PART Mind, unless perverted, which we cannot I. violate without being Self-condemned. And they would be certain too, from Confiderations of Interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future Confequences of Virtue and Vice; yet it is, however, credible, that they may have thofe Confequences, which Religion teaches us they will: And this Credibility is a certain Obligation in point of Prudence, to abstain from all Wickedness, and to live in the confcientious Practice of all that is Good, But,

Thirdly, The Answers above given to the Objections against Religion, cannot equally be made Use of to invalidate the Proof of it. For, upon Suppofition that God exercifes a moral Government over the World, Analogy does moft ftrongly lead us to conclude, that this moral Government must be a Scheme, or Conftitution, beyond our Comprehenfion. And a thousand particular Analogies fhew us, that Parts of fuch a Scheme, from their Relation to other Parts, may conduce to accomplish Ends, which we should have thought, they had no Tendency at all to accomplish: nay Ends, which before Experience, we fhould have thought fuch Parts were contra dictory to, and had a Tendency to prevent. And therefore all these Analogies fhow, that p. 4. And Part II. Ch. vi.

the

the Way of arguing made ufe of in objecting CHAP. againft Religion, is delufive: because they VII. fhew it is not at all incredible, that, could we comprehend the Whole, we fhould find the Permiffion of the Disorders objected against, to be confiftent with Juftice and Goodness and even to be Inftances of them. Now This is not applicable to the Proof of Religion, as it is to the Objections against it; and therefore cannot invalidate That Proof, as it does these Objections.

;

Laftly, From the Obfervation now made, it is eafy to fee, that the Answers above given to the Objections against Providence, though, in a general way of fpeaking, they may be faid to be taken from our Ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from That, but from fomewhat which Analogy fhews us concerning it. For Analogy fhews us pofitively, that our Ignorance in the Poffibilities of things, and the various Relations in Nature, renders us incompetent Judges, and leads us to falfe Conclufions, in Cafes fimilar to This, in which we pretend to judge and to object. So that the things above infifted upon, are not mere Suppofitions of unknown Impoffibilities and Relations:

Serm. at the Rolls, p. 312. 5th Edit.

0 2

but

PART but they are fuggested to our Thoughts, and I. even forced upon the Obfervation of ferious

Men, and rendered credible too, by the Analogy of Nature. And therefore, to take these things into the Account, is to judge by Experience and what we do know: and it is not judging fo, to take no Notice of them.

CON

197

CONCLUSION.

TH

PART
I.

HE Obfervations of the laft Chapter, lead us to confider this little Scene of human Life, in which we are fo bufily engaged, as having a Reference, of fome Sort or other, to a much larger Plan of things. Whether we are, any way, related to the more distant Parts of the boundless Universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the Course of things, which comes within our View, is connected with somewhat paft, prefent, and future, beyond it. So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the Middle of a Scheme, not a fixt but a progreffive one, every way incomprehenfible: incomprehenfible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is, and what fhall be hereafter. And this Scheme cannot but contain in it fomewhat, as wonderful, and as much beyond our Thought and Conception, as any thing in That of Religion. For, will any Man in his Senses say, that it is less difficult a p. 181, &c.

b See Part II. Ch. ii.

I.

PART to conceive, how the World came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is fome other Rule of Government, more natural, and of eafier Conception, than That, which we call moral? Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature, no Account at all can be given, how this Univerfe, or the Part of it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the Course of it to be carried on, as it is; Nor any, of its general End and Design, without a Moral Governor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor of the World, is a Principle gone upon in the foregoing Treatife, as proved, and generally known and confeffed to be proved. And the very Notion of an intelligent Author of Nature, proved by particular final Causes, implies a Will and a Character. Now, as our whole Nature, the Nature which He has given us, leads us to conclude His Will and Character to be moral, juft, and good: fo we can fcarce in Imagination conceive, what it can be otherwife. However, in Confequence of this his Will and Character, whatever it be, he formed the Universe as it is, and carries on the Course of it as he does, rather than in any other Manner; and has af• p. 164.