may once more render formidable. The bravery of the Russian troops, and the severe battles which it has cost to beat them, must certainly contribute to render peace still more popular in a country subject to an unsparing military conscription. Happily, too, Austria made no effort, and therefore was not defeated. Some kind of doubt, consequently, remains with the French, whether they could have triumphed over the whole force of the Continent; and they can have no doubt, that such a victory would have cost them much dearer. The neutrality of Austria, then, and the good conduct of the Russians, will probably render it more convenient for Buonaparte to give such terms at present, as could scarcely again have been expected, unless, in the most unlikely of all events, his complete discomfiture. Had Austria given him cause of alarm, he certainly would have turned short about upon her, and with the assistance of his different auxiliaries on the West and South, acting under some of his thousand finished commanders, would have speedily prevented any further movement from that quarter. Had Russia then persisted in the contest, he would have followed up his victories, cost what they might, until he reached the fertile provinces which lead to St Petersburgh. But this would have been his last war with Russia. The peace which sooner or later must have come, would, in that ease, have left to some dependent state the task of checking so troublesome and doubtful an enemy. Sweden, if any such question can admit of certainty, would surely have been reared up to fill this office; and instead of Russia being left entire to assist Austria at some future period, she would probably have been excluded from all share in the politics of Europe, by the restoration of a power too feeble ever to cope with France, and only strong enough to aid her.

Happily this change, which, together with the establishment of their power in Poland, has been a favourite plan of the French statesmen since the reign of Lewis XV., is not likely at present to take place. France will, in all likelihood, be satisfied with the reduction of the King of Prussia to a state of dependence, and the erection of some part of his dominions into a separate and French principality; thus gaining a new depôt for intrigue, and an advanced post for French troops to the east of the German powers, and in the neighbourhood of Russia. The consequences of such an arrangement, while Buonaparte's influence in France, and the military character of his people continues, need scarcely be pointed out. It renders all hope of an effectual resistance, by the joint operation of Russia and Austria, nearly chimerical. The utmost that can be said for it is, that the complete success of the plan, the restoration of Poland and Sweden, would have been much worse.

Bb 3

Thus,

Thus, then, the Continental powers will find it necessary to remain under the influence of France, and, tired of hostility which has only reduced them lower each time, they will bethink themselves of conciliating her friendship or forbearance. The adoption of some measures unfavourable to England, will probably form part of the price for which this is granted; and the interruption of our commercial intercourse with the north of Europe, is likely to be one of the first fruits of the new order of things. If a similar prohibition be extended to Portugal, our whole direct intercourse with Europe will be confined to the trade of Sicily. Even this we shall only retain, while France thinks it better to confine our forces in that island; and we shall then owe to that war in disguise,' which has been painted as the enemy's only means of annoying us, the power of selling a single bale of goods to any of our European customers. Under such circumstances, we certainly cannot expect to dictate terms to our only remaining customers the Americans. But this will be the smallest part of the evil. A rigorous enforcement of the prohibition against our goods may be apprehended in most of the places subject to our enemy's influence; and though it is true that no such exclusion can be completely effected, it is equally certain that the conversion of the greatest part of our regular trade into contraband, will exceedingly diminish the amount of our commercial dealings, and narrow, in the most alarming degree, those resources by which a war of rapidly increasing expense must be carried on. By such means, even if all direct hostility against us were out of the question, it is probable that the enemy expects to diminish, not certainly our hatred of him, but our horror at peace. A great number of failures in the mercantile world-the ruin of many colonial proprietors-the general increase of price in all imported articles-not to mention the return of numbers of our ruined countrymen from their residences abroad-would no doubt spread a degree of consternation throughout this island, not the less violent because it succeeded to a few years of exulting confidence in our immutable prosperity. While the income of the people suffered, the demands for the public service would necessarily increase; and the weight of new taxes would become almost too heavy even for those who have talked of cheerfully giving up half their property to save the rest.

But it is probable that, though the alarm and real vexation which must then be diffused, must induce the people to wish for peace, they would find that they had waited too long, and lost the opportunity. For, in what situation will our enemy stand with respect to invasion? He may try it when he chooses, and has nothing to fear if he fails. There is no longer

the

the most remote chance of a diversion in our favour; and if we destroy his whole invading squadron, or annihilate his army after it lands, we have only obtained security until he shall make a se cond attempt. Formerly there were many serious obstacles to the project being tried ;-for, if he engaged in it, he had to apprehend that the powers of the Continent would seize the opportunity of attacking him; and he could not doubt that they would fall upon him, if he was repulsed,-while the people of France were likely to be disheartened, perhaps discontented by the failure. Now that the Continent is subdued, and left without the possibility of resisting for years to come, he has none of these dangers to think of;-our utmost efforts must end in barely defending ourselves. That the invasion will be attempted, too, with means which never before were at his disposal, cannot admit of a doubt. If he sets about it in good earnest-that is to say, if we make a grand exertion of this sort absolutely necessary, by refusing to treat-he has not only an abundance of soldiery quite unexampled in any country, but the power of obtaining ships and seamen both in the north and south of Europe. His points of attack are no longer confined to Brest, Boulogne, and the Texel. The north of Germany, the Danish dominions, and the Tagus, will in all human probability be added to his sea coast, or so far subjected to his influence, that he may use their harbours as his own. Whether the British navy can be suddenly augmented, so as to blockade every armament which he may fit out over this vast extent of coast, and whether, if we had as many fleets as we now have ships, all the harbours capable of containing an armament are likewise capable of being blockaded, are questions that need only be stated to be answered.

