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Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, said: "Sir, in a State where everything was perfectly calm and quiet, where there had been no attempt since the commencement of this revolution to take sides with the States in revolt, military were sent on the day of the general election to every voting place in the two lower counties of that State except two. I state to the Senate and to the country yhat I know to be true, and what I can prove, that peaceable citizens were arrested on the day of the election, and incarcerated in the common jail of the county, at one place; that at another voting place, peaceable citizens, who were making no disturbance, doing nothing illegal or improper, were arrested and placed in confinement in a room; that at another place, peaceable citizens, beforo they arrived on the ground, before they had done or said anything on the election ground, were taken from their wagons and fastened up in a house, and some of them deprived of their right to vote. I state another fact which can be proved: at another voting place, persons were intimidated from voting, and others were assaulted. At some voting places the inspectors of the election were compelled to tako what they believed to be illegal votes; at other voting places, persons having a clear legal right to vote were prevented from voting by the military.
"Now, sir, I do not say that the General Government desires this to be done. Gen. Wool left his headquarters, went to the town of Seaford, in my State, and stayed there until after the election. I believe, as far as Gen. "Wool was concerned, and as far as the election was concerned at that place, there was very little wrong done—nothing further than what would be the natural effect of having soldiers ata poll, the natural intimidation which it occasioned. I will state also that where there were regular soldiers, under officers of character, there wa3 not generally so much wrong done as at other places. But, sir, whore Maryland home guards were stationed, outrages of a gross character were committed upon our citizens. I want to know—and that is the object of this resolution —what were the reasons for the sendiug of these men into the State of Delaware; what representations have been made to the General Government."
Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, said: "I hope the resolution will be adopted. I do not desire to debate it; but I desire the information. I think we are entitled to it. The Government of the United States having sent into the State of Delaware, under the command of a major-general of the army of the United States, some three thousand troops, on the day beforo the election, and distributed them throughout the State—a State which has at no time whatever, either by her position, her course of conduct, or the action of her people, ottered any resistance to the authority of the United States—we have a right to know the reasons for such actions. It may be, and probably it will bo
shown, that some of our own citizens, in the heat of political excitement and partisan resentment, have made improper, erroneous, and false statements to the Secretary of War. If that is so, wo have a right to know it. We have a right to know who those recreant sons of Delaware are. Tho people of Delaware have a right to know who it was that thus attempted to cause civil strife and military rule to be established in the State."
Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts: "I think it were better that tho resolution should bo passed over; and I therefore move that it lie upon the table."
Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, said: "Will the senator from Massachusetts withdraw that motion for a moment? I was going to suggest that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs."
Mr. Sumner: "I have no objection to that."
Mr. Anthony: "I have no objection at all to the information asked for being obtained; I desire that it should be laid before the country; but I think the resolution is not expressed in such felicitous language as the senator from Delaware usually employs. It seems to charge all the matter that is to be inquired into upon the Secretary of War, and tho particularity of the inquiries seems to imply that unless he is pinned down to the exact point, ho is going to evade the inquiry. I do not think it is respectful or proper. I would prefer that a resolution should bo offered inquiring generally into the matter; and if the Secretary should not roply fully, then wo should know, what the resolution now seems to assume, that he does not mean to answer the inquiry?"
Mr. Saulsbury, in reply, said: "Mr. President, I offer this resolution asking information of the Secretary of War. The proposition now is to refer a resolution asking for information from the Secretary of War to the Committee on Military Affairs. Can the Committee on Military Affairs give tho information? How can you refer a resolution of inquiry, directed to the Secretary of War, to the Committee on Military Affairs? It is not to bo supposed that they are tho persons who have sent soldiers into the State of Delaware. I would prefer, and I say so frankly to the Senate, if they think wo ought not to be furnished with this information, that they meet tho question fairly and vote the resolution down."
Mr. Grimes, of Iowa, followed, saying: "It seems to mo that a part of the information sought for in this resolution is manifestly improper. It not only inquires of the Secretary of War whether he lias done this thing, but it requires an inquisition as to who instituted these proceedings, who made the representations to the Secretary of War that induced him to take this official action, if he did take it. It is manifestly improper for us to go into any such inquiry as that. Does tho senator desire to lay the basis here, or to furnish the testimony for any number of judicial investigations,
of the apostles of that doctrine to force a collision between the North and the South, either to bring about a separation or to find a vain but bloody pretext for abolishing slavery in the States. In any event, I knew, or thought I knew that, the end was certain collision, and death to the Union.
