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as he must be by the Archduke and the Hungarian insurrection ; ---and so there would have been an end of Buonaparte, and the French revolution,
We fear, however, that our author is here taking it all his own way, and fighting both for the allies and their enemies. He cannot surely think, that Buonaparte would have been idle while this grand march was going on. If it was so greatly for his advantage to accept the battle which they gave at Austerlitz, he would have moved off to intercept them as soon as they point, ed towards Prague, and would have brought them to an engagement, or stopped their mancuvre. The distance between Olmutz and Prague is nearly 150 English miles. Was Buonaparte to remain in his camp at Brunn, and starving too, while the allies were moving over this space, at the rate of ten miles a day? Or, if the execution of the movement depended on its celerity, are we to believe that the Russians and Austrians were certain of marching with greater expedition than the French ? Our author admits, that both armies were in want of provisions ; they could not therefore remain stationary ;-and from every thing which has appeared in the different campaigns between the French and their enemies, we are entitled to conclude, that, if the chance of defeating them in a pitched battle was small, the chance of beating them by maneuvres, and particularly by rapid marches, was, infinitely smaller. What reason have we, from any of the late campaigns, to imagine that the Austrians and Russians could have marched away, and fought or not as they chose, during their whole movement ? Is it not much more likely, that Buonaparte, seeing part of the army quietly in garrison at Olmutz, and part observing him in Teschen, (which was a diminution by no means inconsiderable, of the chief force), would have allowed the rest to advance until he could just get between them and their own country, and would then, by a rapid movement, have overtaken and brought them to a battle with his whole forces after his usual manner, leaving the forces in Olmutz to garrison that town, and the army in Teschen to observe him, until he had time to pick them -up after destroying the main body? Fatal as the battle of Ausa terlitz was, such a catastrophe would have been much more so. It would indeed have laid open to him the whole frontier of Russia. The idea of his having been in such danger at Austerlitz, is, however, infinitely less chimerical, than the notion so fondly cherished by some persons in this country, that his chief danger was after the battle, and that the allies might have destroyed him without difficulty, if they had only delayed the negotiations a few weeks longer. The indecency, indeed, with which we upbraid those monarchs whom our councils have brought to the verge of
ruin, because they refuse to plange deeper and lose all, is one of the most disgusting circumstances attendant upon the late continental policy of England. General Dumourier talks of, what he is pleased to term the pacifico-mania,' upon several occasions ; but he is much too sensible a man to blame Austria for the peace, by which she preserved her existence.
The particulars of the campaign against Prussia, have not ună dergone so much discussion, and are less fully known, than those of the war in Suabia or Moravia. The mistakes which our au. thor imputes to the cabinet of Berlin, and its generals, are numerous, and cannot be vindicated. They gave the enemy time to assemble his army by marching separate and inconsiderable divisions from the south of Germany upon the Mayne, instead of advancing into Franconia as soon as war had been resolved on, and thus carrying it on, as Frederic the Great had done, at the expence of a foreign and hostile territory. In the whole detail of the plan which they did adopt, the greatest want of generalship is observable; and the quick surrender of the strong places, one after another, can only be ascribed, our author thinks, to the cowardice or disaffection of their commanders. He also blames the King of Prussia, and with perfect justice no doubt, for taking possession of Hanover, and thus offending the best and most attached of his natural allies. He avoids saying one word, however, upon the policy of this country, in being offended at such conduct, in the peculiar circumstances of the Continent; nor does he blame the King of Prussia for the most fatal of all his errors, the rupture with France. It is scarcely possible that so acute a person as General Dumourier should have passed over those points; we must rather impute his silence on them to his dread of the pacifico-mania,' above hinted at. Like Mr Gentz, and a large body of reasoners (shall we call them ?) in this country, our author seems afraid of reprobating, under any circumstances, any thing that has the semblance of hostility, lest neutrality should gain ground; or of admitting that peace is ever politic, lest the doctrine should make its way, that war must never be resorted to. They all along forget, that they have not to argue with quaker statesmen, but with men who deprecate premature resistance to France, only because it is sure of being ineffectual ;-who, far from wishing to see the Continent sunk in a state of apathy to French aggressions, only deplore partial and unavailing struggles, because these must indeed produce, from entire prostration of strength, the lethargy so much and so justly to be feared.
