with fine effect, compelling the enemy to shift their batteries several times. At the same time the enemy endeavored to throw forward a body of sharpshooters, but were prevented by the fire of our men from so doing. The artillery duel and sharpshooting continued for about three hours, when Gen. Pemberton rode up and ordered our men to cease firing, as he desired no artillery duels. In obedience to the order, our men ceased firing, and the result was that next morning, the enemy, emboldened by our silence, approached one hundred yards nearer than they were the day before, without any opposition. On Tuesday the enemy made their first assault on the line of works held by Brig.-Gen. Shoup's brigade of Louisianians. They marched up in one solid column, our men withholding their fire until the enemy had approached within thirty yards of the lines, when they opened a terrific volley of musketry. The enemy wavered a moment, and then marched forward. They were again met by another volley, when they broke and fled under cover of the hills. This was the only attempt made on that day to force our lines, and the attempt was evidently made more with the intention of 'feeling' our lines than with any serious idea of storming them." By the 21st, the arrangements of Gen. Grant for drawing supplies of every description were completed, and he determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault. His rea sons for this are thus stated: "I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reënforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly to succeed in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to turn upon Johnston and drive him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. It would have saved Government sending large reënforcements much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works." Accordingly, orders were issued on the 21st for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at 10 A. M. on the next day. This assault is thus described by Gen. Grant: "All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in the movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions, and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded; but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed. "No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works, with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the Twenty-first regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time. The assault proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, or other evidence of demoralization." A Confederate report thus describes the manner in which the assault was met by them: "The days intervening from the 19th to the 22d were spent in one continued bombarding and sharpshooting during the day; in the night they generally ceased firing. On the morning of the 22d, the enemy opened a terrific fire with their Parrott guns, and continued it till about eleven o clock, when the bombardment ceased, and heavy columns of the enemy could be seen forming in line of battle. Our forces were all ready for them, and eager for their advance. At about a quarter to twelve, the column of the Federal army advanced all along the lines in splendid order, and with a loud cheer dashed up to the works. They were gallantly responded to by our brave boys, and the first charge repulsed. On the extreme right of our lines, the nature of the ground prevented the enemy from making any heavy attack, but on the right of the centre, the centre, and the left of the centre, the assault was desperately made and gallantly met. But once did our lines break, and that was in Lee's brigade. The enemy gained a temporary footing on the rifle pits, but Lee quickly rallied his men, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and reoccupied the lines. The engagement at this point and at the right of the line, held by Brig.-Gen. L. Herbert, was of a terrible nature, the Federals having thrown their best troops on these works. Five times did they charge, and each time were repulsed. The last charge on the right of Brig.-Gen. Herbert's lines was made by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of Erin. They came at a double quick up the hill, each man in the front rank furnished with ladders to reach the works. Three times they essayed to plant their ladders, but were prevented by the obstinate resistance offered by the consolidated Twenty-first and Twentythird Louisiana regiments. At the third charge they came within ten yards of the line, but two volleys of buckshot from the shotguns of our forces compelled them to make a precipitate retreat from the front of our works. At about 2 o'clock they made their last charge, and were again repulsed, when they retired, and did not attempt any further demonstration that day. The loss of the enemy on that day is estimated by competent parties at not less than from 8,000 to 10,000, while our loss was between 800 and 1,000 in killed and wounded." The following despatch of Rear-Admiral Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, describes the part taken in this conflict by the naval force: MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG