I. PART at prefent": efpecially whilst the Probability of a future Life, or the natural Immortality of the Soul, is admitted upon the Evidence of Reason; because this is really both admitting and denying at once, a State of Being different from the present to be natural. But the only diftin&t Meaning of that Word is ftated, fixed, or fettled: fince what is natural, as much requires and prefuppofes an intelligent Agent to render it fo, i. e. to effect it continually, or at stated Times; as what is fupernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. And from hence it must follow, that Perfons Notion of what is natural, will be enlarged in Proportion to their greater Knowledge of the Works of God, and the Difpenfations of his Providence. Nor is there any Abfurdity in fuppofing, that there may be Beings in the Universe, whofe Capacities, and Knowledge, and Views, may be fo extenfive, as that the whole Chriftian Difpenfation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous or conformable to God's Dealings with other Parts of his Creation; as natural as the vifible known Course of Things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other poffible Senfe to be put upon the Word, but that only in which it is here used; fimilar, ftated, or uniform. See Part II. Ch. ii. p. 238, &c. & Part II, Ch. iii. p. 276. This This Credibility of a future Life, which has CHAP. been here infifted upon, how little foever it I. may fatisfy our Curiofity, feems to answer all the Purposes of Religion, in like manner as a demonftrative Proof would. Indeed a Proof, even a demonftrative one, of a future Life, would not be a Proof of Religion. For, that we are to live Hereafter, is just as reconcileable with the Scheme of Atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive, is: and therefore nothing can be more abfurd than to argue from That Scheme, that there can be no future State. But as Religion implies a future State, any Prefumption against fuch a State, is a Prefumption against Religion. And the foregoing Obfervations remove all Prefumptions of that Sort, and prove, to a very confiderable Degree of Probability, one fundamental Doctrine of Religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and difpofe the Mind seriously to attend to the general Evidence of the Whole. CHAP. 16 PART CHA P. II. Of the Government of God by Re wards and Punishments; and particularly of the latter. HAT which makes the Queftion con Tcerning cerning a future Life to be of fo great Importance to us, is our Capacity of Happinefs and Mifery. And that which makes the Confideration of it to be of fo great Importance to us, is the Suppofition of our Happiness and Mifery Hereafter, depending upon our Actions Here. Without this indeed, Curiofity could not but sometimes bring a Subject, in which we may be fo highly interested, to our Thoughts; efpecially upon the Mortality of others, or the near Profpect of our own. But reasonable Men would not take any farther Thought about Hereafter, than what fhould happen thus occafionally to rife in their Minds, if it were certain, that our future Intereft no way depended upon our present Behaviour: Whereas on the contrary, if there be Ground, either from Analogy or any thing elfe, to think it does; then there is Reafon alfo for the most active Thought and Sollicitude, to secure that Intereft; to behave so as that that we may escape That Mifery, and obtain CHAP. That Happiness in another Life, which we II. not only fuppofe, ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend alfo is put in our own Power. And whether there be Ground for this laft Apprehenfion, certainly would deferve to be moft feriously confidered, were there no other Proof of a future Life and Interest, than That prefumptive one, which the foregoing Obfervations amount to. Now in the present State, all which we enjoy, and a great Part of what we fuffer, is put in our own Power. For Pleasure and Pain are the Confequences of our Actions; and we are endued by the Author of our Nature with Capacities of foreseeing these Confequences. We find by Experience He does not fo much as preserve our Lives, exclusively of our own Care and Attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that Suftenance, by which he has appointed our Lives fhall be preferved; and without which, he has appointed, they fhall not be preserved at all. And in general we forefee, that the external things, which are the Objects of our various Paffions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and fuch Manners: But by thus exerting Ourfelves, we obtain and enjoy these Objects, in which our natural Good confifts; or by this Means I. PART Means God gives us the Poffeffion and Enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have any one Kind or Degree of Enjoyment, but by the Means of our own Actions. And by Prudence and Care, we may, for the most part, pafs our Days in tolerable Eafe and Quiet Or, on the contrary, we may by Rathness, ungoverned Paffion, Willfulness, or even by Negligence, make Ourselves as miferable as ever we pleafe. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, i. e. to do what they know beforehand will render them fo. They follow those ways, the Fruit of which they know, by Instruction, Example, Experience, will be Difgrace, and Poverty, and Sickness, and untimely Death. This every one obferves to be the general Course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by Experience, that all our Sufferings are owing to our own Follies. Why the Author of Nature does not give his Creatures promifcuously fuch and fuch Perceptions, without Regard to their Behaviour; why he does not make them happy without the Inftrumentality of their own Actions, and prevent their bringing any Sufferings upon themselves; is another Matter. Perhaps there may be fome Impoffibilities in the Nature of Things, which we are unac quainted |