"Believing thus, I have for years past denounced those who taught that doctrine with all the vehemence, the bitterness, if you chooso —I thought it a righteous, a patriotic bitterness—of an earnest and impassioned nature. Thinking thus, I forewarned all who believed the doctrine, or followed tho party which taught it, with a sincerity and depth of conviction as profound as ever penetrated the heart of man. And when, for eight years past, over and over again, I have proclaimed to the peoplo that the success of a sectional anti-slavery party would bo tho beginning of disunion and civil war in America, I believed it. I did. I had read history, and studied human nature, meditated for years upon the character of our institutions and form of government, and of the people South as well as North; and I could not doubt tho event. But the people did not beliovo me, nor those older and wiser and • greater than I. They rejected the prophecy, and stoned the prophets. The candidate of the Republican party was chosen President. Secession began. Civil war was imminent. It was no petty insurrection; no temporary combination to obstruct the execution of tho laws in certain States; but a revolution, systematic, deliberate, determined, and with the consent of a majority of the people of each State which seceded. Causeless it may have been; wicked it may have been; but there it was; not to be railed at, still less to bo laughed at, but to bo dealt with by statesmen as a fact. No display of vigor or forco alone, however sudden or great, could have arrested it even at the outset. It was disunion at last. Tho wolf had come. But civil war had not yet followed. In my deliberate and solemn judgment, thero was butono wise and masterly modo of dealing with it. Noncoercion would avert civil war, and compromise crush out both abolitionism and secession. Tho parent and the child would thus both perish. But a resort to force would at once precipitate war, hasten secession, extend disunion, and, while it lasted, utterly cut oft" all hope of compromise. I believed that war, if long enough continued, would be final, eternal disunion. I said it; I meant it; and, accordingly, to the utmost of my ability and influence, I exerted myself in behalf of tho policy of noncoercion. It was adopted by Mr. Buchanan's Administration, with the almost unanimous consent of tho Democratic and Constitutional Union parties in and out of Congress; and, in February, with tho concurrence of a majority of the Republican party in the Senate and this House. But that party, most disastrously for tho country, refused all compromise. How, indeed, could they accept any? That which
the South demanded, and the Democratic and Conservative parties of the North and West were willing to grant, and which alone could avail to keep the peace and save the Union, implied a surrender of the sole vital element of the party and its platform—of tho very principle, in fact, upon which it had just won the contest for tho Presidency; not, indeed, by a majority of the popular vote—the majority was nearly a million against it—but under the forms of the Constitution. Sir, the crime, the "high crime " of the Republican party was not so much its refusal to compromise, as its original organization upon a basis and doctrine wholly inconsistent with the stability of the Constitution and the peace of the Union.
"Hut to resume: tho session of Congress expired. The President elect was inaugurated; and now, if only the policy of non-coercion could be maintained, and war thus averted, time would do its work in the North and tho South, and final peaceable adjustment and reunion be secured. Some time in March it was announced that the President had resolved to continue the policy of his predecessor, and even go a step farther, and evacuate Sumter and the other Federal forts and arsenals in the seceded States. His own party acquiesced; the whole country rejoiced. Tho policy of non-coercion had triumphed, and for once, sir, in my life, I found myself in an immense majority. No man then pretended that a Union founded in consent could bo cemented by force. Nay, more, tho President and the Secretary of State went farther. Said Mr. Seward, in an official diplomatic letter to Mr. Adams:
For these reasons he [the President] would not bo disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs [the secessionists], namely, that the Federal Government could not reduce the seceding States to obedience by conquest, although he were disposed to question that proposition. But in fact the President willingly accepts it as true. Only an imperial or despotic Government could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insor. rectiouary members of the state.
"Pardon me, sir, but I beg to know whether this conviction of the President and his Secretary is not the philosophy of the persistent and most vigorous efforts made by this Administration, and first of all through this same Secretary, tho moment war broke out and ever since till" tho late elections, to convert the United States into an imperial or despotic Government? But Mr. Seward adds, and I agree with him:
This Federal Republican system of ours is, of all forms of government, the very one which is most unfitted for such a labor.
"This, sir, was on the 10th of April, and yet that very day the fleet was under sail for Charleston. The policy of peace had been abandoned. Collision followed; tho militia were ordered out; civil war began.