SHIP BLACK HAWK, March 23d, 1563. SIR: On the evening of the 21st I received a com munication from Gen. Grant, informing me that he intended to attack the whole of the rebel works at 10 A. M. the next day, and asking me to shell the batteries from 9.30 until 10.30, to annoy the garrisons. I kept six mortars playing rapidly on the works and town all night, and sent the Benton, Mound City, and Carondelet up to shell the water batteries and other places where troops might be resting during the night. At seven o'clock in the morning, the Mound City proceeded across the river, and made an attack on the joined her in company with the Benton, Tuscumbia, hill batteries opposite the canal. At eight o'clock I and Carondelet. All these vessels opened on the hill batteries and finally silenced them, though the main work on the battery containing the heavy rifled gun was done by the Mound City, Lieut.-Commanding City, and Carondelet up to the water batteries, leaving Byron Wilson. I then pushed the Benton, Mound the Tuscumbia, which is still out of repair, to keep the bill batteries from firing on our vessels after they had passed by. The three gunboats passed up slowly, owing to the strong current, the Mound City leading, the Benton following, and the Carondelet astern. The water batteries opened furiously, supported by a hill battery on the starboard beam of the vessels. The vessels advanced to within 440 yards (by our marks), and returned the fire for two hours without cessa- Finding that the hill batteries behind us were silenced, I ordered up the Tuscumbia to within 200 yards of the batteries, but her turret was soon made her drop down. I had been engaged with the forts an untenable. Not standing the enemy's shot, I made hour longer than Gen. Grant asked. The vessels had all received severe shots under water, which we could might have delayed the movement of the army, I or not stop up while in motion, and not knowing what dered the vessels to drop out of fire, which they did in a cool, handsome manner. This was the hottest fire the gunboats have ever been under, but owing to with fine effect, compelling the enemy to shift their batteries several times. At the same time the enemy endeavored to throw forward a body of sharpshooters, but were prevented by the fire of our men from so doing. The artillery duel and sharpshooting continued for about three hours, when Gen. Pemberton rode up and ordered our men to cease firing, as he desired no artillery duels. In obedience to the order, our men ceased firing, and the result was that next morning, the enemy, emboldened by our silence, approached one hundred yards nearer than they were the day before, without any opposition. On Tuesday the enemy made their first assault on the line of works held by Brig.-Gen. Shoup's brigade of Louisianians. They marched up in one solid column, our men withholding their fire until the enemy had approached within thirty yards of the lines, when they opened a terrific volley of musketry. The enemy wavered a moment, and then marched forward. They were again met by another volley, when they broke and fled under cover of the hills. This was the only attempt made on that day to force our lines, and the attempt was evidently made more with the intention of 'feeling' our lines than with any serious idea of storming them." By the 21st, the arrangements of Gen. Grant for drawing supplies of every description were completed, and he determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault. His rea sons for this are thus stated: "I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reënforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly to succeed in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to turn upon Johnston and drive him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. It would have saved Government sending large reënforcements much needed elsewhere; and, finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works." Accordingly, orders were issued on the 21st for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at 10 A. M. on the next day. This assault is thus described by Gen. Grant: "All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in the movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions, and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded; but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed. "No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works, with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the Twenty-first regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time. The assault proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, or other evidence of demoralization." A Confederate report thus describes the manner in which the assault was met by them: "The days intervening from the 19th to the 22d were spent in one continued bombarding and sharpshooting during the day; in the night they generally ceased firing. On the morning of the 22d, the enemy opened a terrific fire with their Parrott guns, and continued it till about eleven o clock, when the bombardment ceased, and heavy columns of the enemy could be seen forming in line of battle. Our