sented by the convention of 1827; and though Great Britain was evidently willing to accept the award, the United States Senate refused, by a vote of 35 to 8, to regard it as binding.1

2

Efforts to settle the question continued under increasing difficulties. The United States entered into a "treaty" with Maine to obtain possession of the lands that might have to be surrendered, which was formally signed on both sides, but never ratified. Desultory negotiations with Great Britain were kept up, new surveys were made by both sides,3 and the border strife continued. Quarrels over timber-cutting and jurisdiction in the disputed district led at last, in 1838-1839, to actual hostilities in the "Restook," or Aroostook, War. The state of Maine bristled with military preparations, and the United States government prepared to take a hand; but the disturbances were quieted through the mediation of General Scott. Although there was peace on the border after this for a time, there was no telling when the trouble in that quarter might begin again.

4

Such was the general condition of the relations between the United States and England when Webster became secretary of state under Harrison in

1 Senate Exec. Journals, IV., 257.

2 Webster, Works, V., 97; Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 138.

For the work of Featherstonhaugh and Mudge, see Ibid., II., 141.

4 Webster, Works, V., 93; Scott, Memoirs, 331-354.

March, 1841. He at once proposed a renewal of negotiations with the plan of settling the boundary question directly, rather than by the methods thus far employed, at a line to be agreed on by the ministers of the two countries. Great Britain received the offer favorably, and appointed Lord Ashburton special minister with full powers to conclude a treaty covering all matters at issue between the two countries. Ashburton reached Washington in April, 1842, and in June the negotiations began in earnest.

There have been few instances in which negotiations ultimately successful have been carried on under greater difficulties. Besides the serious difference in the point of view of the two nations concerning some of the questions involved, a special obstacle to agreement lay in the fact that there were really four parties to be consulted instead of two; in addition to Webster and Ashburton, commissioners from the interested states of Massachusetts and of Maine also took part. The legislature of Maine had passed a resolution refusing to regard the acknowledgment of her claim to any portion of the disputed territory as an equivalent for the surrender of the rest. The conduct of these two states, together with that of New York in the case of McLeod, must have impressed on Webster the fact that the supporters of state rights were not all from the South; and if he had been called on to re1 Benton, Abridgment of Debates of Cong., XIV., 576.

VOL. XVII.-6

1

peat in 1842 his speech of 1830 in reply to Hayne,1 he would doubtless have put into it an even stronger degree of earnestness and conviction. The saving feature of the situation lay in the mutual confidence and perfect frankness of Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton towards each other, and in the assistance delicately given from time to time by President Tyler.2

The object was at length successfully accomplished, through the so-called Ashburton treaty, dated August 9, 1842. The lines from the source of the St. Croix to the intersection with the St. Lawrence, and from the passage between Lakes Huron and Superior to the northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods, were agreed upon and carefully described, and a commission was provided for to survey and mark the division. The boundary as fixed was a line less advantageous to the United States than that of the award of the king of the Netherlands. The claims of Massachusetts and Maine were satisfied by a payment of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to each from the United States government, besides a share of what was known as the "disputed territory fund." The free navigation of certain waters along that part of the line which lay in the St. Lawrence and the Lakes, as well as of the St.

1 See MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy (Am. Nation, XV.), chap. vi.

2 Tyler, Tylers, II., 216–218; Schouler, United States, IV., 403. The official correspondence between Webster and Ashburton is in Niles' Register, LXIII., 41-47, 53-63.

John where it tormed the boundary, was conceded to both parties; and an agreement was adopted whereby the people of that part of the upper valley of the St. John lying in Maine obtained an outlet for their lumber and agricultural produce to the sea. The boundary from the Connecticut River to the St. Lawrence was fixed at the forty-fifth parallel, as determined by the survey completed in 1774, instead of the true forty-fifth, and the little strip of territory including the works at Rouse's Point was thus saved to the United States.1 Two other important provisions of the treaty, those relating to the slave-trade and the extradition of criminals, are elsewhere treated."

One interesting feature of the history of the treaty was what Lord Ashburton called "the battle of the maps." Among the mass of evidence concerning the boundary was a copy of a map which Jared Sparks had discovered in the French archives and sent to Mr. Webster for his use. This map, which was supposed to have accompanied a note from Benjamin Franklin to Vergennes, also found in the archives, had on it a line marked in red, apparently indicating the boundary according to the preliminary agreement of 1782, and hence became known as the "Red Line" map. The line as drawn was somewhat north of the forty-fifth parallel be

3

1 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 432-438.

Hart, Slavery and Abolition (Am. Nation, XVI.), chap. xix. 3 Curtis, Webster, II., 168.

tween the St. Lawrence and the head of the Connecticut, but ran south of the valley of the St. John, giving Great Britain more than she claimed.1 Webster did not show the map to Ashburton, but he did allow the Massachusetts and Maine commissioners to see it in order that they might understand the effect it would possibly have if the subject went again to arbitration. Subsequently there was found in the British Museum a copy of Mitchell's map which had been used in the negotiations of 1782, and which showed a line marked by King George III. as "the boundary described by Mr. Oswald," giving the United States a considerably larger share of the St. John Valley than the treaty of 1842 had allowed.' This map must have been known to the British authorities while the negotiations for the treaty were in progress. Another copy of Mitchell's map, with the same line marked on it, was found in 1843 among the papers of John Jay, who was one of the American commissioners in 1782. The Red Line and Oswald maps figured extensively in discussions of the treaty after it was ratified, but had no place in the negotiations that led to it, except as the former was used to secure ratification for the treaty on the American side.

1 Curtis, Webster, II., 132, 171.

? See Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 156, and map; Curtis, Webster, II., 169.