and left of centre, by the divisions under Maj.Gen. Augur and Brig.-Gen. Sherman. The enemy was driven into his works, and the Federal troops moved up to the fortifications, holding the opposite sides of the parapet with the enemy. On the right, the troops continued to hold their position; but on the left, after dark, the main body, being exposed to a flank fire, withdrew to a belt of woods. The skirmishers remained close upon the fortifications. On the extreme right, the first and third regiments of negro troops were posted. Of their behavior in action, Gen. Banks thus reports: "The position occupied by these troops was one of importance, and called for the utmost steadiness and bravery in those to whom it was confided. It gives me pleasure to report that they answered every expectation. In many respects their conduct was heroic. No troops could be more determined or more daring. They made during the day three charges upon the batteries of the enemy, suffering very heavy losses, and holding their position at Lightfall with the other troops on the right of our line. The highest commendation is bestowed upon them by all the officers in command on the right. Whatever doubt may have existed heretofore as to the efficiency of organizations of this character, the history of this day proves conclusively to those who were in condition to observe the conduct of these regiments, that the Government will find in this class of troops effective supporters and defenders. The severe test to which they were subjected, and the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy, leaves upon my mind no doubt of their ultimate success. They require only good officers, commands of limited numbers, and careful discipline, to make them excellent soldiers." The entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing, since landing at Bayou Sara to this time, was nearly a thousand, including some of the ablest officers of the corps, among whom was Gen. Sherman. A bombardment of the position had been made by the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for & week previous to this assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex.

On the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another assault on Port Hudson was made. The position of Gen. Banks's forces at this time was somewhat changed, forming only a right and left without a centre, and, joined together, making a right angle. The division of Gen. Grover, on the upper side of Port Hudson, extended a distance of nearly four miles from the river toward the interior, within supporting distance of Gen. Augur's division. This was on the west side of the

enemy's fortifications, and extended a distance of three miles to the river, and within hailing of the fleet. At this time, looking from the extreme northeasterly range of the enemy's rifle pits toward the river, on the upper side of Port Hudson,, a long line of earthworks could be seen, glistening with bayonets, and protected by a deep ditch nearly twelve feet in width. Within short range, enfilading breastworks commanded every approach to the position of the enemy. The defences of the enemy formed nearly a right angle, both lines of which extended to the river, and enclosed a sharp bend. The point of attack was the extreme northeasterly angle of the enemy's position. For some days previous, several pieces of their artillery had been dismounted by the Federal fire and abandoned, while those in position were rendered useless by the fire of the sharpshooters. Two regiments were detailed as sharpshooters, who were to creep up and lie on the exterior slope of the enemy's breastworks, while another regiment-each soldier having a hand grenade besides his musketfollowed. These grenades were to be thrown over into the enemy's position. Another regiment followed with bags filled with cotton, which were to be used to fill up the ditch in front of the breastworks. After these regiments came the others of Gen. Weitzel's brigade. Following these as a support were the brigades of Col. Kimball and Col. Morgan. These forces under Gen. Weitzel were designed for the attack on the right. In conjunction, on the left, moved the old division of Gen. Emory under Gen. Paine, forming a separate column. Both divisions were under the command of Gen. Grover, who planned the attack. It was expected that Gen. Weitzel's command would make a lodgment inside of the enemy's works, and thus prepare the way for Gen. Paine's division. The advance was made about daylight, through a covered way, to within three hundred yards of the enemy's position; then the field consisted of deep gullies covered by brush and creeping vines. The fire of the enemy was incessant, but a part of the skirmishers succeeded in reaching the ditch, where they were immediately repulsed by an enfilading fire. But little was therefore accomplished with the hand grenades, as they were at once caught up by the enemy, and hurled back. Meanwhile the assaulting column moved forward as rapidly as possible, and made a series of desperate assaults on the works, but the enemy were fully prepared, and lined every part of their fortifications with heavy bodies of infantry.

It was a part of the general plan of attack that a feint should be made on the extreme left by Gens. Augur and Dwight. This assault was made, and the fighting was extremely desperate on the part of the forces under Gen. Dwight. At length all the assaulting columns were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the morning. The loss of Gen.

