Mill is the Locke of the nineteenth century, it would be necessary to examine and correct his views. For while the Essay on the Human Understanding evolved much truth, and exercised, upon the whole, a healthy influence, it contained very grave defects and errors, which issued in very serious consequences both in France and in this country; in the former landing speculation in a miserable sensationalism, and in the latter originating the wire-drawn attempts to fashion all our ideas out of one or two primitive sources by means of association. have already intimated that I believe the errors of Mr. Mill to be far more numerous and fundamental than those of Locke; and should his sensational and nescient system come to be adopted, it will be followed, both in theory and in practice, with far more fatal results than any that ensued from the combined idealistic and realistic philosophy expounded in Locke's great work.

I

Among a considerable portion even of the reading and thinking people of England, there is a strong aversion to all professedly metaphysical speculation,-which they regard as a net of sophistry spread out to catch them. But in avoiding an avowed and elaborate discussion of fundamental truth, it often happens that they are taken in by a plausible smartness, which is really metaphysics, but bad metaphysics,-treating every profound subject in a superficial way. In this respect

some of our countrymen act very much like those ex-cessively cautious and suspicious persons to be met with in the world, who are so afraid of everybody cheating them, that they become the dupes of those

more designing schemers who are ever warning them against the dishonesty of others. There are readers of Hobbes, who, on perceiving how free he is from mysticism, and how readily he seems to explain all our ideas by sensation, and all our actions by selfishness, are tempted to think that this man who speaks so clearly and dogmatically must be speaking truly. They are about as wise as the excessively far-sighted individuals who so easily account for all extraordinary actions on the simple principle that all mankind are fools, or rogues, or madmen! The Englishman is thus often led astray by a deception which pretends to be simplicity itself. abhor as much as any man the introduction of metaphysics into the discussion of commonplace or practical subjects. But there is another error, quite as common, and to be equally dreaded, and that is the introduction of superficial metaphysics furtively, by those who would gain your confidence by telling you that they avoid metaphysics. If we are to have metaphysics, let them avow that they are metaphysics, and let the investigation be conducted scientifically and systematically. By all means let us have clear metaphysics, just as we would wish to have clear mathematics and clear physics. But clearness to the extent of transparency is of no value, provided it be attained, as in the case of the French sensational school, only by omitting all that is high or deep in man's nature. I certainly do not look on Mr. Mill as a superficial writer. On the contrary, on subjects on which he has not been led to follow Mr. James Mill or M. Comte, his thoughts are commonly as solid and

weighty as they are clearly expressed. But, speaking exclusively of his philosophy of first principles, I believe he is getting so ready an acceptance among many for his metaphysical theories, mainly because, like Hobbes and Condillac, he possesses a delusive simplicity.which does not account for, but simply overlooks, the distinguishing properties of our mental nature.

CHAPTER II.

THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.

M. COUSIN brings it as a charge against Locke, that in his Essay on the Human Understanding, he treats of the origin of ideas before inquiring into their nature. Locke thus announces his method: "1st, I shall in"quire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, " and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished "with them" (Introd. s. 3.) Upon this, his French critic remarks that there are here "two radical errors in regard

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to method: 1st, Locke treats of the origin of ideas be

fore having sufficiently studied these ideas; 2dly, he “does more, he not only puts the question of the origin "of ideas before that of the inventory of ideas, but he en

tirely neglects this last question" (Lectures on Locke, ii.) M. Cousin seems to lay down an important principle here, and to be so far justified in blaming the English philosopher for neglecting it. In order to be able to settle the very difficult question of the origin of our ideas, we must begin, and, I believe, end, with a careful inspection of their precise nature. In the very passage

in which Locke proclaims his mode of procedure, he speaks of inquiring into the original of those ideas which a man "observes, and is conscious to himself." The observation by consciousness should certainly precede any attempt to furnish a theoretical decomposition of ideas. I am convinced that in the construction of his theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection, Locke did not patiently and comprehensively contemplate all that is in certain of the deepest and most characteristic ideas of the human mind. I do not ground this charge so much on the fact that he treats, in the First Book, of the Origin of Ideas, before coming, in the Second Book, to discuss the Nature of Ideas, as on the circumstance that in the Second Book he is obliged to overlook some of the profoundest properties of our ideas, in order to make them fit into his preconceived system. But we find Mr. Mill justifying Locke, and condemning Cousin. "I accept the question as M. Cousin states it, and I contend that no attempt to determine "what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be successful or entitled to regard, unless preceded by "what M. Cousin says ought to follow it—an inquiry "into the origin of our acquired ideas" (Exam. p. 145).

Mr. Mill at this place examines Sir W. Hamilton's constant appeals to consciousness. Sir William would often settle by consciousness alone questions which I suspect must be solved by a more complicated and difficult process. It is thus, for instance- that is, by an appeal to consciousness-that he would determine that we know immediately an external or material world.