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is alloyed and changed into something else that is not “affection,” but is selfishness and 6 calculation." And so of the Husband “ towards the Wife,”—of the betrothed or engaged towards one another. Let Father or Son, or Brother or Sister, or Husband or Wife, or any else whose bounden duty it is to render “ Affection,” let them permit selfish considerations to enter in, and “the Desires," whether of money, or comfort, or station, or of anything else to intrude, and they shall find out, that craftily as they may disguise it, there is an instinct that pierces through this concealment. And they may find, too, that even in the Social Nature of man, there is such a law as this : “He that hath, it shall be given unto him, and he shall have more abundance, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that he hath."

I say not this under any high romantic feeling, or in any hasty fervor, but in a common sense way, as a natural inference from a natural rule. And seeing the amount of unhappiness that has been in families for the last seventy or eighty years, seeing also how generally men calling themselves Moral Philosophers, have taught actual selfishness as a rule,* I believe that the cause and effect are these two_“Selfishness in matters of the Affections," taught by these philosophers and acted upon by persons that knew not the wrong,—and then misery as a consequence from that action.

Now, all the relations existing between persons wherein “Affection" is due, all these are attended with a multitude of actual and real advantages over and above the Affection, upon which, as the Highest Goodt of them all, the relation is founded. Each and all of them, in their natural and proper operation, tend to heighten the "Affection,” but if each and all of them were gone, then the Affection should be retained. Now, the assertion we make is this: that if any of them separately, or all of them together, assume the influence, or be the leading principle, then the Affection is degraded and debased into a “ desire," and the relation is injured in its integrity and pureness.

The husband that truly loves his wife, loves her the more for her various wife-like qualities, for everything that makes him in his house more happy, more comfortable, more respectable. All these qualities become, as it were, fuel to increase his affections and love. But he that desires to have all these, and for that reason takes a woman to be a wife, he may find himself disappointed. And so for every relation in life wherein affection is due—if men would have all, let them have this the first.

* The Moral Philosophy of Paley has been commonly called the 'Selfish Philosophy.” † See in Book I. the doctrine of the Highest Good.

A parallel case I may state as confirming this conclusion. I have known many men who because they were religious prospered in worldly affairs; and I have noticed that just as soon as they began to substitute the consequence as a motive for its cause, to say in their hearts, “I shall remain religious in order that I may prosper in worldly affairs,” just so soon their religious feeling begins to decay. The one fact and the other depend upon the same principle.

Now, wherein "the Affections" are kept clear from the Desires by the man, with his own will, consciously, there is seen a peculiar character of mind easily recognized by all, and in the common language of all given as a distinguishing name. This word is “Nobleness;" and he is “noble" in Heart who to all to whom affection is due gives that affection unalloyed by the “Desires” and “Appetites.'

“Nobleness of mind” we shall therefore use henceforth as a word to which a distinct and definite meaning in Ethical Science is attached. And opposite to it directly is what we call Meanness, the character of which is that it makes “affection a pretence and a means for gratifying and indulging the “Desires,”-lawful, indeed, in themselves, if lawfully used, but when taking the place of the Affections and substituted for them, most evil.

That the “ Affections” are intended for “Persons” in “Society:" from this the second principle, a multitude of practical inferences of the highest moral value are deducible; but these, most properly, shall come under the particular examination of the several relations to which they are referred, and therein our readers shall find them. In the meantime we go on to another part of this subject.

CHAPTER II.

Sympathy.-Two kinds.-Passive and Active. -Passive Sympathy, the sense

of harmony of feeling with others.—Illustrations of it and its uses.- A moral precept founded upon it.—Second kind of Sympathy, the active power of entering voluntarily into the feelings of others.--It is vicarious. -Misery is in this world more than happiness for man unprotected.-- But Society in all its forms is defensive against misery.-We sympathize inore with sorrow than joy.--Hence its uses manifest.-Sympathy in a great measure voluntary.-- Natural and acquired deficiency of this affection.--Hardheartedness. Its natural punishments.—Sentimentalism a disease of the Sympathy.--Rousseau.–Law of sympathy.—Moral conclusions from this arising