The withdrawal of Gen. Banks's force from the west side of the Mississippi was followed by great activity on the part of the enemy, for the purpose of recovering the places held by a small body of Federal troops, and to cause a diversion from Port Hudson. Opelousas was reoccupied by a considerable Confederate force; the west bank of the Mississippi was lined with squads of the rebels, who fired upon every boat which passed. A raid was made upon Plaquemine by a body of Texans, who burned two steamers lying there. They were driven out by Lieut. Weaver, commanding the gunboat Winona. On the 17th of June, an attack was made on the Federal pickets at La Fourche, which was repulsed. On the next day it was repeated with the same result. On the 23d, Brashear City was captured by a confederate force under Gens. Green and Morton. A camp of slaves, or contrabands, as they were called, was attacked by the enemy, and large numbers killed. Immense quantities of ammunition, several pieces of artillery, three hundred thousand dollars' worth of sutler's goods, sugar, flour, pork, beef, and medical stores, of vast amount, were also captured. On the 28th, an attack was made on Donaldsonville, and the storming party succeeded in getting into the fort. But the gunboats opened a flanking fire above and below the fort, and drove back the supporting party, so that the enemy broke and fled. Of those who had entered the fort, one hundred and twenty were captured and nearly one hundred killed.

Other movements on the part of the enemy were made at this time, which indicated great activity, and enabled them to destroy much Federal property. No embarrassment however was caused to the position of Gen. Banks. The enemy, in short, recovered the La Fourche, Teche, Attakapas, and Opelousas country, and captured Brashear, with fifteen hundred prisoners, a large number of slaves, and nearly all the confiscated cotton.

After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the purpose to make another was given up by Gen. Banks, until he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender was sent to Gen. Banks, and it was made the occasion for firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender was communicated. Gen. Gardner, upon receiving the infor

GENERAL: Having received information from your troops that Vicksburg has been surrendered, I make cial assurance whether this is true or not, and if true, this communication to request you to give me the ofl

I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the
consideration of terms for surrendering this position.
I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

FRANK GARDNER, Major-General. To which Gen. Banks thus replied:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF, { BEFORE PORT HUDSON, July 8th, 1568. f To Maj.-Gen. Frank Gardner, commanding C. S. Forces, Port Hudson:

GENERAL: In reply to your communication, dated the 7th instant, by flag of truce, received a few momen's

since, I have the honor to inform you that I received, boat General Price, an official despatch from Majore yesterday morning, July 7th, at 10.45, by the gunGen. Ulysses S. Grant, United States Army, whereof the following is a true extract:

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, NEAR VICKSBURG, July 4th, 1963. [ "Maj.-Gen. N. P. Danks, commanding Department of the Gulf:

"GENERAL: The garrison of Vicksburg surrendered this morning. The number of prisoners, as given by the officer, is 27,000, field artillery 128 pieces, and a large number of siege guns, probably not less than eighty.

Your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, Major-General." cannot, consistently with my duty, consent to a cessaI regret to say, that under present circumstances, I tion of hostilities for the purpose you indicate. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. BANKS.

The following further correspondence then took place: PORT HUDSON, July 8th, 1563. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, giving a copy of an official communication from Major-Gen. U. S. Grant, United States Army, announcing the surren der of Vicksburg.

duty requires, I am willing to surrender to you, and Having defended this position as long as I deem my will appoint a commission of three officers to meet a similar commission appointed by yourself, at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon and drawing up the terms of the surrender, and for that purpose I ask for a cessation of hostilities. breastworks, where the meeting shall be held for this Will you please designate a point outside of my purpose?

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, FRANK GARDNER, Commanding C. S. Forces. HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES, DEFORE PORT HUDSON, July 8th, 1868. To Maj.-Gen. Frank Gurdner, commanding Confel erate States Forces, Port Hudson:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, stating that you are willing to surrender the garrison under your command to the forces under my command, and that you will appoint a commission of three officers to meet a similar commission appointed by me, at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon and drawing up the terms of the surrender.

In reply, I have the honor to state that I have de signated Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, Col. Henry W. Birge, and Lieut.-Col. Richard B. Irwin, as the officers to meet the commission appointed by you.

direction. The movement of Gen. Hooker was made by a road three miles north of the river, and concealed from the view of the enemy's pickets on the south bank. That night, at ten o'clock, a storm from the northeast commenced with high wind and torrents of rain. The march began the next morning at daylight, but the roads had become almost impassable. In every gully, batteries, caissons, supply wagons, ambulances, and pontoons were mired. All day there was a constant and exhausting struggle of men, horses, and mules with the mud. On Wednesday night the wearied troops lay down in their blankets. The storm still continued.

