wilson of Massachusets-24.

NAYS-Messrs. Carlile, Henderson, Kennedy, Lane of Indiana, Latham, Powell, Rice, Richardson, Saulsbury, Turpie, Wall, Willey, and Wilson of Missouri

-13.

This bill was reported to the House, and finally laid aside, as having been provided for by the report of the Committee on Conference, above stated, which had been adopted.

In the Senate, on the 22d of December, Mr. Saulsbury offered the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be, and is hereby directed to inform the Senate whether armed soldiers were sent into the State of Delaware, to be present at the polls on the 4th day of November last, the day of general election in said State; and if so, by whose orders, upon whose application, the necessity, if any, for their being so sent, for what purpose they were sent, to what places by name they were sent, how many were sent, how many to each of such places. the names of the regiments or companies sent, the names of the officers commanding such regiments and companies; and whether any, and, if so, how many provost marshals were or have been appointed, and at what places, in Said State, with their names, the necessity, if any, for their appointment, and the powers conferred upon them; and that he communicate to the Senate all papers and orders in his Department relating to the sending of such soldiers into said State.

Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, said: "Sir, in a State where everything was perfectly calm and quiet, where there had been no attempt since the commencement of this revolution to take sides with the States in revolt, military were sent on the day of the general election to every voting place in the two lower counties of that State except two. I state to the Senate and to the country what I know to be true, and what I can prove, that peaceable citizens were arrested on the day of the election, and incarcerated in the common jail of the county, at one place; that at another voting place, peaceable citizens, who were making no disturbance, doing nothing illegal or improper, were arrested and placed in confinement in a room; that at another place, peaceable citizens, before they arrived on the ground, before they had done or said anything on the election ground, were taken from their wagons and fastened up in a Louse, and some of them deprived of their right to vote. I state another fact which can be proved: at another voting place, persons were intimidated from voting, and others were assaulted. At some voting places the inspectors of the election were compelled to take what they believed to be illegal votes; at other voting places, persons having a clear legal right to vote were prevented from voting by the military.

"Now, sir, I do not say that the General Government desires this to be done. Gen. Wool left his headquarters, went to the town of Seaford, in my State, and stayed there until after the election. I believe, as far as Gen. Wool was concerned, and as far as the election was concerned at that place, there was very little wrong done-nothing further than what would be the natural effect of having soldiers at a poll, the natural intimidation which it occasioned. I will state also that where there were regular soldiers, under officers of character, there was not generally so much wrong done as at other places. But, sir, where Maryland home guards were stationed, outrages of a gross character were committed upon our citizens. I want to know-and that is the object of this resolution what were the reasons for the sending of these men into the State of Delaware; what representations have been made to the General Government."

Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, said: "I hope the resolution will be adopted. I do not desire to debate it; but I desire the information. I think we are entitled to it. The Government of the United States having sent into the State of Delaware, under the command of a major-general of the army of the United States, some three thousand troops, on the day before the election, and distributed them throughout the State-a State which has at no time whatever, either by her position, her course of conduct, or the action of her people, offered any resistance to the authority of the United States-we have a right to know the reasons for such actions. It may be, and probably it will be

shown, that some of our own citizens, in the heat of political excitement and partisan resentment, have made improper, erroneous, and false statements to the Secretary of War. If that is so, we have a right to know it. We have a right to know who those recreant sons of Delaware are. The people of Delaware have a right to know who it was that thus attempted to cause civil strife and military rule to be established in the State."

Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts: "I think it were better that the resolution should be passed over; and I therefore move that it lie upon the table."

Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, said: "Will the senator from Massachusetts withdraw that motion for a moment? I was going to suggest that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs."

Mr. Sumner: "I have no objection to that." Mr. Anthony: "I have no objection at all to the information asked for being obtained; I desire that it should be laid before the country; but I think the resolution is not expressed in such felicitous language as the senator from Delaware usually employs. It seems to charge all the matter that is to be inquired into upon the Secretary of War, and the particularity of the inquiries seems to imply that unless he is pinned down to the exact point, he is going to evade the inquiry. I do not think it is respectful or proper. I would prefer that a resolution should be offered inquiring generally into the matter; and if the Secretary should not reply fully, then we should know, what the resolution now seems to assume, that he does not mean to answer the inquiry?"

Mr. Saulsbury, in reply, said: "Mr. President, I offer this resolution asking information of the Secretary of War. The proposition now is to refer a resolution asking for information from the Secretary of War to the Committee on Military Affairs. Can the Committee on Miltary Affairs give the information? How can you refer a resolution of inquiry, directed to the Secretary of War, to the Committee on Military Affairs? It is not to be supposed that they are the persons who have sent soldiers into the State of Delaware. I would prefer, and I say so frankly to the Senate, if they think we ought not to be furnished with this information, that they meet the question fairly and vote the resolution down."

Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, followed, saying: "It seems to me that a part of the information sought for in this resolution is manifestly improper. It not only inquires of the Secretary of War whether he has done this thing, but it requires an inquisition as to who instituted these proceedings, who made the representations to the Secretary of War that induced him to take this official action, if he did take it. It is manifestly improper for us to go into any such inquiry as that. Does the senator desire to lay the basis here, or to furnish the testimony for any number of judicial investigations,

for private prosecutions and personal collisions, in the State of Delaware? Does he not see (if I apprehend the state of public sentiment in Delaware) that such must be the case, if it be true that armed men were sent into the State of Delaware upon the advice and recommendation of some of the citizens of Delaware? I am perfectly content to ask the Secretary of War whether or not he did send men into the State of Delaware to attend the polls; but I am not going into any such private inquisition as is proposed by the resolution, and ask the Secretary to inform me upon whose instance it was done, whether upon the recommendation of this senator or that senator. If we establish a rule that we shall do this, and go on and inquire of each head of a department upon whose recommendation he does this act and that act, we shall have no end to these inquiries."

Mr. Bayard, in reply, said: "We do not want to inquire into the fact of whether the army was sent there and whether they were distributed at the polls-that is notorious; but we want the reasons which justify an act which certainly is an infraction of the rights of the people of Delaware, and an infraction which, carried out in other States--I am not speaking of what the design was, for I do not know what the grounds were; I want to know--would enable any existing Administration to keep itself in power and control the Government of this country just as long as it had the military force to do so. That would be the effect of submitting to such action. I want to know the grounds and the reasons, to see whether there was any justification for this action. It is not, as the honorable senator from Iowa supposes, with any desire for judicial inquiry against individuals there; nothing of the kind. It would not be evidence for the purpose of subjecting them to judicial inquiry.'

In the House, on the 8th of January, the appropriation bill being under consideration, an amendment was offered to add to the clause "for compensation of thirty-three commissioners, at $3,000 each, and eleven clerks, at $1,200 each, $112,200," the following proviso:

Provided, A sufficient sum shall be collected in the insurrectionary States to pay said salaries: And prodided further, That no greater sum shall at any time be paid to said commissioners, or to any of them, than shall have been collected from the taxes in the insurrectionary States, and paid into the Treasury of the United States.

The discussion which followed brought out an expression of views relative to the position of the seceded States under the Federal Government. Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, in the course of his remarks said: "I did say, sir, that I find no warrant in the Constitution for the admission, under the Constitution, of West Virginia. I do not know whether the gentleman from Kentucky voted for that bill or not." Mr. Dunlap: "I will say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that I voted against the bill, because I deemed it unconstitutional."

Mr. Stevens: "Then the gentleman voted against it upon the same opinion I expressed, that it was unconstitutional. But I went farther, and voted for it because I did not believe that the Constitution embraced a State now in arms against the Government of this Union, and I hold that doctrine now. It was not said upon the spur of the occasion. It is a deliberate opinion, formed upon a careful examination of the law of the United States and the laws of nations.

"Though it may be out of place just now, I will give one or two reasons for my opinion. The establishment of our blockade admitted the Southern States, the Confederates, to be a belligerent power. Foreign nations have all admitted them as a belligerent power. Whenever that came to be admitted by us and by foreign nations, it placed the rebellious States precisely in the position of an alien enemy with regard to duties and obligations. Now, I think there is nothing more plainly written in the law of nations than that whenever a war, which is admitted to be a national war, springs up be tween nation and nation, ally and ally, confederate and confederate, every obligation which previously existed between them, whether treaty, compact, contract, or any thing else, is wholly abrogated, and from that moment the belligerents act toward each other, not according to any municipal obligations, not according to any compacts or treaties, but simply according to the laws of war. And I hold and maintain that with regard to all the Southern States in rebellion, the Constitution has no binding influence and no application."

Mr. Dunlap: "Are not those seceded States still members of this Union, and under the laws of the Government?”

Mr. Stevens: "In my opinion they are not." Mr. Dunlap: " Then I would ask the further question, did the ordinances of secession take them out of the Union?"

Mr. Stevens: "The ordinances of secession, backed by the armed power which made them a belligerent nation, did take them, so far as present operations are concerned, from under the laws of the nation."

Mr. Dunlap: "Are they then members of the Union?"

Mr. Stevens: "They are not, in my judg ment."

Mr. Dunlap: "And the ordinances of secession took them out?"