· Having, in our author's view of the subject, by his rashness and audacity, destroyed the Prussian army, contrary to all the rules of military science, Buonaparte might have completed the
cruiting in improving the dominio occupy thaesses. The
conquest of Europe, had he possessed the great qualities which enable a man of genius to profit by his successes. The winter was already set in; he had only to occupy that season in consolidating and arranging the dominions which he filled with his troops; in improving the pacific dispositions of Austria ; in recruiting his army and clothing it at the expense of the conquered countries ; in raising a subsidiary German force; in availing himself of intrigue to separate his adversaries--and the business was finished. Si sa tête fougueuse eût pu se plier à une pareille conduite, c'en était fait de la liberté du monde. Instead of this, however, he pushed on his exhausted army, and rashly dise' closed his whole projects. The extent and boldness of these ter. . rified all Europe, but united none of the sovereigns more firmly against him. Indeed, so infatuated or intimidated were they that not even his unparalleled folly, in betraying his own secret, would have worked his ruin, had he not happily been at length defeated by the Russians,-compelled to retreat after some vain boasting and parade, reduced to act upon the defensive, and to await what every man of sense now foresees must be his doom..
The project which Buonaparte so heedlessly disclosed, was, it seems, of this nature. He was to restore the Polish monarchy under one of his generals, obtaining the consent of Austria, in return for Silesia, and drawing from the new kingdom a numerous addition to his army. He was to procure two diversions, by making the Turks attack Russia in the Ukraine, and the Persians threaten her in Asia. He was to gain over the King of Sweden by giving him the Prussian part of Pomerania, and the Russian prom vinces on the Gulf of Finland, which would have reduced Russia to nearly the same situation from which Peter the Great raised her. *Finally, but which might as well have been placed first, as it is the foundation of the scheme, he was to have overthrown the allies in a decisive battle, which would enable him to give the law at St Petersburgh. • The different branches of this vast plan General Dumourier
examines séparately. There was no chance, he contends, of 'Austria agreeing to the reestablishment of Poland, unless Buonaparte could suddenly threaten her with his whole army and that of his allies on the Rhine, having previously completed the conquest of Silesia to tempt her withal, and delaying the prosecution of the war beyond the Vistula until he obtained her acquiescence. The Poles themselves were not disposed to make any exertions. This part of the argument is, in our apprehension, perfectly just. Our author, however, reasons from the event, respecting the disposition of the country; and states merely as a fact, what might easily have been gathered
from the well known state of the nobles and their peasantry, The Turkish government was too feeble, he thinks, to make any diversion ; and he exults not a little in the march of the Russians into Moldavia and Wallachia, as if this very movement were not a most important diversion in favour of the French. The Persians, he argues, were too much divided among themselves, and had too narrow a front for offensive operations, to give Russia any trouble worth guarding against by detaching troops. This part of the plan, indeed, seems exceedingly doubtful; and we see no reason to believe that the French intrigues in Persia had any reference to the immediate operations of the war. To the scheme of seducing Sweden, our author can only object, by boasta ing of the great spirit which the young monarch has displayed ; and demanding, in a way rather declamatory than convincing, whether such a prince could be gained over by Buonaparte ? He seems altogether to have forgotten, that, not many years ago, this same prince was as keen an enemy of England as he now is of France; happily, indeed, with just as little effect, but with equal demonstrations of hostility and spirit.' Perhaps he was pushed on by Paul ; but the present speculation supposes that France shall have become more formidable than Paul: and who shall answer for any monarch's conduct, when such an enemy offers him the choice of destruction by continuing a contest without an object--or aggrandisement by becoming his ally? · Because the King of Sweden dislikes France, has he lost his fear of Russia ? Do his personal feelings sway his court and his people? Is not a French alliance an hereditary favourite in that country; and the hatred, founded on the just dread of Russia, a feeling still more deeply rooted? What could be more tempting to the nation, what more likely to tempt the King, even if intimidation were out of the question, than an arrangement which should restore the ancient independence of that country, substituting, for the influence of its powerful neighbour, the old alliance with a more distant state ? Nor need we go further than this part of the project (which is in the highest degree likely to have been in the .contemplation of France) to refute the view's of Buonaparte's character which our author exhibits. Let us be just to an enemy, and ask ourselves, if he can really be a slave to caprice and irritation, hurried away by every gust of passion,ma being of mere rashness and audacity, actuated by no principles of sound .policy,--who, at the moment of greatest personal animosity towards the Swedish monarch, formed the scheme now imputed to him, of restoring Sweden to her ancient rank, and trusting (as safely he might trust) to her hands, thus strengthened by himself, the maintenance of his cause in the north of Europe ?
