very expert in their functions, remain generally the same, and carry on the work of the government undisturbed, while their su periors are visiting the seven towers, or the islands, or losing their heads, or are torn in pieces by the soldiery or the multitude, The failings which our author admits must be imputed to the character of the Turkish ministers, are not, we fear, unknown in the divans of other nations. Certainly it would ill become us, at the present moment, to express any contempt for a people governed by men, with whom the preservation of their own authority is paramount to every consideration, and with whom it is useless to urge the interest of the empire, if their personal advantage or safety be endangered by the measure.

The government of the provinces is entrusted to lieutenants, appointed by the Sultan, and removeable at his pleasure. The greater provinces, comprehending several subdivisions, are governed by begler-begs, or beyler-beys, a title equivalent to

,

prince

of princes. The lesser provinces, either included as subdivisions under those governments, or forming separate provinces, or single towns, are administered by governors with the titles of Pasha, Bey, or Aga. Pasha is a general appellation for governor; but seems chiefly applicable to provinces of a certain extent. Bey is applied to smaller principalities; and Aga is a military governor, frequently of a single town. We speak with a certain want of precision on this subject; for nothing can be more confused than Mr Thornton's account. In the same page, we are told that the belerbeys exert a superior jurisdiction over the governments administered by the pashas, the beys, and the sanjacs;'

that these governments are called pashaliks, musselimliks, vaivadaliks, and agaliks; that the chief governor has no authority over those inferior officers in his own district; 'that next to the Grand Vizir ranks a pasha of three tails,-then a pasha of two tails, then a bey, who has only one tail,-and, lastly, the aga, who has only a sanjak or standard;' so that the last statement (which is in a note) omits all mention of the belerbey, whom the text placed first, and calls sanjak, a standard, which the text denominated a governor. * Ön turning to Rycaut, from whom this page is apparently taken, we find sangiack used for smaller province, or subdivision of the beglerbeglik; and sangiack-beg, for the governor of the subdivision; (a nomencla ture adopted by Mr Thornton also in another part of his book, p. 162.) We find, also, no distinction made between a horse tail and a standard; and beglerbeg and pasha are used indiscri minately

* P. 122. The difference of spelling is evidently a mistake; Sanjac is used for standard in p. 274.

minately for the governors of large provinces; though pasha only, and not beylerbey, is applied to the governors of separate territories or towers, larger than those governed by beys or agas; (Rycaut, chap. xii.) Indeed, it is the frequent misfortune of Mr Thornton's readers, to find themselves left in confusion and uncertainty, by his vague, and often contradictory statements. There generally is no such thing as getting at a fixed opinion, or making out a clear point, from a perusal of this book.

All these offices are conferred for money. The value of each is accurately stated in a book at the seraglio; and, at the expiration of the first year, the payment must be renewed; otherwise a successor is found who will give the price. Besides paying so much to the Sultan, presents must be constantly made to court favourites, if the pasha (we use the term generically) would retain his place; and if those presents with the tribute come regularly to the Porte, no inquiries are made into the means by which the money was raised, or the conduct of the governor in any other respect. When a pasha can establish his independence by his wealth or the number of his troops, he rebels; that is to say, he sends no remittances to the Porte; and, if the distance is too great, or the Sultan's power too small to subdue him by force, a sort of contest in cunning arises between the Sultan and him, the former trying to assassinate, the latter to kill the assassin. It is not uncommon for this feeble power to send an executioner, with orders, if he should fail in the main object of his mission, to heap honours on the rebellious chief,that appearances may be saved; a chance of further obedience and tribute obtained; and punishment deferred to a fitter season. III. We shall now shortly consider what have been represented as the checks to the absolute power which we have just described. The Ulema, or body of the law and the religious institutions or opinions of the country, are commonly viewed in this light. The Ulema (or learned men), in its more extensive signification, comprehends all the lawyers and priests of the empire; but, in its ordinary sense, it is restricted to signify, the jurisconsults, or muftis, and judges, and cadis; that is, the persons skilled in the law, and those appointed to administer it. Every thing relating to this point is confusion in Mr Thornton; and we subjoin some passages, occurring within the bounds of a few pages, to show how little he or his compiler have been at the pains of forming distinct notions of their subject. The Ulema, the perpetual and hereditary guardians of the religion and laws of the empire,' p. 100. The order is divided into three distinct classes, comprehending indeed the ministers of religion, but distinguishing them from the foukahha, or jurisconsults, who are again subdivided into muftis, or doctors of law, and cadis, or ministers

nisters of justice.' p. 101. This dignity (of Ulema) is perpetual and hereditary, not in individuals, but in the order. note to p. 101. Their property is hereditary in their families, and is not liable to arbitrary confiscations. p. 101. About the end of the seventeenth century, they were made removeable at pleasure, like all other functionaries.' note to p. 101. The Ulema used formerly to admit no one into their order who was not recommended by some extraordinary merit; but now the sultan creates Ulema at his pleasure,' p. 102. The children of Mollas' (judges of great towns) are admitted with the consent of the Sheik-Islam (or chief mufti); but it requires an express order of the sovereign to admit any other children.' p. 102., The functions of the ulema are perfectly distinct and unconnected with those of the imams, or immediate ministers of religion. These do not even belong to the order of the Ulema, in the restricted meaning and general acceptation of the word. p. 103. mufti is the chief minister of the legal, judicial, and, religious power. p. 94. An ancient prejudice, founded on the respect due to religion and its ministers, protects individuals of the order of the Ulema from judicial inflictions, entailing infamy or dishonour.' p. 106. In p. 107, it is twice stated, that the Ülema owe their appointment, individually, as well as their continuance in office, to the Sultan alone. The Ulema are wholly unconnected with the ecclesiastical order.' .p. 112.

