The very idea of a Will, the very meaning of the word, is, that it is the faculty whose function is freedom.

"He doubts whether the idea of a Will implies freedom; nay, he proves the Will not free, but Slave."

And this is his argument: "The Will is determined by motives"-"it does not then determine itself, but is determined""therefore it is not free."

This is the famous argument for Slave-Will, a mere verbal eatch, and nothing more. However, in order that our readers may see it to be so, we shall put it in the shape of a regular syllogism:

Major premise: "The Will is determined by motives."

Minor premise: Whatever is determined, does not determine itself.

Conclusion: Therefore-The Will does not determine itself. As the logicians say, "Nego minorem," I deny the minor premise to be true. What proof is there that whatever is determined does not determine itself?

Another syllogism :

Major: "That which is determined is passive.

Minor: "That which is passive does not determine itself." Conclusion: Therefore-That which is determined, does not determine itself.

A syllogism false through a double Middle Term. That which is passive is the verb "is determined," in the first premise; and in the second it is real, a thing;-the middle term in the major is verbal—in the minor, real: the conclusion, then, is inconsequent-it does not follow. So it seems this great argument is merely verbal; a sophism, which proves the Will, the faculty of our being, to be passive, because a verb in a sentence put together by the writer is a passive verb! The same may be seen by multitudes of other arguments constructed upon the same model: e. g. from the premise, "John is loved," you can prove "that he does not love himself;" from the sentence, "This man. is slain," that "he has not slain himself;" and so on, through as many false argumentations upon the false model as are required. In reality, that "the Will is determined by motive," does not exclude it from being "self-determined:" being so, it still comes under the assertion, "it is determined."

All Motives are divided into two classes: the External and

the Internal. All that come from the outward, physical world, and work upon us through our senses, are External. Those that come from our internal and Spiritual nature-from the Conscience, the Spiritual Reason, the Affections,-these are Internal. The first enslave the man; they bind his Will in an obedience to the things of Time and Sense; they make outward, material and corporeal objects to have the dominion over him. His Will, determined by this class of motives, then, is so far enslaved, not free. Again: Internal motives-those that come from our Spiritual nature and from the Spiritual world—these are internal; they do not enslave the Will;-they free it. He, for instance, that is determined by his Conscience to go in the right path, against the temptation to go in the wrong,—he feels that, in the one case, determined by one motive, he is free; in the other, determined by it, he would be a slave. So in matters of Reason: walking by the rule and law of Moral Principle, determined by it as a motive, he is free; led against it by any motive, he is a slave. And so with respect to the Affections: to be led by them is to be free; to be led by Sensuality, or Self-will, or Selfishness, is to be enslaved.* This is the truth upon the subject of Determination of the Will by Motive. One class of motives enslaves the Will; the other frees it. How accordant it is, both in nature and in philosophy, to the truth of our Saviour's words, "If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed," every one can see; as also how distinctly it agrees with the nature of Motive and of the Will.

What, then, is the use of entangling verbally the mind of uneducated men in such sophisms as that which I have above examined, and of really supposing all Motives to be external, and the Will not to be a faculty, but a mere machine for motives,-. a water-wheel, whereupon these are poured from without, and which thereby goes?

But, although men may not be able to answer these sophisms or logicians enough to put their finger on the unsound part of the argument, they always act and always have acted as beings that have in their nature a faculty whose function is Freedom. Nay,

the very upholders of these arguments-even they act as if their own reasoning were false. No Necessitarian ever yet acted consistently with his scheme. Their actions show that the scheme is verbal merely, and not real. We shall, therefore, pass by and neglect as frivolous such argumentations, and go on according to our own consciousness of Human Nature, and our knowledge or penetration into that of the race, describing the moral powers, and leaving the proofs to our reader's knowledge of himself; and then urging moral action and moral culture upon these truths, instead of fruitless speculation and dry verbal paradox.

We ask, then, any individual,—we suppose the one who now has this page open before him,-to consider this illustration we are about to give.

My reader, then, has arrived at a certain point and period of life, that he calls Now, in reference to Time and events past, and HERE, in reference to place. In reference to Time, a certain definite series of events has happened, through which he has passed; and his present point in the series he calls "Now," or the "present time." In reference to Space, his course, from beginning to end, might be traced exactly upon the globe; and the present point he calls HERE. The result, then, of his course in Space and in Time, is that "Now the man is HERE." What, then, has produced this result? What forces have brought him so far that NOW he is HERE?

