river, terminating in Haines's Bluff, a distance of twelve or fifteen miles. They were fortified throughout their entire length. These bluffs front the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers. The ascent is abrupt and precipitous, and the only approach to the city by land from up the river is by climbing their face. In the rear the ground is high and broken, and somewhat rolling. It falls off gradually to the Big Black river.

The line of the Yazoo here is nearly northeast. It is six miles distant from the bluffs at Old river, and passes along their face until, at Haines's Bluff, the river and the bluffs come together. This junction is nine miles from Vicksburg by the road along the foot of the bluffs, and twenty-three miles from the Mississippi by the course of the Yazoo river. On the triangular-shaped bottom land between the bluffs and the Yazoo down to the Old river, the troops were disembarked for the purpose of getting in the rear of Vicksburg and capturing it.

About one third of the distance down the Yazoo from Haines's Bluff, a beyou puts off from the river at nearly right angles, until it approaches the bluffs, when it turns and follows their base until it empties into the Mississippi. It is called the Chickasaw bayou. Between this bayou and the bluffs is a plain, upon which the timber had been felled to form an abatis. The banks of the bayou are quite steep, and about two hundred feet apart. At the base of the bluffs, through their whole length, rifle pits had been dug, in the rear of which, upon the face of the bluffs, single-gun batteries had been planted at short intervals from Vicksburg almost to Haines's Bluff. At various commanding points along the range, both on its face and upon the summit, field works were thrown up for the reception and protection of light artillery whenever it might be needed.

Parallel with, and about half a mile north of the Chickasaw bayou, is a deep slough, having no connection with the river. As it approaches the base of the bluffs, it makes a sharp turn and enters Chickasaw bayou near the point where the latter makes its angle as it strikes the bluffs. In the latter part of its extent it contains but little water; its bottom, however, is a quicksand, which does not afford good footing. The bottom land of the Yazoo is covered with a dense growth of cypress trees: much of it is quite clear and free from undergrowth, while in other parts it is quite thick.

The first troops landed, on the 26th, were a brigade, under Gen. Blair, of Gen. Steele's division, and a brigade from each of the divisions under Gens. M. L. Smith and Morgan. They were ordered to advance two miles into the country, and make a thorough reconnoissance in the direction of the bluffs. The brigade from Gen. Morgan's division found the rebels in force about two miles inland. The other brigades met with no opposition. No conflict took place.

The force of Gen. Sherman was organized in four divisions as follows: First division, three

brigades, under Brig.-Gen. George W. Morgan; second division, three brigades, under Brig.Gen. Morgan L. Smith; third division, three brigades, under Brig.-Gen. A. J. Smith; fourth division, four brigades, under Brig.-Gen. Frederick Steele. The brigade commanders of this fourth division were Gens. Frank P. Blair, jr., John M. Thayer, C. E. Hovey, and Col. Hassendurbel.

Under the plan of attack, Gen. Steele was to hold the extreme left, Gen. Morgan the left centre, Gen. M. L. Smith the right centre, and Gen. A. J. Smith the extreme right. The division under Gen. Smith, however, not having arrived, Gen. Blair was placed on the right centre. All the divisions were to converge toward the point of attack on the bluffs. The remainder of the division of Gen. Steele was landed on the 27th above the Chickasaw bayou, to operate on that part of the line. The entire day was spent in getting the troops ashore. The bank of the river was overgrown with brush, and the ground was so soft that it was necessary to build roads for moving the wagons and artillery. At night the command had advanced only two miles from the shore.

On the same day, the 27th, the divisions on the centre, including Gen. Blair's brigade, advanced slowly toward the bluffs, in order to give time to Gen. Steele to come into position on the left. A battery of the enemy was found near the point designated for junction with Gen. Steele, not far from the angle of the bayou, and silenced. The night ensuing was cold and frosty, and the troops bivouacked without fires.

