Natural

Evils are greater than Mo

ral ones, and Free

berty, attended only with fome Danger of Evils, but not with the Evils themselves, as in the former Cafes, (62.)

VIII. Fourthly, It must be obferv'd that Elections are therefore efteem'd Evil, because they lead us into Natural Evils. For if an Election contain nothing abfurd or prejudicial, 'tis not a wrong one. Hatred of God, Rebellion against his Commands, Murther, Theft, Lying, are Sins, because they Good then are hurtful to ourselves or others, because they dethe Natu- prive us of natural Good, and lead to Evil. Electiral Appe- ons therefore are wrong and undue on account of

Will a

greater

tites.

the natural Evils which fometimes attend them; Natural Evils then are greater than Moral +: For that which makes any thing bad must neceffarily be worse itself: But Free-Will is better than natural Appetites, and a Gift more worthy of the Deity, it is not therefore to be deny'd to the Creatures on account of the concomitant Evils, any more than the natural Appetites and Propenfities: both of them indeed fometimes lead us into the fame Evils, but with this Difference, that the one, viz. the natural

NOTES.

(62) In relation to us, indeed, a Gift which is attended only with the poflibility of fome Inconveniencies, appears to be of more dignity aud value than one that brings fome degree of unavoidable Mifery along with it, and as fuch it ought to be receiv'd with proportionable gratitude by us But with refpect to a Being who foresees all the Abuses of Free-Will, all the contingent Evils confequent thereupon are as certain as the natural and neceffary ones, and therefore ought to be equally provided againft. This Argument therefore about the Contin gency of Moral Evil, fo far as it relates to the Deity, need not be infifted on, fince our Author allows the Divine Prefcience, and confiftently with that, offers reafons fufficient for the Vindication of the other Attributes of God in the prefent Cafe.

+ See Chap. 4. §. 4. par. 8. and Ri.

natural Appetite, loads us with Evils by neceffity; but the other, viz. Free-Will, not of neceffity, but only if we please. These might have been avoided fince they are contingent, but thofe could not, fince they force themfelves upon us against our Wills: If therefore it was not unworthy of God to create an Appetite which was attended with neceffary Evils; how much more agreeable was it to his Goodness to have endow'd us with Free-Will, by which these Evils may be avoided or at least alleviated? If the natural Appetite be a greater Good than what thefe Evils which flow from it can overballance, and therefore worthy to be implanted in Animais by the Deity; how much more excellent a Good will Free-Election be, by which alone we become capable of Happiness, tho' join'd with the danger of falling into Evils by abufe?

would be

worfe if

IX. Fifthly, If the State of Man would be worfe The State without Free-Will than with it, 'tis plain that Li- of Man berty diminishes instead of increasing the Sum of Evils, and is beftow'd upon us for that end. But Free Will how much more miferable the State of Man would were taken away. be without Liberty than it is with it, will appear to any one who confiders what fort of Creatures we fhould be without Election. For if Man were not free, he would be driven by the violence of Matter and Motion, and fooner or later be quite overwhelm'd with those natural Evils which neceffarily arife from the Nature and Laws of Motion. But it is better to struggle with fome of these with Liberty, than all of them with neceffity; the former is the Condition of Men, the latter of Brutes +. If by being deprived of Election we fhould be freed from all kind of Evil, we might complain of God for giving it; but feeing that whether we be free

or

+ Only in fome Degree. See the Obfervation from Bayle in Note 24.

Free A

are apa ble of per fect Hap

pine's, therefore

it is better

or bound by the chain of Fate (while we have Bodies) we must neceffarily endure thofe Evils which are confequent upon the affections of Bodies; (nay thofe very Evils which we were afraid of falling into by a wrong Choice) 'tis in vain to defire the abfence of Liberty, by relying upon which, and ufing it aright, we may avoid the most bitter part even of thefe neceffary Evils.

X. For in the Sixth place, it is most manifest gents only that the greatest Good, and that whereby Men excel other Animals, is owing to Liberty. By the affiftance of this we rife above Fate, and when attack'd from without by adverfe Fortune, we find our Happiness within ourfelves. Other Animals have nothing to oppofe to a Diftemper, Death, or Pain; nothing to delight themfelves in, except Sleep, Food, and the Appetite of propagating their Species. But a free Agent, in the midst of Pains and Torments, of Hunger and Thirst, nay Death itself, has wherewithal to please itself, and to blunt the Edge of all thefe Evils. We com

to enjoy Liberty.

plain of our Bodies, that by being tied to them, we are oblig'd to undergo very many and great Hardfhips; how much more full of Complaints should we be if we were entirely fubjected to them, and hurried into Evils without any Remedy or Relief? Is it not better for us to have our Happiness in our own Power, than to be oblig'd to feek it elsewhere, nay rather to despair of it? Which Happiness is only to be found in a Free Choice, as was fhewn before. From hence it appears, I hope, fufficiently why God created Free Agents notwithstanding the abufe which they were liable to. For he chofe a Creature which would fometimes do amifs, rather than that every thing fhould be drawn on by Fate,

and

and a Chain of Neceffity, into inevitable Evils. (63.)