During the next day an effort was made to concentrate on the high table land near Banks's Ford. It now became too manifest that it would be impossible to get the army through the freshly cut roads to the river, so that the fords could be reached. On Friday the storm abated, but further progress was necessarily suspended, and on the next day the movement was abandoned, and the army returned to its former quarters.

On Monday, the 26th, Gen. Burnside issued the following address, surrendering the command of the army to Gen. Hooker:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, January 26th, 1563. } By direction of the President of the United States, the Commanding General this day transfers the command of this army to Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker.

The short time that he has directed your movements has not been fruitful of victory or any considerable advancement of our lines, but it has again demonstrated an amount of courage, patience, and endurance that

under more favorable circumstances would have accomplished great results.

Continue to exercise these virtues. Be true in your devotion to your country and the principles you have sworn to maintain. Give to the brave and skilful general who has long been identified with your or ganization, and who is now to command you, your full and cordial support and coöperation, and you will de

At his own request, Gen. Burnside was relieved of his command, and the President immediately conferred it upon Gen. Hooker. The views under which this command had been accepted by Gen. Burnside were thus stated by him in his testimony before a committee appointed by Congress to investigate the conduct of the war:

On the 7th or 8th of November, I received an order from the President of the United States, directing me to take command of the Army of the Potomac, and also a copy of an order relieving Gen. McClellan from that command. This order was conveyed to me by

Gen. Buckingham, who was attached to the War Department. After getting over my surprise, the shock, &c., I told Gen. Buckingham that it was a matter that required very serious thought; that I did not want the command; that it had been offered to me twice before,

and I did not feel that I could take it; I counselled with two of my staff officers in regard to it, for, I should I had no right, as a soldier, to disobey the order, and think, an hour and a half. They urged upon me that that I had already expressed to the Government my unwillingness to take the command; I told them what my views were with reference to my ability to exercise such a command, which views were those I had unmand such a large army as this; I had said the same reservedly expressed, that I was not competent to com over and over again to the President and Secretary of War; and also that if matters could be satisfactorily arranged with Gen. McClellan, I thought he coll other general in it. command the Army of the Potomac better than any

On the same day when Gen. Burnside retired, Gen. Hooker, on assuming the command, issued the following address to the army:

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, January 26th, 1963. the undersigned assumes command of the Army of the By direction of the President of the United States Potomac.

He enters upon the discharge of the duties imposed by the trust with a just appreciation of their respon sibility. Since the formation of this army he has been identified with its history; he has shared with you its glories and reverses, with no other desire than that these relations might remain unchanged until its des tiny should be accomplished.

In the record of your achievements there is much t be proud of, and, with the blessing of God, we will contribute something to the renown of our arms and the success of our cause. To secure these ends your commander will require the cheerful and zealous cooperation of every officer and soldier in the army. In equipment, intelligence, and valor the enemy is our inferior. Let us never hesitate to give him battle whenever we can find him.

The undersigned only gives expression to the feelings of this army when he conveys to our late com mander, Maj.-Gen. Burnside, the most cordial good wishes for his future.

My staff will be announced as soon as organized.
JOSEPH HOOKER,

Maj.-Gen. Commanding Army of the Potomac. Gens. Sumner and Franklin were at the same time relieved of the command of the right and left divisions of the army. The following is the official order of the President under which these changes were made:

HEADQUARTERS oF THE ARMY,
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, January 25th, 1563.

I. The President of the United States has directed: First. That Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

Second. That Maj.-Gen. E. V. Sumner, at his own request, be relieved from duty in the Army of the Po

tomac.

from duty in the Army of the Potomac. Third. That Maj.-Gen. W. B. Franklin be relieved

Fourth. That Maj.-Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac. The officers relieved as above will report in person to the Adjutant-General of the Army. By order of the Secretary of War,

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. S. Congress adopted the following resolution: On the 26th of January, the Senate of the U.

Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire whether Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for the movement of the Army of the

Potomac, or any portion of the same; and if so, whether any subordinate generals of said army have written to or visited Washington to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with, and, if so, by what authority.