On the next day, the 28th, the enemy was driven across the Chickasaw, and night closed with the troops of Gen. Sherman in full possession south of the bayou, with one bridge thrown across, and with two bridges partly constructed. While reconnoitring the ground and directing the movement of some infantry, Gen. M. L. Smith was severely wounded in the hip, and the command of his division devolved upon Gen. David Stuart. Meanwhile, Gen. Steele had pushed forward his command. The slough on his right was deep and impassable, and on the left the ground had become swampy and full of small pools, so as to be also impassable. The only line of approach to the bluffs was along a narrow levee or causeway, which was exposed throughout to the enemy's artillery. Three attempts were made to approach the causeway, but the destruction of the troops was so manifest that they were withdrawn. Gen. Sherman, under this state of affairs, ordered Gen. Steele to return to the river, reembark and land on the lower side of the Chickasaw, thus holding still the extreme left, and advance upon its bank until he met Gen. Morgan. It was too late in the evening of the 28th when the troops were fairly on shore below the bayous to move farther. At this time the division of Gen. A. J. Smith came up and took its position on the right of the line. It had remained at Milliken's Bend as a support to a

BAYOU CHICKASA

The situation of the forces at this time was as follows: Gen. Morgan was in position on the south side of the Chickasaw; near its angle, at the base of the bluffs, and on his immediate right, was Gen. Blair's brigade; Gen. M. L. Smith's division, under Gen. Stuart, was on the right centre, and Gen. A. J. Smith was moving up to the extreme right. Gen. Steele was coming up on the left to act as a reserve to Gen. Morgan.

At daylight on the 29th, the Confederate batteries began to fire upon Gen. Morgan's position, and continued it for an hour, although with little effect. With several cessations the cannonade was kept up during the forenoon. Occasionally engagements of infantry, as the opposing regiments came in reach of each other, took place. Several detachments were throwing bridges across the bayou, for the purpose of making an assault on the bluffs. The brigade of Gen. Blair had crossed the bayou before it turned along the bluffs, and was in position at the front of the hill, with a small abatis and a deep ditch between it and the point it designed to assail. On his right, at the point where the bayou makes its angle, was Gen. Morgan. Next to him was Gen. Stuart, and on the extreme right was Gen. A. J. Smith, preparing to throw a bridge across.

No order had been issued by Gen. Sherman appointing an hour for the assault. But by order of Gen. Morgan, Gen. Blair advanced, and Gen. Thayer, of Gen. Steele's brigade, came up for his support. The difficulties of crossing the ditch, and passing the abatis, were such, that the line of Gen. Blair was thrown into some disorder, which, however, it soon recovered, and moved forward upon the Confederate works. The first movement was over a sloping plateau, raked by a direct and enfilading fire from heavy artillery, and swept by a storm

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of bullets from the rifle pits. Undauntedly the brigade passed on, and in a few moments drove the enemy from their first range of rifle pits, and took full possession of them. Halting for a moment, the brigade pushed forward and took possession of the second line of rifle pits about two hundred yards distant. The batteries were above this line, and their fire still continued. A prompt and powerful support was necessary to make the attempt to capture them.

Simultaneously with the advance of Gen. Blair, an order was given to Gen. Thayer, of Gen. Steele's division, to go forward with his brigade. He crossed the bayou by the same bridge as Gen. Blair, and, entered the abatis at the same point, and deflecting to the right, came out upon the sloping plateau, about two hundred yards to the right of Gen. Blair, and at the same time. As he reached the rifle pits, with a heavy loss, he perceived that only one regiment, the Fourth Iowa, Col. Williamson, had followed him. After his movement commenced, the second regiment of his brigade had been sent to the right of Gen. Morgan as a support. The other regiments had followed this one. Notice of this change of the march of the second regiment, although sent, had failed to reach Gen. Thayer. With little hope of success, he bravely pushed forward into the second line of rifle pits of the enemy on the right of Gen. Blair. Here, leaving the regiment to hold the position, he hurried back for reënforcements. Meanwhile, Gen. Blair, vainly waiting for support, descended in person to persuade the advance of more troops. He, and Gen. Thayer, both failed in their efforts, and were obliged to order their commands to retire.

While Gen. Blair was urging the advance of more troops, his brigade fought with desperation to win the way to the top of the crest. Some fifty yards above the second line of rifle pits was a cluster of small willows. Thither many of the enemy, driven from the rifle pits, had fled. They were promptly pursued by the Thirteenth Illinois, and driven out by a handto-hand contest. They were supported at once by the other regiments of the brigade, but the position was exposed to a hot fire of the enemy's batteries. Meantime, a Confederate infantry force was concentrated to attack them, and after a sharp struggle the latter were forced back to the second line of rifle pits, when Gen. Blair's order to retire was received. The division of Gen. Morgan was not brought over the bayou in time to engage in the assault. The division of Gen. Stuart encountered so much difficulty in constructing their bridges over the bayou, under a hot fire of the enemy, that only one regiment finally crossed over. The bridge was then commanded by a flanking fire of the enemy, which prevented others from crossing. The regiment which had crossed returned after dark. A notice of the intended movement on the left had not been given to the division commanders on the right of Gen. Morgan. The division of Gen. Smith was so near

to Vicksburg, and the strength of the enemy before him so great, that an assault would have been fruitless. Several sharp encounters, however, took place.