THERE is one especial difficulty about Ethics, in that it is a science of which each one has the requisite knowledge in his own consciousness; and the presentation of it, then, in an external systematic form, is almost impossible. The business, therefore, of the writer, so far as he can, is to present the truths in such a manner, that each one may recognize them as facts of his own nature, and accede to the rules drawn forth by the author; but for putting it in a mechanically systematic order, it is a thing which the very nature of the science forbids. The true system in it is not of external arrangement, but of internal sequency, so that fact shall lead to fact, and principle be made a foundation-stone to principle: that so the reader shall be led to think upon his own nature and to see by it, that the principles of the science are true. For often it happens that a fact or truth shall be denied by him under the influence of prejudice or of ignorance, which, had he seen it in its Ethical connexion with others of which he would make no doubt, though they have never been brought up consciously to his mind, he would at once have acknowledged to be true. Let not the reader, then, expect this external, mechanically systematic order from us; we are content if we present the various truths of Ethical Science in the peculiar systematic method which we have described above, that form which we feel most appropriate to a science, all the facts of which are in existence in each one's breast. In accordance with these views, we would, in this chapter, as in its

peculiar and appropriate place, present the subject of Sympathy (and perhaps some kindred truths,) to the thought of our readers.

The original meaning of the word Sympathy is “Harmony of the Affections,” (sympatheia). It originally implied not merely that state in which of two persons the feelings of the one being affected in a particular way, the feelings of the other, because of sympathy, shall be so affected, --so that “we rejoice with them which do rejoice, and weep with them which weep," although we have not the motive to rejoicing, or to sorrow, that they have, but only our sympathy with them. It was not taken, then, solely as this the passive effect, but also as a particular power that brings about the effect, and is a part of our nature.

And by many beautiful comparisons this idea was supported, by marvels of the most wondrous kind it was proved or impressed. The Philosophy of ancient Greece and of Middle-age Europe, teems with the wonders of that miraculous principle, Sympathy. It was pointed out that two harps being tuned alike, and one being played, the chords of the other would follow the tune with a faint, sympathetic music. It was believed that precious stones had sympathies with peculiar persons and characters. Nay, even the influence of the stars shed their virtues upon men by Sympathy. · And the herbs of the field wrought by “Sympathy." And, stranger still, wounds could be healed at a distance by an ointment whose force depended upon “Sympathy," the ointment being smeared upon the weapon, not upon the wound! In fact, he that shall look at the works of “Baptista Porta,” or “Albertus Magnus,” shall find there the strangest Natural Philosophy ever dreamed of, and all of it founded upon the one principle, Sympathy.

But perhaps the Platonic notion, that supposes marriage to be the union of two souls that once, in their pre-existent state, were one, and the “sympathy” which urges them again to union, to send them unconsciously seeking it over the world, is the most interesting fable upon the point. Although hardly inferior to it may be counted that which supposes the mother's heart to be endued with such natural affection towards her child, that after it has been lost, if brought again into her presence, through secret sympathy her heart shall yearn towards it. And then again, that Middle-age persuasion, by which two perfect friends shall, at the remotest distance have, under certain conditions, a true and perfect knowledge of one another's state; because of their friendship,

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the feelings of their hearts moving with a perfect sympathy. All these are interesting fables, showing nevertheless the feeling and persuasion of the existence of a Great Power and Principle in the Being of Man.

We hold that there is actually and really such a power, perhaps not performing works so wonderful as these attributed to it, and yet rightly understood and rightly employed, very wonderful, and truly bringing about extraordinary results. We say, that taking away the marvels, and fabulous dreams, and high poetic fictions, the idea, as it was conceived of old, of a Sympathy or Harmony of the Affections,” by means of which effects ensue, that come from no mental power or conscious effort of the mind, but from an instinctive “harmony,” or “discordance” of that power we have called the “ Heart” or the Affections," is most perfectly and entirely true.

The idea, we say, as it was of old conceived, such as we have defined it, and as it is now understood by the ordinary and common mass of men.

The idea, then,—that we may clearly define it, so that men may know precisely what they are required to examine,—is this, that

Sympathy is a natural harmony by which, upon matters especially that concern the Affections, one human being shall, under certain conditions, feel, in despite of all concealment of language, the real state of the other.” This asserts that there is in some men, under some circumstances, a naturally penetrative power, in a very great degree, that shall see the real state of others in despite all concealment; and that this power being particularly prominent in some minds, is yet an element in all.

It asserts, for instance, that for that man that is really and sincerely compassionate in heart, we will say, or meek in temper, or truly pure minded, or affectionate, this feeling does, as it were, give a tone to his thoughts and emotions, all of them, and become a sort of key-note to his mind. Nay, that such is the power of this that we call “feeling," that it frames and forms anew, and gives an expression to all the features and all the gestures. So that really and truly the predominant feeling comes in as a flavor in all actions, a key-note in all thoughts, a subtle writing upon the face, a lauguage that speaks through every limb. And were man's senses as subtle as they are dull, and obtuse, from the slightest glance, the merest gesture, the fullness of the mind might be seen.

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