Let him consider, and he shall find that his course hitherto is naturally and aptly described as a voyage-the man, as a vessel that started upon the voyage of life, and has got so far. What, then, has brought the vessel so far on its course? Two forces onlythe internal power that is within the vessel-the external force without the combination, or rather the resultant* of these two, is that which brings all vessels thus far. So it is with the man: two forces he shall recognise to have brought him so far as he has come on his voyage—the force of external circumstances and the force of internal power. And never has there been a life in the course of which up to any given point the two forces do not unite. External circumstances, in their result, are modified by

* The “Resultant," in Statics, is that force which "results," in direction and amount, from the combined action of two others upon the same body at the same time.

the internal power: and it is modified by external circumstances. The course of the vessel is shaped by the two powers combined.

Now, by looking at the matter in this way, the individual shall see that, in each act of life, these two powers-the internal and the external-both exist: the Will is never so weak in any man that it does not modify the effect of the external influences; nor is it, again, so strong in any, that by its force, exclusively and entirely, the man's course is guided. The external force and the inward power exist together in bringing to an issue all actions. The sternest and strongest Human Will never was so potent as to annihilate the influence of circumstances, so that this last force should become nothing: and the most crushing force of circumstances never did nor could reduce to nothing the effect on action of the internal power; but both, in degrees that vary much in relative power, exist in each act of man's life.

As a practical matter of the consciousness of all men, they know and feel the internal force to exist: the external force also to show itself in each action, in all actions; and that neither in the course of the whole life, nor yet in any one single action, does this twofoldness cease to exist, or one of the forces become all and the other become nothing.

Now, before we go further, it is worth while to see how paradox upon this matter arises. The Fatalist supposes Circumstance to bind man in with an irresistible chain, so that all actions are predoomed by an eternal fate. Is not this to exaggerate the one force, to suppose it irresistible, and to suppose the other to come to nothing,—a mere theory that each one's own experience can assure him to be false? For each one in each circumstance feels the two powers, and knows that the one, as well as the other, ever exists. Because things are to be touched, have I no sense of touch? Because things visible are to be seen, have I no sight? Because there is a power without me, which can and does act upon me in a degree which I cannot measure, have I no power within?

And, on the other hand, there are some men who eke out an Atheistic philosophy by an argument for what they call "Freewill," but which, in all senses and meanings of the word, is not "Free-will," but "Self-omnipotence." They first take it for granted that mere physical laws embrace all action; and then that by his internal power man can modify, as he likes, all these laws.

And so man is wholly and entirely free, no external power upon him, his inward power is lord of all. That is, that internally he has an intelligent power which meets nothing from without but unintelligent physical laws, and so is entirely without control.

So might the dove, that by chance had fallen into the grosser element of water, and found it to obstruct its flight upon rising into the thinner fluid of air, imagine that all resistance was gone; or that the more it was diminished the more progress it would make.* Whereas, for all external resistance to vanish entirely, would be for all its inner power to be rendered wholly unable. Just so it is with these men, they imagine away the outward Intelligent Power that bears upon man through what we call "circumstance," and think in this of freedom! If this dream were realized, their “Will," would be as the doves' wings, idly fluttering in vacuum, unable and useless.

And their dream of an internal Will, with no external Will modifying it, this is just as vain a paradox as that of the Fatalists; just as vain, for the same consciousness that tells me and all men of an inward power, the Will, that can modify all external circumstances, that same knowledge of myself and of the world shall tell me of an external power working through what I call circumstances that shall modify the result of my action.

The so-called arguments or verbal riddles, that deny, the one the internal power, the other the external power,-occupy, in some books a great space, with us they shall take up none. The evidence that I have for the internal power, the Will, that same evidence, I have in my own experience, and in that of all men, for the external power that acts upon me through the "Circumstance."

And my course of life, both in itself as a whole, and in each act of it singly, is a resultant of these two powers, varied in force, it may be, but still existent each of them in each event, and in the whole result, or entire sum total of my life. I think the experience of each considerate man, apart from prejudice or system, will show him that this is true; and that it is not only in

* This illustration is taken from a well-known, but not well-understood German writer. I use it because as an illustration it suits my purpose admirably. And I mention it lest some censorious person should bring a charge of plagiarism.