could only be had from consciousness; but he maintained that the laws which regulate our mental operations and the phenomena of our moral nature could not be discovered by such a process. Here is the passage in which Huxley, after speaking of the combination in Comte of "scientific incapacity with philosophical incompetence," goes on to comment on the view which we have just stated:—

"The Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation of the mind is a thing inherently impossible in itself, and that psychology is a chimera-a phantasm generated by the fermentation of the dregs of theology."

[It is scarcely necessary to say that no such words as these last were ever used by any Positivist. The mention of theology is introduced merely to create prejudice, and to conciliate the 'orthodox.']

"Nevertheless, if M. Comte had been asked what he meant by 'physiologie cérébrale,' except that which other people call 'psychology,' and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain except by that very observation intérieure' which he declares to be an absurdity-it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape the admission that, in vilipending psychology, he had been propounding solemn nonsense.'

He goes on to contrast with Comte's alleged error the sound judgment of Hume in holding that "the inquiry into the contents and

the operations of the mind must be conducted upon the same principles as a physical investigation, if what he calls the moral philosopher would attain results of as firm and definite a character as those which reward the natural philosopher.' He then quotes with approbation a passage of some length from the Introduction to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature to show that the author agreed with him, in opposition to Comte, as to the usefulness and necessity of the method of internal observation. But, when we read the passage, we find with surprise and, as I have said, with amusement, that Hume really takes the contrary side and agrees with Comte. "Moral philosophy,” he says, "has this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that, in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. When I am at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them in that situation and observe what results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up in the same manner any doubts in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must,

therefore, glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs and in their pleasures. When experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension."

Huxley seems to have discovered, on further considering the passage, that it really cut the ground from under his feet; and so he subjoined to it the following note:-" The manner in which Hume constantly refers to the results of the observation of the contents and processes of his own mind clearly shows that he has inadvertently overstated the case"; that is to say, Huxley understood better than Hume the opinion of the latter on the subject in hand.

I

IX.

I'

CARTESIAN THEORY OF THE AUTOMATISM OF

ANIMALS.

T is not necessary to combat this theory, which has had no recent supporters. But we find in Comte the following excellent note (Phil. Pos. Leçon 45), which illustrates well the important and often misconceived subject of the place of Descartes in the history of thought-" Perhaps nothing characterises better the difficult situation in which the mind of Descartes was placed; namely, that of a constant struggle between the Positive tendency which was so strong in him and the theologicometaphysical impediments imposed by his epochthan the paradoxical conception to which he was, in my judgment, very naturally led, on the intelligence and instinct of animals. Wishing to limit, as far as he believed it possible, the empire of the old philosophy, and yet not being able to conceive the extension of his fundamental method to such an order of phenomena, he took up the daring position of systematically denying their existence by his celebrated hypothesis of Animal Auto

Cartesian Theory of the Automatism of Animals. 115

matism. Once arrived at Man, the evident impossibility of applying to his case the same philosophical expedient forced him to come to a compromise--so to say with metaphysics and theology by abandoning to them, rather maintaining for them, by a sort of formal treaty, this last part of their original offices. Whatever may have been the real and grave inconveniences arising from this singular automatic theory, it is important to observe that it was precisely in order to its refutation that the physiologists, and especially the naturalists of the eighteenth century, were gradually led to the demolition of the radical separation which Descartes had thus attempted to establish between the study of man and that of animals, which has finally brought about in our days the entire and irrevocable elimination of the whole theological or metaphysical philosophy in the most advanced intellects. Thus this strange conception has not really been by any means useless to the general progress of the human mind in recent times."