Our author concludes with a great deal of invective against the folly of attempting a march into Russia during the winter. In this mad project, he says, Buonaparte has at last been defeated ; and driven, as he must speedily be, out of Poland, he will find all the restof Europe in rebellion against him;--the Germanstates, aided by Sweden --Austria ---Spain,--Portugal ;-- the Neapolitans, assisted by the English from Sicily,--the Swiss,--the Dutch,--the Flemings. But it is to the French theinselves that our author looks most willingly for the usurper's final destruction ; and, taking for granted that the other nations of Europe are striving, as the fugitive conqueror passes them, who shall give the blow, he closes his tract with an eloquent exhortation to the French people, to rise in the mean time as one man ;-to rescue the flower of the army from the hands of its present chiefs, and free it from the corrupt mass of foreigners which has been mixed with it; -to restore the Bour. bons, and follow the paths of wisdom and virtue, which alone lead to happiness. Of all this agreeable dream, little indeed now remains. Were there not so much of melancholy in the subject, there would be something very ludicrous in following our author's fine fancies, after the fatal reverse of fortune, as he will probably call it, which confounded them the very moment they had been promulgated. Of the fragments of his castle which lie scattered before us, we shall select one as a specimen of his way of building. We wish the love of this art were confined to him. self, or that the overthrow of one more structure could cure the passion for such employment, which is almost epidemical in the present day. He has just been vanquishing Buonaparte, almost to the last man, in several engagements; and he thus proceeds to reap the fruits of his victories.
• Laissons courir ce fou à la perte, les Russes seuls font suffisants pour en purger la terre. Plaignons les braves soldats, devenus, la plupart malgré eux, les fatellites de ce tyran du monde. Tournons nos regards derriere lui. Tous les moyens de grande défensive arrangés, il restera encore assez de troupes à l'Empereur Alexandre pour détacher par la Baltique dans sa Scherenflote vingt mille hommes, qui peuvent joindre dès le printemps le Roi de Suede dans l'isle de Rugen. .
Ce jeune Monarque, à l'exemple du Grand Gustave Adolphe, dévelopera en Poméranie avec le secours Russe et le sabside Anglais une armée de cinquante mille hommes, et s'étendant dans la Bafle Saxe depuis Dantzick et Colberg jusqu'à Hambourg, doublera cette armée avec les insurgents de la Pruffe, de la Helle, passera l'Elbe, délivrera la Prusse et la Saxe, et établira une grande guerre au centre de l'Allemagne, à laquelle se joindra necessairement l'Autriche. Qui s'opposera à ces deux grands orages, s'étendant du Danube à la Mer Baltique ? La faible Ligue du Rhin ? Non, elle se disfoudra, et chacun de ses VOL. X. NO. 20.