than by virtue of Election. Let us weigh the triAles of Children, and the serious Affairs of Men; the Temerity of Fools, and the Counfels of the Wife; and it will be evident almoft in all of them that they are neither determin'd by Reason nor Nature, but pleafe by Election only. This, among other things, may appear from the Diverfions of Gards and Dice. Nothing is more agreeable to all, or pleafes more; but upon no other ac-count, if we examine it thoroughly, than because we will be thus employ❜d. Nay that dire Luft of Rule which bewitches mortal Minds, and tranfports them beyond themselves, which cannot be fatisfy'd unless the whole World be fubdued, and even not then; this neither receives NOTES. uneafy Paffages that he must meet with in it all which muft make his Life a thing quite different from what it was when he firft lived it. But if we would propofe to a Man of fixty Years to lengthen his Life for fixty more with the same strength and vigour he had at twenty, and let him take his Chance, I doubt if one in a million would refuse the offer. that Laftly; let us fuppofe that a Man has lived happily many Years, and at length falling into fome great Misfortune or grievous Pain difpatches himself. This does not prove he thinks the Life God hath given no benefit,, or worse than Death; but only that the fmall and miferable part which remains to him is not worth the living. A Man has a Veffel of good Wine which he drinks with Pleasure to the Dregs, then throws them out. Will any one conclude from thence that the Man thinks a Veffel of Wine no valuable Prefent? And yet this is exactly the Cafe of fuch Self-murderers. From the Whole I think it manifest that Life, fuch as it is, is a valuable Good, and confequently fit to be bestowed on us by a good God. As it has more Good than Evil in it, 'tis plain we are obliged to him that gave it; and it is a very wicked and ungrateful thing for any one to pretend the Contrary. See more of this in Sect. 1. Sub. 5. par. 11, 12, &c. Elections effect in ceives its Origin nor Aprobation from Nature or any innate Appetite. But the force of Election is never more apparent than in fome Men's infatiable Avarice, and continual Study to heap up unprofitable Riches, for no ufe, no end, but to fatisfy their Choice. Behold the covetous Man brooding over his Gold; a Curfe to his Relations, a Jeft to his Neighbours, a Reproach to Nature; depriving himself of Food, Sleep, Reft, and other Neceffaries, and yet applauding himself ftill. Why do these things please which are so unnatural, fo abfurd, fo prepofterous? Can they be explain'd otherwife than from this Principle that we are pleased with what we choofe? This is ftill felt and purfu'd, tho' he that does this be not conscious that he is doing it, neither obferves what it is which pleases him. It is not therefore the Direction of the Senfes, or the Impulse of Animal Nature only, which tranfports us into Vices and unlawful Acts; thefe are commonly done against the Remonftrance of thofe Appetites which are implanted by Nature, against the Remonftrance of Senfe and Inftinct, no less than Reason, and the least Crime we commit is in obeying them. We may learn then, to our great Misfortune, that we are not entirely driven by the Impetus of Animal Nature, and that this Power of pleafing ourselves by Election does not lie idle; but rather that it is the too great and inordinate use of it which transports us into Wickedness. VII. As to the third Objection, viz. that the Corproduce ruption of Mankind is almost universal, it is to be the fame obferved in the first place, that Elections produce the Moral the fame effect in the Moral, as Motion does in the World as Natural World; neither is it any more to be expected that in our present State all Elections should the Natu- be confiftent and uniform, than that all Motions Motion does in zal. fhould fhould be fo. Now as contrariety of Motion is a neceffary Cause of natural Corruption, fo the interfering of Elections is of Vice or Moral Corruption. God could indeed take away both, viz. by destroying Motion and free Choice; but while these are permitted, neither of the Evils could be prevented in the present State of things. are con fects many others. VIII. Secondly, We may obferve that things are Things connected together, and have a mutual dependence nected to on each other, on this account, as Machines which gether,ind require the most Workmanship may be stopped or a Defect disordered by the defect of a single Nail or Wheel: in one affo the Error or Offence of one Man puts the rational Syftem or Society of Mankind out of order. Any Perfon, by almoft one fingle free Act, may destroy a House or Ship, nay a City or a Fleet by Fire or Wreck. Any King or Governor can, by an eafy and free Act, overwhelm whole Nations with War, Rapine, Slaughter and Villany. A Father may beget Sons, who being yet unborn, are fure of inheriting his Difeafes and Infirmities as well as his Goods. Nor could it be otherwife while the Nature and