If then we must at length, and indeed, expect to fight the battle on our own shores, it may be prudent to consider how dreadful the consequences would prove, even of the most unsuccessful war which France could carry on in this commercial territory. That it could not be a very short struggle, or indeed a contest perfectly free from the greatest of possible dangers, must appear evident to every one who reflects on the superior skill of the enemy's officers, the experience of his whole and the present state of Ireland. When the cerarmy, tain injury is so great-when there is a possibility at least of a still greater calamity-and when the utmost we can gain by such losses and risks is merely the repulse of the invader, leaving him nearly in the same situation as before, and ourselves much weaker; it becomes us to consider whether it would not be just as wise to terminate the war at present, if an honourable peace can be procured. We cannot possibly gain by continuing this contest. On the contrary, such of our allies as remain steady to us

Bb 4

will

will be ruined; and the resourses of those who either are disposed or compelled to leave us, will be turned against us. The enemy is, in all probability, willing to treat once more he thinks he shall gain by a peace the only thing which war cannot give him, colonies and trade;-and, satisfied with subduing the Continent, he may be inclined to forego the chance of conquering us. If he really has no such views, and will only make peace upon extravagant terms, we must, of course, resolve to fight the battle out, and endeavour to forget by whom our safety has been endangered. But, in the present state of the Continent, if a peace can, upon tolerably good terms, be procured, it will surely be the height of folly to throw away the last chance of bringing back France to the pursuits of civil life, and rendering her a safe and quiet neighbour.

It is an exceedingly prevalent notion in this country, that the enemy is worse off than he affects to be, because he offers moderate terms to those powers whom he pretends to have conquered. He overruns Austria; and when he comes to talk of peace, he takes but a trifling part of her dominions, leaving her still a great nation. Is it possible' say the reasoners to whom we are alluding that he can really have gained such victories? No; he must feel that he can do no better;-he is afraid-he has got into some scrape there is something rotten at home-or he knows that he shall be defeated if the war lasts. Such have been the inferences from the enemy's moderation in former treaties; and, no doubt, the peace which he is about to make with our allies, will be liable to the same remarks. Nothing, however, can be worse founded than opinions of this sort; and nothing can be more fatal, than the delusions to which they give rise. The enemy knows very well, that by taking something at present, he may get more hereafter; and he is aware that he can only continue master of the question of peace and war, with a neighbour whom he has defeated, by giving, in the first instance, moderate terms. If he did otherwise, the treaty might be broken at a moment which did Tot suit him. To encroach gradually after the war has ended, is a part of the same policy which teaches him to move rapidly while it continues. We must lay our account, then, with his not remaining quiet now, any more than he did after the treaty Presburg. But to delude ourselves with the hope, that because he is moderate in his terms, compared with the successes which he claims, therefore his pretensions are false; and to derive from them another inference, that by keeping alive some war on the Continent, or at least continuing at war ourselves, as a rallying point to the allies, we shall, in the end, beat him,-is a species of folly which would be ridiculous, were it confined to a few, and productive of less melancholy effects.

of

It is common with the same class of politicians, to receive, as something akin to disaffection, every gloomy description of our own prospects, or those of our allies. When such a representation is made, they do not inquire whether it be true or false, although that is the only question; but they say, it tends to promote despondency. Those who fairly and honestly state the case as it is, are called prophets of evil, and preachers of despair-are plainly accused of wishing to see their own predictions realizedand more than suspected of assisting in their fulfilment. To all such thoughtless or designing persons, one answer may be sufficient. The evil foretold is a misery which must directly affect every human being in the country-it is an invasion of a large French army, either successful, or with difficulty repelled. This is a prospect which no rational creature can take any pleasure in contemplating. Then do not speak of it,' say the railers, it dispirits the people. Not so-A nation, whom the timely view of their real situation can difpirit, will affuredly never face the danger when it comes near. But it is very poffible to enfure a panic, with all its fatal confequences, among the bravest people, by feeding them with falfe hopes, ftimulating their natural spirits by artificial means, and blindfolding them till the moment when the immediate approach of the danger requires them to act. Above all, a ftrong and general popular feeling against peace is to be dreaded by every wife ftatesman, if it be the refult of fuch delufions; for, when the crifis is at hand, and the truth is known, a ftill stronger averfion to the war is likely to feize the multitude, and all fpirit-ftirring topics will furely fail. The mischiefs of fuch popular infatuation were felt, but in a very fubordinate degree, during the Grand Alliance war; when the general averfion to a treaty upon moderate terms broke off the negotiations; and, being followed by an equally violent clamour for peace, brought about the most inadequate bargain that two nations ever made,

The wifer conduct is to look our fituation in the face, while there is yet time to better it. We have conftantly and glorioufly vanquished all our enemies at fea; we have gained the most honourable victories over fuperior forces by land ;-we have fuffered not a fingle reverse which can stain our reputation. But our allies have been destroyed, rather than conquered,the world has need of repofe, and the war can no longer benefit any one except our enemy. This is our fituation. We can lofe no honour by fairly agreeing to treat ;-by yielding fomething to the misfortunes, not of ourselves, but our friends-and by endeavouring to be really at peace, as foon as we have put an end to the war.

ART.