"Now, sir, on the 14th of April, I believed that coercion would bring on war, and war disunion. More than that, I believed, what you all in your hearts believe to-day, that the South could never be conquered—never. And not that only, but I was satisfied—and you of the abolition party have now proved it to the world—that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States. In any event, I did not doubt that whatever might be the momentary impulses of those in power, and whatever pledges they might make in the midst of the fury for tho Constitution, the Union, and the flag, yet the natural and inexorable logic of revolutions would, sooner or later, drive them into that policy, and with it to its final but inevitable result, the change of our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism.
'•These were my convictions on tho 14th of April. Had I changed them on the 15th, when I read tho President's proclamation, and become convinced that I had been wrong all my life, and that all history was a fable, and all human nature false in its development from the. beginning of time, I would have changed my public conduct also. But my convictions did not change. I thought that if war was disunion on the 14th of April, it was equally disunion on the 15th, and at all times. Believing this, I could not, as an honest man, a Union man, and a patriot, lend an active support to the war; and I did not. I had rather my right arm were plucked from its socket, and cast into eternal burnings, than, with my convictions, to have thus defiled my soul with tho guilt of moral perjury. Sir, I was not taught in that school which proclaims that 'all is fair in politics.' I loathe, abhor, and detest the execrable maxim. I stamp upon it. No state can endure a single generation whose public men practise it. Whoever teaches it is a corrupter of youth. What we most want in these times, and at all times, is honest and independent public men. That man who is dishonest in politics is not honest, at heart, in any thing; and sometimes moral cowardice is dishonesty. Do right; and trust to God, and Truth, and the People. Perish office, perish honors, perish life itself; but do tho thing that is right, and do it like a man. I did it. Certainly, sir, I could not doubt what he must sutfer who dare defy the opinions and the passions, not to say the madness, of twenty millions of people. Had I not read history? Did I not know human nature? But I appealed to Time, and right nobly hath the Avenger answered me.
"I did not support the war; and to-day I blesa God that not the smell of so much as one drop of its blood is upon my garments. Sir, I censure no brave man who rushed patriotically into this war; neither will I quarrel with any one, here or elsewhere, who gave to it aa honest support. Had their convictions been mine, I, too, would doubtless have done as they did. With my convictions I could not.
"But I was a Representative. War existed —by whose act no matter—not mine. Tho President, tho Senate, tho House, and the country, all said that there Bhould bo war—
war for the Union; a union of consent and good will. Our Southern brethren were to be whipped back into love and fellowship at tho point of the bayonet. Oh, monstrous delusion! I can comprehend a war to compel a people to accept a master; to change a form of government; to give up territory; to abolish a domestic institution—in short, a war of conquest and subjugation; but a war for Union! Was the Union thus made? Was it ever thus proserved ?_ Sir, history will record that after nearly six thousand years of folly and wickedness in every form and administration of government, theocratic, democratic, monarchic, oligarehio, despotic, and mixed, it was reserved to American statesmanship in the nineteenth century of the Christian era to try the grand experiment, on a scale tho most costly and gigantic in its proportions, of creating love by force, and developing fraternal affection by war; and history will record, too, on the same page, tho utter, disastrous, and most bloody failure of the experiment.
"But to return: the country was at war; and I belonged to that school of politics which teaches that when we are at war, the Government—I do not mean the executive alone, but the Government—is entitled to demand and have, without resistance, such number of men, and such amount of money and supplies generally, as may be necessary for tho war, until an appeal can be had to tho people. Before that tribunal alone, in the first instance, must the question of the continuance of the war be tried. This was Mr. Calhoun's opinion, and he laid it down very broadly and strongly, in a speech on the Loan bill, in 1841. Speaking of supplies, ho said:
I hold that there is a distinction in this respect between a state of peace and war. In the latter, the right of withholding supplies ought ever to he held subordinate to the energetic and successful prosecution of the war. I go farther, and regard the withholding supplies, with a view of forcing the country into a dishonorable peace, as not only to be what it has been called, moral treason, but very little short of actual treason itself.
"Upon this principle, sir, he acted afterward in the Mexican war. Speaking of that war in 1847, he said:
Every senator knows that I was opposed to the war; but none knows but myself the depth of that opposition. With my conception of its character and consequences, it was impossible for me to vote for it.
"And again, in 1848:
But, after war was declared, by authority of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could notprevent, and what it was impossible for me to arrest: and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my efforts to give such direction to the war as would, as far as possible, prevent the evils and dangers with which it throateued the country and its institutions.
