from the well known state of the nobles and their peasantry, The Turkish government was too feeble, he thinks, to make any diversion; and he exults not a little in the march of the Russians into Moldavia and Wallachia, as if this very movement were not a most important diversion in favour of the French. The Persians, he argues, were too much divided among themselves, and had too narrow a front for offensive operations, to give Russia any trouble worth guarding against by detaching troops. This part of the plan, indeed, seems exceedingly doubtful; and we see no reason to believe that the French intrigues in Persia had any reference to the immediate operations of the war. To the scheme of seducing Sweden, our author can only object, by boasting of the great spirit which the young monarch has displayed; and demanding, in a way rather declamatory than convincing, whether such a prince could be gained over by Buonaparte? He seems altogether to have forgotten, that, not many years ago, this same prince was as keen an enemy of England as he now is of France; happily, indeed, with just as little effect, but with equal demonstrations of hostility and spirit. Perhaps he was pushed on by Paul; but the present speculation supposes that France shall have become more formidable than Paul: and who shall answer for any monarch's conduct, when such an enemy offers him the choice-of destruction by continuing a contest without an object, or aggrandisement by becoming his ally? Because the King of Sweden dislikes France, has he lost his fear of Russia? Do his personal feelings sway his court and his people? Is not a French alliance an hereditary favourite in that country; and the hatred, founded on the just dread of Russia, a feeling still more deeply rooted? What could be more tempting to the nation, what more likely to tempt the King, even if intimidation were out of the question, than an arrangement which should restore the ancient independence of that country, substituting, for the influence of its powerful neighbour, the old alliance with a more distant state? Nor need we go further than this part of the project (which is in the highest degree likely to have been in the contemplation of France) to refute the view's of Buonaparte's character which our author exhibits. Let us be just to an enemy, and ask ourselves, if he can really be a slave to caprice and irritation, hurried away by every gust of passion,-a being of mere rashness and audacity,-actuated by no principles of sound policy, who, at the moment of greatest personal animosity towards the Swedish monarch, formed the scheme now imputed to him, of restoring Sweden to her ancient rank, and trusting (as safely he might trust) to her hands, thus strengthened by himself, the maintenance of his cause in the north of Europe? -- Our author concludes with a great deal of invective against the folly of attempting a march into Russia during the winter. In this mad project, he says, Buonaparte has at last been defeated; and driven, as he must speedily be, out of Poland, he will find all the rest of Europe in rebellion against him;-the German states, aided by Sweden,--Austria, Spain,-Portugal;-the Neapolitans, assisted by the English from Sicily, the Swiss,-the Dutch,--the Flemings. But it is to the French themselves that our author looks most willingly for the usurper's final destruction; and, taking for granted that the other nations of Europe are striving, as the fugitive conqueror passes them, who shall give the blow, he closes his tract with an eloquent exhortation to the French people, to rise in the mean time as one man ;-to rescue the flower of the army from the hands of its present chiefs, and free it from the corrupt mass of foreigners which has been mixed with it;-to restore the Bourbons, and follow the paths of wisdom and virtue, which alone lead to happiness. Of all this agreeable dream, little indeed now remains. Were there not so much of melancholy in the subject, there would be something very ludicrous in following our author's fine fancies, after the fatal reverse of fortune, as he will probably call it, which confounded them the very moment they had been promulgated. Of the fragments of his castle which lie scattered before us, we shall select one as a specimen of his way of building. We wish the love of this art were confined to himself, or that the overthrow of one more structure could cure the passion for such employment, which is almost epidemical in the present day. He has just been vanquishing Buonaparte, almost to the last man, in several engagements; and he thus proceeds to reap the fruits of his victories. Laiffons courir ce fou à fa perte, les Ruffes feuls font fuffifants pour en purger la terre. Plaignons les braves foldats, devenus, la plupart malgré eux, les fatellites de ce tyran du monde. Tournons nos regards derriere lui. Tous fes moyens de grande