Mr. Stevens: "I have my own views of this subject, and if erroneous the gentleman will not act upon them."

Mr. Dunlap: "Then if these States are not within the Union, how, as chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, do you propose to pass an appropriation to pay officers to collect revenue in States which do not belong to the Union?"

Mr. Stevens: "I propose to levy that tax and collect it as a war measure. I would levy a tax wherever I can upon these conquered

provinces, just as all nations levy them upon provinces and nations they conquer. If my views and principles are right, I would not only collect that tax, but I would, as a necessary war measure, take every particle of property, real and personal, life estate and reversion, of every disloyal man, and sell it for the benefit of the nation in carrying on this war. We have such power, and we are to treat them simply as provinces to be conquered, and as a nation fighting in hostility against us until we do conquer them. I can arrive at no other conclusion. To me it is a great absurdity to say that men, by millions, in arms, shall claim the protection of the provisions of the Constitution and laws made for loyal men, while they do not obey one of those laws, but repudiate their binding effect. There never was a principle more clear than that every obligation, whether in a national or civil point of view, in order to be binding, must be reciprocal; and that the moment the duty ceases upon the one part, the obligation ceases upon the other; and that, in my judgment, is precisely the condition of the rebel States now."

Mr. Yeaman: "I am so much astonished at the doctrine I am now hearing, and I feel so much interest in this thing, not only as a question of constitutional law, but in view of the influence which these announcements may have upon this controversy, that I hope the gentleman will allow me to ask another question."

Mr. Stevens: "Certainly."

Mr. Yeaman: "Does the gentleman hold, or does he not, that the ordinance of secession passed in South Carolina was legal under the Constitution of the United States?"

quire the right to be treated as prisoners of war, and all the other rights which pertain to belligerents under the laws of nations." Mr. Mallory: "Will the gentleman yield to me for a moment?"

Mr. Stevens: 66

Certainly, sir."

Mr. Mallory: "I would inquire of the gentleman from Pennsylvania with what propriety he can speak of these men at the South who are engaged in this armed resistance to the United States as rebels, or as disloyal men, when he distinctly stated just now that he thought that the duty of obedience and the duty of protection were reciprocal, and that when protection is not afforded by the Government, the citizen is not bound in allegiance to that Government? Does not his doctrine release these men from all obligation to the Government of the United States, which is not protecting them from the confederate government; and has he therefore a right to punish them by the confiscation of their property, or by hanging them as traitors, for the acts which they have committed?"

Mr. Stevens: "All these crimes were committed before they became belligerents; before they had acquired the status of a belligerent power, and compelled us to treat them as belligerents-for instance, as prisoners of war."

Mr. Mallory: "I would ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania if the Confiscation Act does not apply to those crimes which have been committed since the commencement of the armed resistance which, in his doctrine, converted them from traitors and rebels into public enemies. It cannot, therefore, refer to crimes, as the gentleman says, which were committed before this armed resistance was made, and our

Mr. Yeaman: "I would ask further whether the backing up of these ordinances of secession by armed force imparts to them any validity?"

Mr. Stevens: "I hold that so long as they remain in force against us as a belligerent power, and until they are conquered, it is in fact an existing operation. I will not say any thing about its legality. I hold that it is an existing fact, and that so far from enforcing any laws, you have not the power."

Mr. Yeaman: "What I want to know is whether these people are now citizens of the United States, or whether they are an independent nation; and if the latter, I want to know where we derive our right or authority to wage war against them, and to tax them to support that war, all of which I am in favor of."

Mr. Stevens: "I hold that the Constitution, in the first place, so far operated that when they went into secession and armed rebellion, they committed treason; and that when they so combined themselves as to make themselves admitted as belligerents-not merely as men in insurrection, but as belligerents-they did ac

relations of one belligerent nation to another."

Mr. Stevens: "I suppose that bill refers to a continuation of what was commenced before. My own notion is, sir, that we have a right to treat them as we would treat any other provinces that we might conquer. Now, sir, I do not know but what the President looks upon it in that light."

Mr. Maynard: "This discussion has become very interesting; and I would like to ask the gentleman whether he holds to the theory that this is a Government of the American people, or whether he holds that it is simply a compact between separate, independent, and sovereign States?"

Mr. Stevens: "Well, that is an abstract question. It has been well settled heretofore.”

Mr. Maynard: "If he holds to the latter view, I can well conceive why he should hold every individual citizen in each particular State responsible for all the acts committed by the State authorities. If he holds to the former hypothesis, I would ask him how any citizen can lose his rights under the Constitution, wherever he may be found, excepting by his own act, or by the regularly authorized act of the Government through its different branches,