forces were all ready for them, and eager for their advance. At about a quarter to twelve, the column of the Federal army advanced all along the lines in splendid order, and with a loud cheer dashed up to the works. They were gallantly responded to by our brave boys, and the first charge repulsed. On the extreme right of our lines, the nature of the ground prevented the enemy from making any heavy attack, but on the right of the centre, the centre, and the left of the centre, the assault was desperately made and gallantly met. But once did our lines break, and that was in Lee's brigade. The enemy gained a temporary footing on the rifle pits, but Lee quickly rallied his men, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and reoccupied the lines. The engagement at this point and at the right of the line, held by Brig. Gen. L. Herbert, was of a terrible nature, the Federals having thrown their best troops on these works. Five times did they charge, and each time were repulsed. The last charge on the right of Brig.-Gen. Herbert's lines was made by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of Erin. They came at a double quick up the hill, each man in the front rank furnished with ladders to reach the works. Three times they essayed to plant their ladders, but were prevented by the obstinate resistance offered by the consolidated Twenty-first and Twentythird Louisiana regiments. At the third charge they came within ten yards of the line, but two volleys of buckshot from the shotguns of our forces compelled them to make a precipitate retreat from the front of our works. At about 2 o'clock they made their last charge, and were again repulsed, when they retired, and did not attempt any further demonstration that day. The loss of the enemy on that day is estimated by competent parties at not less than from 8,000 to 10,000, while our loss was between 800 and 1,000 in killed and wounded." The following despatch of Rear-Admiral Porter to the Secretary of the Navy, describes the part taken in this conflict by the naval force: MISSISSIPPI SQUADRON, FLAG SHIP BLACK HAWK, SIR: On the evening of the 21st I received a com munication from Gen. Grant, informing me that he intended to attack the whole of the rebel works at 10 A. M. the next day, and asking me to shell the batteries from 9.30 until 10.30, to annoy the garrisons. I kept six mortars playing rapidly on the works and town all night, and sent the Benton, Mound City, and Carondelet up to shell the water batteries and other places where troops might be resting during the night." At seven o'clock in the morning, the Mound City proceeded across the river, and made an attack on the At eight o'clock I hill batteries opposite the canal. joined her in company with the Benton, Tuscumbia, and Carondelet. All these vessels opened on the hill batteries and finally silenced them, though the main work on the battery containing the heavy rifled gun was done by the Mound City, Lieut.-Commanding City, and Carondelet up to the water batteries, leaving Byron Wilson. I then pushed the Benton, Mound the Tuscumbia, which is still out of repair, to keep the hill batteries from firing on our vessels after they had passed by. The three gunboats passed up slowly, owing to the strong current, the Mound City leading, the Benton following, and the Carondelet astern. The water batteries opened furiously, supported by a hill battery on the starboard beam of the vessels. The vessels advanced to within 440 yards (by our marks), and returned the fire for two hours without cessation, the enemy's fire being very accurate and in cessant. Finding that the hill batteries behind us were silenced, I ordered up the Tuscumbia to within 200 yards of the batteries, but her turiet was soon made untenable. Not standing the enemy's shot, I made her drop down. I had been engaged with the forts an hour longer than Gen. Grant asked. The vessels had all received severe shots under water, which we could not stop up while in motion, and not knowing what might have delayed the movement of the army, I orin a cool, handsome manner. dered the vessels to drop out of fire, which they did This was the hottest fire the gunboats have ever been under, but owing to the water batteries being more on a level with them than usual, the gunboats threw in their shells so fast that the aim of the enemy was not very good. The enemy hit our vessels a number of times, but, fight ing bow on, they did but little damage. Not a man was killed, and only a few wounded. I had only ammunition enough for a few minutes longer, and set all hands to work to fill up from our depot below. After dropping back I found that the enemy had taken possession again of one of the lower hill batteries, and was endeavoring to remount his guns, and had mounted a 12-pounder field piece to fire at General McArthur's troops, which had landed a short time before at Warrenton. I sent the Mound City and the Carondelet to drive him off, which they did in a few moments. I beg leave to enclose a letter from Gen. McArthur, explaining why he did not, to use his own expression, take advantage of the result gained by the gun boats. I have since learned