The real assault on the left was made by about three thousand men, and the loss was about eight hundred.

As soon as the assault on the left was concluded, Gen. Sherman determined to make another. A brigade, under the command of Gen. Hovey, was advanced to Gen. Blair's position at the mouth of the bayou, which was to assault the hill, supported by Gen. Morgan and the brigades of Gens. Blair and Thayer. The attack, however, was not made during the remainder of the day; and the next morning developed two new batteries of the enemy in position, and a portion of a new line of rifle pits. Firing was, however, kept up by both sides during that day; and on Wednesday, the 31st, a flag of truce was sent in by Gen. Sherman, and the dead were buried.

Afterward, on the 31st, arrangements were made to attack Haines's Bluff, which was supposed to be defended by a small force. The design, as formed between Admiral Porter and Gen. Sherman, was for a combined naval and land assault on the extreme Confederate right, with a view of getting a position on the bluffs, in the expectation that by so doing they would secure the key to the Confederate position, and compel the enemy to withdraw from the entire range of bluffs and form a new line at Vicksburg. It was planned to land the division of Gen. Steele out of range of the guns of the bluffs, and that they should immediately storm and carry the position. At the same time, the gunboats were to make an attack. The troops were made ready to embark at 2 o'clock A. M. of the next day, but a dense fog having settled on the river prevented their departure. The purpose evidently having become known to the enemy, it was finally given up.

The unexpected strength of the position of the enemy being manifest, and the failure of the forces under Gen. Grant to attack in the rear while Gen. Sherman made the attack in front, entirely disconcerted the original plan upon which the movement of Gen. Sherman was made. The loss of his communications by Gen. Grant, and the necessity for him to fall back, prevented this simultaneous attack on the front and rear of Vicksburg, and probably its capture at this time. It was supposed that the first assault under Gen. Sherman might have been successful if properly supported, so far as related to gaining the crest of the bluffs, although it was not thought that his force could have held it. Gen. Sherman, therefore, resolved to withdraw, and on Thursday night and Friday morning, January 2d, the troops were embarked and moved down to the mouth of the Yazoo river. The entire loss suffered in this expedition was 191 killed, 982 wounded, and 756 missing. Among the former was Lieut. Erwin, in command of a gunboat. Gen.

McClernand, who had been ordered to proceed from Cairo, was at the mouth of the Yazoo on the arrival of Gen. Sherman. The former officer then took the command, and ordered the forces to Milliken's Bend, about twelve miles up the river.

On the 4th of January, Gen. Sherman issued the following order:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
STEAMER FOREST QUEEN, MILLIKEN'S BEND,
January 4th, 1563.

Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two “ army corps; "one to be commanded by General G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own corps, I desire to express to all commanders, to soldiers and officers recently operating be rity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. fore Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alac We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement--the capture of Vicksburg; but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined time; unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the movement in which others were to assist. We were on others. We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushel the attack as far as prudence would justify, and bating found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good oflicers and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. Soldiers will give him the same hearty support and There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from the dire cen flict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff not attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by letter to Major-General McClernand, commanding the Army of the Mississippi, on board the steamer Tigress at our rendezvous at Haines's Landing and at Montgomery Point. By order of

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN. J. H. HAMMOND, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Subsequently, on the 8th, Gen. Pemberton, who had fallen back from before Gen. Grant, and had taken command at Vicksburg, issued the following address to his troops:

}

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI AND LOUISIANA, VICKSBURG, January 8th. The Lieut.-General commanding this department of the army desires to express to its troops his high appreciation of their gallant demeanor in the defence of this important position. All praise is due them, not alone for so bravely repulsing thie renewed assaults of an enemy vastly superior in numbers, but especially for the cheerful and patient endurance with which they have submitted to the hardships and exposures incident to ten successive days and nights of watchfulness close proximity of the opposing armies, while all have in trenches, rendered imperatively necessary by the performed their duties with benefit to their country and honor to themselves. Still, as must ever be the case in war, fortune has favored unequally those who by her favor held the posts of honor, and by their own resolute courage availed themselves of their opportu nity; to them special thanks are due. It will be a proud and agreeable duty of the Lieutenant-General

commanding to claim for them from their country the distinction and honor they so justly deserve. (Signed) J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General Commanding.