"Sir, I adopt all this as my own position and my defence; though, perhaps, in a civil war, I might fairly go farther in opposition. I could not, with my convictions^ vote men and money for this war, and I would not, as a representative, voto against them, I meant that, without opposition, the President might take all tbo men and all the money he should demand, and then to hold him to a strict accountability before the people for the results. Not believing the soldiers responsible for the war, or its purposes, or its consequences, I have never withheld my vote where their separato interests were concerned. But I have denounced from the boginning the usurpations and the infractions, one and all, of law and Constitution, by the President and those under him; their repeated and persistent arbitrary arrests, tho suspension of habeas corpus, tho violation of freedom of tho mails, of the private house, of the press and of speech, and all the other multiplied wrongs and outrages upon public liberty and private right, which have made this country ono of the worst despotisms on earth for the past twenty months; and I will continuo to rebuke and denounce them to the end; and tho people, thank God, have at last heard and heeded, and rebuked them, too. To tho record and to time I appeal again for my justification."
In the Ilouse, on tho 27th of January, tho bill to raise additional soldiers for tho servico of tho Government was considered.
Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, proposed the following substitute for the bill:
Be it enacted b;/ the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Conyrtfs assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby authorized to enroll, arm, equip, and receive into the land and naval service of the United States such number of volunteers of African descent a3 he may deem useful to suppress the present rebellion, for such term of service as he may prescribe, not exceeding live years. The said volunteers to be organized according to tho regulations of the branch of service in which they may be enlisted, to receive the same rations, clothing, and equipments as other volunteers, and a monthly pay not to exceed that of other volunteers; to be officered by white or black persons appointed and commissioned by the President, and to be governed by the rules and articles of war and such other rules and regulations as may be prescribed by tho President: Provided, That the President may forthwith proceed to raise as aforesaid, in the free as well as in the slave States, not less than ono hundred and fifty thousand soldiers of African descent; and shall accept slaves as well as freemen; and such slaves as are received into the service of the Government, and their families, shall thenceforth bo free; and the United States shall make reasonable compensation for such of them as belonged to persons who had never been disloyal during this rebellion.
Mr. Sheffield, of Rhode Island, moved, when tho bill camo up on tho next day, to refer it to the Committee on Military Affairs.
Tho previous question was now demanded, tho object being, on the one side, to adopt tho amendment without debate, and on the other, to prevent its adoption without ample discussion. A series of manoeuvres now commenced of a most exciting character, which resulted in an agreement that was thus stated:
Tho Speaker pro tempore: "Tho Chair then understands tho proposition to bo that by unanimous consent the vote ordering the main question shall be understood to be reconsidered, all
incidental motions now pending dispensed with, and the bill postponed until the meeting of the House at twelve o'clock."
The House then adjourned at twenty-five minutes to six A. M.
The subject camo up on the next day, when Mr. Stevens withdrew tho proviso to bis proposed amendment.
Mr. Maynard, of Tennessee, then moved to refer the bill and amendments proposed to the Committee on Military Affairs. Tho previous question was demanded and seconded.
Mr. Cox, of Ohio, said: "I think there is a radical difference between the law of last session and the present law, although that law was rather radical when it was passed. That law, as it has been interpreted by its friends, and as it may bo now, simply provided that Africans might bo employed in tho military service. It says:
• That the President be, and he is hereby authorized to receive into tho service of the United States for tlie purpose of constructing intrenchments, performing camp service, or any other labor in the military or naval service for which they may be found competent, &c.
"Now, the present pending law, as the gentleman correctly observed, is intended to place the African soldier on a perfect equality in every regard with tho whito soldier, and that is the gist of our objection."
Mr. Stevens said: "I have not said so. I said the object was to put them upon an equality as to tho protection which the President could afford them. I do not mean to say that they are to bo put upon a social and political equality."
Mr. Maynard, of Tennessee, followed: "It is provided in this bill that any number of this kind of troops may bo raised that the President may deem usefid. Well, how large that number may be, of course can only be determined by tho success which this volunteering meets with, and by the necessities of the service. If they are to be officered indiscriminately, cither by white or by black persons—as officered by somebody they must l>e—wo shall not only have brigadier-generals but major-generals of the African race, if under the powers conferred by this bill, tho President should choose to confer that high authority upon men of that race; and when they are brought into tho same field with white troops officered by white men who are outranked by such colored officers, the consequence will be that tho white officers must yield military obedience to them. I need not say to tho gentleman from Pennsylvania, or to tho gentlemen of the House, what effect this must have, whether rightfully or wrongfully, whether in consequence of insane and wild and unreasoning prejudice or not, I will not undertake to say. I speak to the facts. I speak to things as they are. I speak to men s opinions as they have formed them, and r.s we cannot change them by our legislation, or by anything we can say here. I ask gentlemen to consider what would bo the practical effect of such an arrangement of our army."