The

Such being Mr Thornton's various statements, we shall probably be excused, if we have failed to catch his meaning; for indeed he seems not to know it himself. But one thing appears clear, that whatever influence this body possesses, must be exerted without giving umbrage to the sovereign, who can remove every offending member, and destroy the mufti himself. The reputation which the mufti has for learning, and the high honours with which he is treated, both by the Sultan and his court, give his opinion great weight. He is consulted on all occasions of importance; but if he gives an opinion (or fetiva, which he does in writing) contrary to the sovereign's inclination, he is without scruple dismissed, and a more complying counsellor is found to take office under the virtual pledge.

The administration of justice, by the members of the Ulema, whom the sultan chooses for this purpose, is worse than any thing which the subjects of a regular government can imagine. It is strange to find Mr Thornton assert, in general, that justice is - equally administered in suits where both parties are Turks; and fill a whole chapter with proofs, that the Turkish judges are the most cruel and venal persons in the world. If the trade of a false - witness is one of the most flourishing in Turkey, if the judge is

compelled

compelled to decide according to oral testimony, unless when he ean, by cross-examination, convict a witness, on the spot, of perjury, if a person so convicted is scarcely liable to any punishment,-if, moreover, in all their decisions respecting the rights of Jews and Christians, bribery alone sways the Turkish judges;is it conceivable that the causes between Turks can be determined equitably? The account given by our author, of the summary mode in which both civil and criminal cases are decided, is equally at variance with his general panegyric; and the inference to be drawn from his whole statement is, that no such thing as regular justice can be said to exist in the Turkish dominions.

What check, then, it may be asked, is furnished by the institutions of this empire to the power of the sultan? There is evidently but one--the dread of popular insurrection. Every thing depends for its existence on the nod of the prince; and he may just push his caprices as far as he thinks the degraded state of his subjects will permit him. He owes to their superstitions, immediately, the greater part of his influence-ultimately, the whole of it. He has chiefly to beware lest those superstitions are not the cause of some sudden commotion against his person, or that of his minister. He has also to guard against any conduct so generally hurtful to his people, and so plainly, so instantly felt by them, as to overcome the sense of religious awe with which they have been accustomed to view his government. Thus he must avoid any violent interference with religious observances and the established customs of the country, which are all more or less connected with superstitious feelings. He must also be ready to vary his conduct when he perceives symptoms of serious commotions being excited by it. The most successful mode of showing discontent at Constantinople is said to be setting the town on fire in different places. When the sultan learns that one of these fires is no sooner extinguished than another breaks out, he bethinks him of his situation, and begins to inquire into the grievances complained of. As for the inhabitants of the provinces, they may complain indeed of their pasha, by sundry remonstrances to the Porte; but without presents, so large as to exceed those which he sends in his defence, the application is altogether vain. It may easily be imagined, that the pasha is less exposed to insurrection than the sultan ; and his government is in proportion more severe.

IV. When the Turks overran the provinces of the Greek empire, they divided the lands in a manner analogous to that pursued by the northern nations under similar circumstances. The general, after seizing a certain portion, assigned the rest to his officers and men, upon condition that they should attend him in all future wars as soon as required. The principal difference be

tween

tween this and the feudal tenures of the north was; that all the proprietors held immediately of the general or sultan-and no one owed service to any intermediate chief. Such of the former infidel proprietors as were not extirpated during the conquest, were permitted to remain as cultivators, or tributary proprietors of the lands not exhausted by the first partition. The Mussulmans alone were allowed to serve in war. Those conquered Mussulmans who preferred a life of peace, were classed with the infidel tributaries, and paid a capitation tax as commutation for their mi litary services. This class, whether infidels or Mussulmans, are called Rayahs; but that appellation is more commonly restricted to the infidel tributaries, who are likewise denominated Zimmys, while the Mussulman tributaries are called Beledis. The Mussul man Rayahs form the national; the feudal proprietors form the feudal militia. All Mussulman inhabitants capable of bearing arms, are bound to join the Pasha's standard; but the former class are a sort of volunteers, and soon return home; the latter serve, and furnish a contingent of troops, from the obligations of their charter, and are somewhat more to be depended upon. They are either Zaims or Timariots, according as they possess a Zäimet, or a Timar; the former containing 500 acres, or upwards, the latter from 300 to 500.* In the reign of Soliman I:, there were 3192 Zaims, and 50,160 Timars, which furnished 150,000 men to the militia; Olivier reckons about 60,000, and Mr Eton 132,000. Whatever the number may now be, they are little adapted to the modern practice of warfare. They remain in the field only till they obtain a certificate which cannot be refused, af ter the campaign has lasted six months. They then, at the beginning of winter, desert, or rather, march off in large bodies, as happened when they were serving in Syria last war. Those pro prietors of feudal lands, who do not furnish a contingent, must pay, in the European provinces, one year's revenue in the Asiatic, two. This, together with the capitation tax, and the commuta tion money of the Beledis, formed the bulk of the Turkish revenue, as the militia supplied the army, by which the Ottoman conquests were made. The changes which have, in the course of time, been made in both, are merely additions to those original branches of the military and financial system.

About the middle of the fourteenth century, the body of Janizaries was formed; at that time, 12,000 in number. They now amount to about 40,000, † and unite the functions of police of

VOL. X. NO. 20.

S

ficers

*This is Mr Thornton's account. We have reafon to believe, that he is wrong in the extent which he affigns to thofe divifions.

This is much lefs than the estimates of former authors; but we are convinced of its accuracy.

amount of the pay.

Mr T. judiciously grounds it on the