Condition of Men and of the Earth are fuch as we experience them to be. Either therefore Liberty and the Connection of things must be deftroy'd, or thefe Evils tolerated. Wicked. IX. Thirdly, 'Tis certain that God does not Vice and permit any bad Elections, but fuch as may be reconciled with the Good of the whole Syftem, and deform'd nefs, tho' has digefted and ordered every thing in fuch a man- in themner, that these very Faults and Vices fhall tend to felves, do the Good of the whole. For as in Mufick, Dif not impair cords, if heard feparately, grate and offend the ty of the Ear with harshness, but when mix'd in confort whole. with other Notes, make the more fweet and agreeable Harmony; in like manner bad Elections, if confider'd alone, are look'd upon as odious and deteftable, the Beau deteftable, but compared with the whole Syftem, they promote and increase the Good and Beauty of the whole. For when they are temper'd they become medicinal to each other by that very Contrariety, and those which would poifon feparate, when mix'd become a Remedy. For instance, One by a depraved Choice raifes an immenfe Sum of Money, and a vast Estate, and either the fame Perfon or his Heir, by his Vanity and Profufenefs, compenfates for what he had acquir'd by his Extortion, and perhaps does as much Good by fquandering away his ill-gotten Wealth to the most idle Purposes, as if he had bestow'd all upon the Poor. For he applies a Spur to Induftry, whereas he would otherwife afford an handle to Sloth. The rich Man offends in Luxury and Idleness: the Poor tranfgreffes no lefs by too much Labour and Solicitude, which he indulges perhaps for no other End than to provide Inftruments of Luxury for the Rich: but each of them pleafes himself in his Choice, and 'tis almoft the fame thing with refpect to the benefit of the Univerfe, as if one had converted to pious Ufes what he fpent in Luxury, and the other had labour'd moderately to provide only what was ufeful. The fame almost may be faid of all Vices, they are prejudicial, but only to the Criminals themselves, or those that deferve to fuffer; nay they are often beneficial to others; and fo long as the whole comes to no harm, 'tis fit to allow every one the use of his own Will, and let them fuffer for their Sin. God could indeed cut off all Occafion of Sin, by taking away free Elections: But it is plain that this would be far from an Advantage to intelligent Agents. 'Tis our Business to prevent bad Elections, and if we will not, we fuffer for our Folly: But God will will procure the Good of the whole by our Folly no less than by our Wisdom. (81.) Hh Vol. II. X. If NOTES. (81.) We may add, and by our Sin no lefs than by our Righteousness. Thus it may be faid in a good Senfe that private Vices (as well as private Misfortunes) often become public Benefits, tho' the Authors be no less liable to Punishment. But it will be objected, that this makes Vice to be neceffary for the Public Good, and therefore to be no Vice at all, nor confequently punishable. For a tendency or oppofition to the general Happiness of our Syftem, is the very Nature and Effence of Virtue or Vice: If then what is call'd my Wickedness tends to the Good of the World, how can I be punished for it? And if my Action promotes the Glory of God, why doth be yet fini fault? We anfwer, Vice naturally and in general tends to the Mifery of any Syftem; fo that if all were vicious, all would be wretched; and on the contrary, if every one were virtuous, all must be happy; to be vicious and to be productive of Pain or Mifery, would then be convertible terms. But in a mix'd irregular State, where fome pursue the Rules of Virtue and others do not, the Cafe is very much alter'd, there Pain or Evil, and fuch Actions as produce it, may often be the most proper means to remedy fome greater Evil, or procure fome fuperior Good; to reform a Vice, or improve a Virtue; in which Cafe, tho' that way of acting which in general tends to Mifery, happens to be productive of fome real Happiness which could not have been produced without it, yet this is not fufficient to excufe or justify it, nor is it fo much the confequence of its own Nature, and attributable to its immediate Author, as an effect of the fuperintendency of fome other Agent, who applies it, and makes it inftrumental to fome End of his own; who brings Good out of Evil, or from the Evil takes occafion to do fill more Good than he could be conceived to have done without that Evil. of All this I think may be fuppofed of God, and yet the dif ferent Natures of Good and Evil continue fix'd. Man, cannot fee all the Confequences and Connection things, must be obliged to fome general Rules of acting, and whenever he deviates from thefe Rules he does amifs; at leaft when he intends to act against the very End of these Rules, i. e. the general Good, he evidently fins, let the Confequence of his Acts be what it will. Thus the Actions of a Man may be often morally Evil to himself, tho' they prove naturally Good |