défenfive arrangés, il reftera encore affez de troupes à l'Empereur Alexandre pour détacher par la Baltique dans fa Scherenflote vingt mille hommes, qui peuvent joindre dès le printemps le Roi de Suede dans l'ifle de Rugen. Ce jeune Monarque, à l'exemple du Grand Guftave Adolphe, dévelopera en Pomeranie avec le fecours Ruffe et le fubfide Anglais une armée de cinquante mille hommes, et s'étendant dans la Baffe Saxe depuis Dantzick et Colberg jufqu'à Hambourg, doublera cette armée avec les infurgents de la Pruffe, de la Heffe, paffera l'Elbe, délivrera la Pruffe et la Saxe, et établira une grande guerre au centre de l'Allemagne, à laquelle fe joindra neceffairement l'Autriche. Qui s'oppofera à ces deux grands orages, s'étendant du Danube à la Mer Baltique ? La faible Ligue du Rhin? Non, elle fe diffoudra, et chacun de fes VOL. X. NO. 20. Bb membres membres expiera fa faibleffe, en joignant Guftave et l'Empereur d'Autriche pour délivrer l'Allemagne. Le fenfible, le philantrope Buonaparté, cet être bienfaifant qui ne refpire que pour le bonheur du monde, qui offre la paix à tout moment, qui ne répand le fang, ne pille les propriétés, n'opprime et n'avilit les peuples que par l'impulfion d'une delicate fraternité, rentrera en Allemagne le fer et la flamme à la main, jettera les hauts cris fur la perfidie d'une nation égarée qui fe refuse à la félicité dont il la comble, attribuera cette erreur criminelle au machiavelisme et à l'or de l'Angleterre, et cherchera à effectuer une retraite difficile au travers de ces peuples ingrats, et de rentrer en France où il rencontrera la même ingratitude. Regardons encore plus loin. La nation Portugaife qu'il a tanţ preffurée et avilie, qu'il fait menacer depuis plufieurs années d'être effacée de la lifte des nations pour devenir une province de l'Espagne, profitera l'éloignement du Conquérant du Nord qui eft à huit cent lieues, trainant à fa fuite toute la force militaire de France et d'Italie, pour reprendre fon ancienne energie, récouvrer fa liberté et son honneur, fe délivrer des tributs arbitraires dont elle eft accablée, et aider la nation Espagnole à en faire autant. Ce feront encore deux peuples aveugles et ingrats qui échapperont à la bienveillance de l'Auguste moderne. Peut-être même encouragés par l'impunité, puifque vu fon éloignement il ne pourra les atteindre, pousseront-ils, pour affurer leur liberté, leur audace criminelle jufqu'à couronner les Pyrénées, et jetter des efcadres et des troupes fur les côtes du Midi et de l'Oueft de la France pour protéger les infurrections des provinces, qui trouvent mauvais qu'on arrache la fleur de leur jeunesse de fes foyers pour aller affeoir une famille avanturiere fur tous les trônes de l'Europe, et qui ne voyent la fin de ces guerres ruineufes et dévorantes, la ceffation du gouvernement militaire et defpotique, et le retour de la fûreté des propriétés, des lois, de la morale, du commerce, des manufactures, de la vraie liberté, du bonheur de la France, et de la paix universelle de l'Europe, que dans le rétablissement des Bourbons fur un trône qui leur eft bien dû en expiation du martyre du vertueux Louis XVI. et de leurs longues fouffrances. We have stated upon a former occasion, and long before the event, our reasons for never indulging in such hopes as thesc. But, at any rate, they are now mere dreams of a night that is passed away. Let us, instead of disputing what would have followed from events always highly improbable, consider the situation in which they have actually been placed, and the prospect which is spread before us. Such a speculation is more than merely gratifying our curiosity. If attended with some risk, from the rapid progress which affairs are making at the moment of discussion; it is likely, on the other hand, to teach us some lessons which may the more speedily prove serviceable. The fatal impolicy which produced the coalition of 1805, is unquestionably the cause of the disasters now so generally deplored. Satisfied with having a just cause of war, Russia and Austria Austria never inquired whether they had a safe opportunity; or rather, England, resolved at all hazards, and without delay, to turn out the Continent against France, never considered that a pretext for going to war was quite unnecessary,-that the mere relative strength of France would, according to ancient rules, furnish sufficient ground for attacking her, but that it also rendered the attempt ruinous if it failed, and prescribed such a degree of caution in making it, as should give a fair chance of success. The event is but too well known. Austria, unable to withstand the first shock of the war, or to keep her ground until Russia came to her assistance, was in a few weeks so reduced, that she owed her existence to a peace which left her quite incapable of moving again, whatever might happen to make new exertions desirable. Had the strength which was