The report of the committee, which was published in April, 1863, thus states the proceedings under the resolution:

Under that resolution, your committee proceeded to take the testimony of Maj.-Gens. A. E. Burnside and John G. Parke, and Brig.-Gens. John Newton, John Cochrane, and Wm. W. Averill. That testimony brings to light the following facts:

Shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in his front. The main army was to cross at a place some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossings were all selected; the roads were all surveyed, and the corduroy was cut for preparing the roads. At the same time a feint of crossing was to be made some distance above Falmouth, which feint could be turned into a positive attack should the enemy discover the movement below; otherwise the main attack was to be made below. In connection with this movement of the main army, a cavalry expedition was organized, consisting of twenty-five hundred of the best cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, one thousand of whom were picked men. The plan of that expedition was as follows: Accompanied by a brigade of infantry detailed to protect the crossing of the Rappahannock, it was to proceed to Kelly's Ford; there the thousand picked men were to cross, and to proceed to the Rapidan, and cross that river at Racoon Ford; then to go onward and cross the Virginia Central railroad at Louisa Court House; the James river at Goochland or Carter's, blowing up the locks of the James River canal at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at a point south of there, blowing up the iron bridge at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon railroad where it crosses the Nottoway river, destroying the railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by Gen. Pryor's command, and effect a junction with Gen. Peck at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in waiting to take them to Aquia creek. To distract the attention of the enemy, and to deceive them in regard to which body of cavalry was the attacking coluzan, at the time the thousand picked men crossed the Kappahannock a portion of the remaining fifteen hundred was to proceed toward Warrenton; another portoa toward Culpepper Court House; and the remainder re to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Racoon Ford, and then return. While this cavalry expedition was in progress, the general movement was to be made across the river.

On the 26th of December an order was issued for the entire command to prepare three days' cooked rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take for age for their teams and their artillery and cavalry orses, and the requisite amount of ammunition-in fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve hours' Dctice.

Shortly after that order was issued, Gen. John Newtin and Gen. John Cochrane-the one commanding a vision and the other a brigade in the left grand division, under Gen. William B. Franklin-came up to Washington on leave of absence. Previous to obtainig leave of absence from Gen. Franklin, they informed Min and Gen. William F. Smith that when they came Washington they should take the opportunity to represent to some one in authority here the dispirited condition of the army, and the danger there was of attempting any movement against the enemy at that When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane, as he states, endeavored to find certain members of Con

time.

That day the interview took place, and Gen. Newton opened the subject to the President. At first the President, as Gen. Newton expresses it, "very naturally conceived that they had come there for the purpose of injuring Gen. Burnside, and suggesting some other person to fill his place." Gen. Newton states that, while he firmly believed that the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the army was the want of confidence in the military capacity of Gen. Burnside, he deemed it improper to say so to the President "right square out," and therefore endeavored to convey the same idea indirectly. When asked if he considered it any less improper to do such a thing indirectly than it was to do it directly, he qualified his previous assertion by saying that his object was to inform the President of what he considered to be the condition of the army, in the hope that the President would make inquiry and learn the true reason for himself. Upon perceiving this impression upon the mind of the President, Gens. Newton and Cochrane state that they hastened to assure the President that he was entirely mistaken, and so far succeeded that at the close of the interview the President said to them he was glad they had called upon him, and that he hoped that good would result from the interview.

To return to General Buruside. The cavalry expe dition had started; the brigade of infantry detailed to accompany it had crossed the Rappahannock at Richard's Ford, and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at Kelly's Ford. The day they had arranged to make the crossing, General Burnside received from the President the following telegram: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement without letting me know of it."

Gen. Burnside states that he could not imagine, at the time, what reason the President could have for sending him such a telegram. None of the officers of his command, except one or two of his staff, who had remained in camp, had been told anything of his plan beyond the simple fact that a movement was to be made. He could only suppose that the despatch related in some way to important military movements in other parts of the country, in which it was neces sary to have cooperation.

Upon the receipt of that telegram steps were immediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further orders. A portion of it was shortly afterward sent off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to Dumfries and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court House, which it failed to do.

Gen. Burnside came to Washington to ascertain from the President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that some general officers from the Army of the Potomac, whose names he declined to give, had called upon him and represented that Gen. Burnside contemplated soon making a movement, and that the army was so dispirited and demoralized that any attempt to make a movement at that time must result in disaster; that no prominent officers in the Army of the Potomac were in favor of any movement at that time.

Gen. Burnside informed the President that none of his officers had been informed what his plan was, and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the President. He urged upon the President to grant him permission to carry it out, but the President declined to do so at that time. Gen. Halleck and Secretary Stanton were sent for, and then learned, for the first time, of the President's action in stopping the movement, although