eral Taylor.' The troops for this expedition, numbering about three thousand, were concentrated at San Antonio and organized into what was called "the army of the center." Wool crossed the Rio Grande early in October, 1846, but found it impracticable to march directly on Chihuahua, and was forced to make a wide détour to the southward. On the 29th of the month he reached Monclova; but it had already become apparent that the expedition was practically useless, and the "army of the center" was drawn eastward and merged with the army of occupation" under Taylor."

Meanwhile a force of about eight hundred and fifty men under Colonel A. W. Doniphan had been detached by Kearny from his troops in New Mexico and ordered to join Wool. Starting December 14, 1846, Doniphan led his command southward through El Paso, defeating the Mexicans in the battles of Brazito and Sacramento by the way.' March 1, 1847, he occupied Chihuahua, where he remained nearly two months. During this time his men, who, though good fighters, were altogether lacking in discipline, plunged into all sorts of excesses, and drew from him the complaint that they were "wholly un

1 Scott to Taylor, June 12, 1846, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., I Sess., VII., No. 60, pp. 325-327.

2

Polk, MS. Diary, October 20, 1846; Taylor to adjutantgeneral, November 9, 12, 1846, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII., No. 60, pp. 361, 374-376.

3 Doniphan to Jones, March 4, 1847, in Senate Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1, pp. 497–502.

1

fit to garrison a town or city." Towards the end of April he finally abandoned Chihuahua, in spite of the objections of the American merchants there, and marched to join Taylor's army at Saltillo.

The army which was most depended on to force Mexico to terms was that operating in the east. The campaign in this quarter began with an advance from Matamoras through Tamaulipas and Nuevo León into Coahuila. But as it progressed the plan was gradually assimilated, so far as these states were concerned, to that which had been followed in dealing with California and New Mexico, and became one of simple occupation; while the attack was shifted to the south, and the final advance was made from Vera Cruz direct on the city of Mexico.

In the prosecution of the war, in this part especially, the administration was much hampered by the character and conduct of the generals on whom the detailed development and execution of the plan devolved. The friction thus arising was increased by mutual suspicions of political motives between President Polk, certain members of his cabinet, and the generals themselves. At the outset General Gaines, commanding the western military division, caused serious embarrassment by issuing, on his own authority, a call for an unnecessarily large number of short-time volunteers; thereupon he

2

1 Doniphan to Wool, March 20, 1847, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII., No. 60, p. 1128.

Polk, MS. Diary, June 5, 1846.

VOL. XVII.-16

was relieved of his command and ordered to Washington. More annoying, even if not more serious in the outcome, was the series of quarrels and mutual recriminations among the higher officers that marked the whole course of the war. It happened that the two generals to whom fell the chief management of operations in the field, Scott and Taylor, were both Whigs in their political views, and both of them, as well as many officers of rank, were distrusted by President Polk.' When war was declared Scott was appointed to take charge of the campaign against Mexico simply because he was already commander-in-chief of the United States army. His delay, however, in leaving for the field of operations led to complaints, which he answered May 21, 1846, in a letter to Secretary of War Marcy, making very offensive imputations against the president.3 For this he was excused from command of the "army of occupation" and directed to remain at Washington. Here he remained throughout the larger part of the first invasion and the campaign in northern Mexico. As for Taylor, who commanded the army in that district during the interval, he proved himself an obedient soldier and a good fighter; but his want of initiative and failure to push advantages when gained, together with his

1 Polk, MS. Diary, May 23, September 5, November 14, 17, 1846. 2 Ibid., May 13, 1846. 3 Niles' Register, LXX., 231. As to Scott's delay, see Polk, MS. Diary, May 23, 1846.

rather reckless disposition of his troops, rendered him, in the judgment of Polk and his cabinet, unfit for commander-in-chief.1

The latter part of the war especially was marked by a series of charges and counter-charges, between Scott on one side and Generals Pillow and Worth and Colonel Duncan on the other, which resulted in Scott's being superseded by General W. O. Butler after the taking of Mexico, and in the holding of a court of inquiry in that city; but some of the charges were withdrawn and the rest were not sustained.❜

Soon after the war began, another of the customary revolutions in Mexico brought the fall of Paredes and placed the government in the hands of Santa Anna. To this event the authorities at Washington contributed in some degree themselves. Santa Anna had been expelled from Mexico in 1845, and was residing at Havana. February 13, 1846, information to the effect that he was disposed to make peace with the United States on terms approximating in some degree those desired by Polk was received by the president. Then, on April 7, came a despatch from Slidell, dated March 15, in which, after stating that he had just heard of the definite refusal of the Mexican government to

1 Polk, MS. Diary, September 5, 1846, and June 5, 1847. * For a statement of the charges, etc., see Wright, Scott, 264288. Polk, MS. Diary, February 13, 1846.

4U. S. MS. Archives, State Dept.

receive him, he indicated his opinion that Santa Anna could easily put down Paredes, and intimated that in such an event there would be another chance for the success of his mission.

2

With these assurances concerning Santa Anna's attitude it was thought worth while, on the declaration of war, to issue orders to Commodore Conner, who was blockading the Gulf ports of Mexico, to allow the exile free entry in case he should return.1 Early in August, 1846, the Paredes government was overthrown, and on the 16th Santa Anna arrived at Vera Cruz. While he could scarcely have been kept out of Mexico, it seems to have been a mistake to facilitate his entry. He did nothing to promote a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Mexicans; on the other hand, he organized resistance to the invasion more effectively than would have been possible, perhaps, for any other Mexican leader.

The limits of this volume forbid anything more than a very general description of the military operations of the war. The United States troops, though always outnumbered-in some cases heavily- -and usually with the advantage of position against them, enjoyed such superiority both in morale and in materiel that they were almost uniformly victorious. Their victories, however, were

1 Bancroft to Conner, May 13, 1846, in House Exec. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., VII., No. 60, p. 774.

'Conner to Bancroft, August 16, ibid., p. 776.