At the time of the arrival of Gen. McClernand, a plan had been agreed upon between Gen. Sherman and Rear-Admiral Porter to attack Arkansas Post. The reasons for making this attack were that there was time to do it while Gen. Grant was moving his army to Memphis; the blow would be entirely unexpected by the enemy; the Federal forces were amply sufficient to make a victory certain, which would be valuable in restoring the spirit of the troops disheartened by their recent failure, which was not understood in its true light. On the other hand, the Confederate force up the Arkansas river had shown considerable activity by sallies in which they had captured two steaners bearing supplies to the army below. Gen. McClernand approving of the enterprise, the forces moved up the Mississippi to Montgomery Point, opposite the mouth of

White river.

White river, one of the principal streams in Arkansas, rises a few miles east of Fayetteville, and flows in a northeasterly direction into Missouri about one hundred miles. It then returns into Arkansas, and pursues a southeasterly course, and enters the Mississippi about fifteen miles above the mouth of the Arkansas. It is navigable by steamboats three hundred and fifty miles.

On Friday, Jan. 9th, the ironclads Louisville, De Kalb, and Cincinnati, with all the light-draft gunboats, moved up the White river, followed by the fleet of transports. After ascending the White river about fifteen miles, the fleet passed through a cut-off to the left, eight miles in length, into the Arkansas river. Thus the White river empties by one channel into the Mississippi, and by another into the Arkansas, when it has a higher stage of water than the Arkansas. When the Arkansas is higher than the White river, one of the Arkansas currents comes through the cutoff and out by the White river into the Mississippi.

It was about 11 o'clock A. M. when the fleet passed into the Arkansas. This is, next to the Missouri, the longest affluent of the Mississippi river. It rises near the Rocky mountains, and flows through nearly the centre of the State of Arkansas, exceeding two thousand miles in length, and navigable, during nine months of the year, about eight hundred miles from its mouth.

About half past four in the afternoon, the fcet moved to the shore, and preparations were made to land three miles below the fort. The artillery and wagons were brought on shore during the evening and night, and in the morning the troops were landed and marballed in the fields bordering on the north bank. The attack, however, was begun by the gunboats.

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The Arkansas river, in its descent toward the Mississippi, makes here a sharp elbow by flowing north, then turning abruptly to the east, and after a short distance turning again as abruptly to the south. On the left bank, at the point where the river turns to the cast, the fort of Arkansas Post was located. Its guns commanded the river as it stretched to the cast, and even after the turn to the south.

The advance of the troops was along the outside bank of this curve of the river, and it was expected the attack on the fort would be made during the day, but at sundown they were not in position. The division of Gen. Stuart, by order of Gen. Sherman, had moved along the bank, passing two rows of rifle pits which had been abandoned, and reached the point for an attack, but the corps of Gen. Morgan had not then deployed on the left. Orders were then issued by Gen. McClernand for the troops to get into position during the night, so as to make an attack in the morning. The force of Gen. Sherman worked its way through the forest and marsh round to the right, so as to invest the fort, while a brigade was thrown across the river to prevent the arrival down of reënforcements to the rebels.

The fort, which was called "Fort Hindman," was a regular square bastioned work, one hundred yards each exterior side, with a deep ditch about fifteen feet wide, and a parapet eighteen feet high. It was armed with twelve guns, two of which were eight inch and one nine inch. The number of troops which it contained was about five thousand, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Churchill.

During the evening of the 10th, the fort was bombarded by the ironclads Cincinnati, Lieut.-Commander Geo. L. Bache; De Kalb, Lieut.-Com. John H. Walker, Louisville, Lieut.Com. R. L. Owen, all under the orders of Rear-Admiral Porter. The bombardment continued over a half hour, and the firing was active on both sides. The distance of the boats from the fort was about four hundred yards.

About noon on the 11th, the fleet was notified, by order of Gen. McClernand, that the army was ready, and a joint attack was made. The gunboats took a position within about three hundred yards of the fort and opened fire. The fort had opened upon them as soon as they came in sight. At the same time a battery of Gen. Sherman's began to fire, and the troops were advanced to attack. It was not long before the heavy guns of the fort were silenced by the gunboats, but the action on the part of the military grew more severe until four o'clock, when the enemy were so far overcome as to raise the white flag. A rush was immediately made, both by the land troops and naval force, to occupy the works, and the surrender was made complete. The less of Gen. McClernand was about six hundred, of whom one hundred and twenty were killed. The Confederate loss was less, owing to the shelter of their troops. About sixty-five were