through General Grant, that the army did assault at the right time vigorously. In the noise and smoke we could not hear or see it. The gunboats were, therefore, still fighting when the assault had proved unsuccessful. The army had terrible work before them, and are fighting as well as soldiers ever fought before, but the works are stronger than any of us dreamed of. Gen. Grant and his soldiers are confident that the brave and energetic generals in the army will soon overcome all obstacles and carry the works. (Signed) DAVID D. PORTER, Acting Rear-Admiral, Com. Miss. Squadron. Hon. G. WELLES, Secretary of the Navy. Gen. Grant now determined upon a regular siege of Vicksburg, and immediately began to mine the lines. The orders given to the enemy, by Gen. Pemberton, forbade the waste of ammunition, and thus Gen. Grant was able to commence throwing up works and erecting forts within a short distance of the opposing line of breast works. The firing upon the town was made only during the day, until the 26th of May, after which it was continued day and night. The mortars on the peninsula opposite Vicksburg opened fire on the 25th, and continued it until the surrender. It was estimated at Vicksburg that as many as 6,000 mortar shells were thrown into the town every twenty-four hours, and on the line in the rear of the city, as many as 4,000 in the same time. Of the women and children remaining in the city, three were killed and twelve wounded during the siege. During about five days after the siege commenced, the troops in the city were allowed full rations. At the expiration of that time, they were gradually reduced to the following amount: four ounces of flour, four ounces of bacon, one and a half ounce of rice, two ounces of peas, not eatable, and three ounces of sugar, making a total of fourteen and a half ounces of food daily. The extent of the works, and the limited number of the Confederate troops, required every man to defend their lines, and no time was allowed to rest. Whole companies laid back of their breastworks for three weeks without leaving the line for a moment. The sharpshooters of Gen. Grant's army were regarded by the enemy as splendid shots, and after the first few days of the siege it was dangerous for any one of the enemy to look over their breastworks, In one instance, a hat placed on a stick, and held above a port for two minutes, was pierced by fifteen balls. The sharpshooters of the enemy were no less expert. The garrison was buoyed up with the hope of relief by an attack upon the rear of Gen. Grant's army by Gen. Johnston, who was gathering troops in Mississippi. Meantime every effort was made to strengthen the force under the command of Gen. Grant. He had already ordered a division under Gen. Lanman and four regiments at Memphis to join him. He now brought forward the divis ions of Gens. Smith and Kimball, of the sixteenth army corps, and placed them under the command of Maj.-Gen. C. C. Washburn. On the 11th of June, Maj.-Gen. F. J. Herron's division, from the department of Missouri, arrived, and on the 14th, two divisions of the ninth army corps, Maj.-Gen. J. G. Parke commanding, reached Vicksburg. These two divisions were a part of the forces of Gen. Burnside, commanding in the Department of Ohio. This increase of the forces of Gen. Grant enabled him to make the investment of Vicksburg more complete, and at the same time left him a large reserve with which to watch the movements of Gen. Johnston. These reënforcements were arranged by placing Gen. Herron's division on the extreme left, south of the city. Gen. Lanman's division was placed between Gens. Herron and McClernand. Gen. Smith's and Gen. Kimball's divisions and the force under Gen. Parke were sent to Haines's Bluff. This place was now fortified on the land side, and every preparation made to resist a heavy force. About the 25th of June, Gen. Johnston crossed the Big Black river with a portion of his force, and everything indicated that he would make an attack. The position of Gen. Grant before Vicksburg having been made as strong against a sortie of the enemy as their works were against an assault, he placed Gen. Sherman in command of all the troops designated to look after Gen. Johnston. The force so designated, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was one division from the thirteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth army corps each, and Gen. Lauman's division. As Gen. Johnston did not make the attack at the time it was expected, Gen Grant determined to attack him as soon as Vicksburg was taken. He accordingly notified Gen. Sherman that another assault on Vicksburg would be made at daylight on the 6th of July, and ordered him to have up supplies of all descriptions, and to be ready to move upon the receipt of further or ders, if the assault should prove successful. Gen. Sherman made his preparations immediately, and was ready to move earlier than the time appointed. On the 6th of June an attack was made on Milliken's Bend, in which the enemy were repulsed. The Union loss was 101 killed, 285 wounded, and 266 missing. Gen. Halleck, in his report, says: "It is represented that the |