Mr. Porter, of Indiana, offered tho following amendment:
Bat no person of African descent shall be admitted as a private or officer of any regiment in which white men arc in the ranks, nor shall any person of African descent, in any case, be placed in command of white soldiers.
Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, opposed the bill with great vigor. Ho said: "What havo we heard in this hall since this bill has been rerorted? The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Stevens), who is the leader of tho Abolition party in this House, and who was the originator of this project, and who has nursed it with tho fondness for a sickly and only child, one for whose fate he cannot but fear, tells us, 2nd in bis place proclaims to tho South, that we, with a white population in Pennsylvania and New York alone of a million and a half more than there are whites in tho whole eleven seceded States of tho South, and eight millions ia the fifteen States more than the whole white jopulation of the eleven States—that with all this difference, this country cannot conquer and suppress this rebellion, unless he can employ the negro slave, and put Sambo, or some other man meaner than Sambo, in command. Great God! Is that so? Are yon, gentlemen upon the other sido of the House, prepared to indorse this statement of the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, and proclaim to the world that our States, with all their resources of population and physical power, with such resources of means for carrying on tho war, with a million soldiers now in the field, still find it necessary at this time to blacken our record for the first time, by adopting into tho army of the United States the African slave, and making him tho equal and associate, by legislation, of tho gallant soldier who may have distinguished himself in many a hardfought battle; and that a captain Sambo and captain white somebody, and colonel Sambo and colonel white somebody must stand side by side, day after day, on terms of perfect equality?"
ilr. Dnnn, of Indiana, was in favor of these troops, urging as follows: "I havo another object in the employment of theso men, and I am willing hero to avow it. It is this: we have not only to conquer this rebel country, but we havo to bold it after it is conquered, ^e have for a time to hold it by force of arms; and the question arises whether we shall send our men of the North there to perish in Southern swamps and sickly localities, or whether wo shall make use of that population which, from their peculiar physical adaptation, can brave the malaria of that climate like alligators? If they aro ignorant in tho use of arms, instruct them in that use. Teach their 'hands to war, and their fingers to fight.' Are they so brutalized that they will not fight for their own libcrtv? Shall we receive them and edu
cate them to arms for this purpose, or shall we send our own sons there?"
Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, took tho floor in opposition to tho bill, saying: "You propose by this bill to raise a force of one hundred and fifty thousand slaves as soldiers. You include, to bo sure, arid permit to be enlisted, freo men of color. How, in a general view of the subject, can you approve of it? What is your reason for it? Have you any deficiency of numbers in your army? Have your own constituents shrunk from this contest? You say it is a contest for freedom, a contest for liberty; and shall we, sir, stigmatize our constituents, our brothers, the white free-born men of this land, as being so degenerate as to shrink from this contest, and so compel you to appeal to your own black men to defend the liberties of the white man?
"What a perversion of all feeling to make such an appeal! There is no want of patriotism, no want of courage upon the part of the free white men in this country. Have they shown any such want? In a war that has not lasted moro than eighteen months, you havo now in the field, or marching for the field, or in preparation for tho field, one million of white men, who, with a few exceptions, have voluntarily become soldiers. Where has the world exhibited such an example of universal patriotism and universal devotion to country? Yet in the face of all this, gentlemen here propose to raise one hundred and fifty thousand Americans of African descent. You stigmatize them, while you invite them into tho field. The bill is an indelible stigma upon their character. You employ them as soldiers to fight your battle, but give them only one half pay, and exclude them from command to a great extent. You put a stigma upon them, while you call them into the field, and while you say they are worthy to be the defenders of the liberties of this country. Your own soldiers are stigmatized by your own hands. Is this right; or is it anything else, in view of all this, but a portion of that abolition policy which would take every slave from the master? That must be the object. They are not necessary for the putting down of this rebellion. They are not worthy of being called to tho aid of those who aspire to be considered free-born men.
"All nations which have held slaves have been found to reject their services for military purposes in time of war. My learned friend from Ohio (Mr. Shellabarger,) who the other day was comparing these rebels to Catiline, is well enough acquainted with his history, and can bear testimony that he, that bold conspirator, had Roman pride enough left in tho midst of his vices to reject the assistance, even in his extremest hour of peril, of slaves and gladiators, although they were white slaves, men who had been born free, men who had. been made captives in war, and reduced by the inhuman policy of that ago to the con