wasted in 1805 been reserved for the next year, and joined to the united efforts of Russia and Prussia, we do not say that the Duke of Brunswick would have marched to Paris, but such a front would have been opposed to France, as must have rendered it highly dangerous for her ruler, either to continue his aggressions in Germany, or to attempt the invasion of this country. With the countries beyond the Alps and the Pyrenees in a state of equal discontent, his own people heartily sick of the war, his conquered provinces still more anxious for peace, he would probably have thought in good earnest of ships, colonies, and commerce,' and would have deferred to a better season his projects both of continental and maritime aggrandizement. A peace might have been obtained, such as his neighbours could safely trust; or, if he determined to try another campaign, the resistance which he has in point of fact lately experienced, entitles us to conclude, that, unavailing as it has now proved, if augmented by the exertions of Austria, it would have induced him to pause, even before any efforts were made against him in the south. But we are following the example of General Dumourier, and only indulging a pleasing fiction, which makes the reality more intolerable. After the ruin of Austria, and the advanced positions which the enemy immediately occupied, no rational statesman could entertain hopes of the remaining part of Europe opposing an effectual resistance to him. To avoid an open rupture, was the only policy which remained. Russia had still some name left. Her unwieldiness, and the weakness of Prussia, were as yet unknown. Rather than discover those secrets by experiment, it is probable that France would have remained satisfied with some petty encroachments,quite sufficient, no doubt, to justify war, and in happier times, to prescribe it; but much rather to be connived at than resented after the fate of Austria,-which Prussia had done nothing, and Russia Bb 2 Russia scarcely any thing to stay. The conduct of the Court of Berlin was indeed such as to merit even more abuse than has been lavished upon it, if the awful punishment had not since followed. Unfortunately England had, at that moment, no voice in its councils, having, from views, excuseable perhaps, but not the less to be deplored, gone to war with Prussia, because a just cause of hostility was afforded, and lost sight for a while of the maxim, that whatever is not French should be treated as Eng lish.* If experience could teach nations, as it is said to do the most indocile of individuals, we might now expect one truth to be received as the dear-bought fruits of the last ten years, that no measures against France have any chance of success, in which Austria is not the chief actor, and that, for this purpose, she must be also the prime mover of those schemes. We must wait her time, we must accommodate ourselves to her situation, we must nurse her resources, and adapt our conduct to her views. Upon her we can always rely, with the confidence which strong mutual interest alone can give.When her time comes, and a sufficient number of the other nations have an interest in joining the league, when cabinet and people feel alike disposed to fight, -then the aggressions of France may be considered as about to check themselves, and it will be safe for England to assist a continental war. In the present state of Europe, and for a long time to come, the best service she can render her allies, is to exert herself actively in preventing them from seeking new wars with an enemy whom they cannot face; and it is her own interest to view as her allies, at least to this effect, all nations which are either unsubdued, or forcibly retained in friendship with France. The restoration of peace on the Continent, is, therefore, in our view of the subject, a very fortunate event. Russia and Austria, if they are altogether unable to make head against France at present, retain, nevertheless, resources which prudent management may * This question of the rupture with Pruffia on account of Hanover, was never difcuffed; because, if the late Miniftry, probably from expectations of peace, were inclined to refent the conduct of Pruffia, their adverfaries were too happy to get a new war at any price, and more efpecially a war for Hanover. It is painful to reflect, that this was one of the most popular acts of the late administration. The country cared, indeed, very little about Hanover; but the charm of finding some more enemies, and that, too, at a time when there was some fear of a peace with France, was not to be refifted. It is perhaps not too much to affirm, that Hanover became a fort of favourite with the people, because it furnished the ground of a fpirited quarrel; although, in former times, a continental war used to be the object of averfion, if it had any relation to the King's German dominions. |