Cc 4

XI. But

NOTES.

(63) Our Author having fhewn in Sect. 2 that the greatest part of our Happiness confifts in this Principle of Election, here points out fome of the many Inconveniencies that would attend the lofs of it. Firft, If there was no fuch thing as a free Agent, all would be mere Mechanism and neceflary Effects of the first Caufe, i, e. the beft and nobleft part of Nature would be cut off, that which of all others is moft worthy of and agreeable to the Deity. There would be no Creatures capable of making any kind of return, of paying any reafonable Obedience and Duty to God; no poflibility for him to display his Wif dom, Goodnefs and Mercy in the Government of them, nor any means of bringing them to the fublimeft Degree of Intellectual Hippinefs, viz. that which arifes from Morality. Secondly, Thofe paffive Beings themfelves would be in a much worfe Condition than they now are. They would be deprived of all the Happinefs which they now enjoy from the choice of indifferent Objects; they would be neceffarily expofed to all the natural Evils arifing from the general Laws of Matter and Motion, viz. Diftempers of the Body, Inclemency of the Seafons, Hunger and Thirft, &c. which Liberty enables them frequently to guard against and avoid, and frequently to bear with pleasure, and even to convert to their fuperior Good: nay, they must inevitably undergo the greatest part of those very Evils which at prefent, by this Power, they hive at molt only a poffibility of incurring. Thirdly, Without L berty, the other most exalted Powers of the Mind would be entirely ufelefs, and often aggravations of our Mifery. A Faculty of Understanding (fays Dr. Jenkin [a.]) without a Will to de"termine it, if left to itself, muft always think of the fame "Object, or proceed in a continued feries and connection of "thoughts without any Aim or End; which would be a perpetual Labour in vain, and tedious Thoughtfulaefs to no purpose: but if it fhould be fometimes determin'd by fome thing external to new Objects, yet what ufe of Reafon could "there be in Contemplations, which were merely obtruded "and forc'd upon the Mind?" And to forefee a train of Evils, without any power of acting againft and oppofing them, mult

66

66

66

66

[a] Reasonableness of the Chriftian Religion, ad vol. C. 12. P. 238. 5th Edit.

The bene

Will

be had

Power of

XI. But you'll fay, that you defire the Pleasure fits ofFree and Advantages arifing from free Elections, but could not would not have the Power to Sin; i. e. you would have a Liberty reftrain'd by Nature within certain without a bounds, fo as never to extend to Evil. But it may Sinning. be justly doubted whether this was poffible in the prefent ftate of things: For Free-Will is naturally an active Power, and determines itself to Action, and requires nothing more in Objects, than that they should give occafion for the Exercise of Elections; 'tis therefore active in its own Nature, Now whatfoever is limited by another admits of bounds, and is therefore paffive with refpect to the Limiter; it feems equally abfurd then for a Free Agent to be thus limited, as for Matter, which is in itself and of its own Nature paffive, to determine itself to Action, and is perhaps no lefs impoffible. (64.) XII. Secondly,

NOTES.

must be only anticipating Mifery, and adding the future to the prefent, and a fenfe of our Inability of ever helping ourselves to both. Thefe Confiderations are fufficient to prove, that the want of Liberty in general would be an irreparable Damage to any confcious System.

For a fuller Explication of them fee Mr. Jackson's Defence ef buman Liberty, p. 79, &r, and Scott's Chriftian Life, Part 2. C. 4. Sect. 3. p. 318, &r. 8vo or Sherlock on Providence, C. 7. p. 240, 2d Edit. or D'Oyly's First Diflirtation, C 10. or Dr. Jenkin in the Chapter above cited.

The next Enquiry muft be, what Confequences would at tend either the Limitation of this free Power to fome particular Objects, or the Infringement and Sufpenfion of it on particular Occafions

64.) If Matter were made active, it would be no longer Matter in like manner if a felf moving or active Being were render'd paffive, it would be no longer what it now is, nor have the fame properties which it now has. Hence appears the abfurdity of fuppofing a Liberty, prope ly fo call'd, to be determin'd to fome particular ways of acting, 'tis the fame as the Liberty of a Stone