I.

'ABSOLUTE' AND 'RELATIVE.'

OMTE has the following sentence-'Tout est re

C latif; voilà la seule proposition absolue.' He

observes that so characteristic of his philosophy is the principle of relativity, that, if the name 'Positivism' did not offer superior advantages, it might be called 'Relativism.'

All our knowledge, in fact, being confined to phenomena, is purely relative. We can know nothing of 'things in themselves'; but only of their relation to us and to other things-how they affect us, and how they modify other objects. The want of a single sense shuts out from us the knowledge of one whole class of physical facts; and, no doubt, the acquisition of an additional sense would reveal to us another class now outside the range of our observation.

Further, all events depend on conditions, and are determined by them; and, in this sense also, there is nothing absolute. Creations and firstorigins are inaccessible to us. Phenomena are

simply changes; and it is a uniform fact within the whole range of our experience that, previous to any given change, definite conditions must be satisfied, and that, when they exist, they render the change inevitable.

The Positivist does not consider perfect knowledge of the outer world, of society, or of human nature, to be either attainable by us or necessary for us. He thinks the right aim is to attain such knowledge as will be useful for real human needs, and he regards much that is accessible as valueless, and the labour spent on its acquisition as wasted. The true end of all knowledge-he holds-is to be the guide of practice-whether in action on the physical world, or in the regulation of our hearts and lives; and whatever cannot be shown, or does not appear likely, to tend directly or indirectly to that end may safely, and indeed ought to, be neglected. But of course, in applying this rule, we must beware of forming hasty or narrow judg

ments.

Observation forms us to the habit of expecting and estimating degrees in the properties and acts of things and of persons. We do not find perfection anywhere, only different grades of approximation to it. And hence the Positivist, whilst honouring all useful existences, especially such as are superior to himself in moral qualities, does not prostrate himself in spiritual self-effacement before any. In his aspirations towards goodness, he does

not place before him a goal of flawless excellence; but, impressing on himself a constant sense of his shortcomings, aims at daily becoming better. So also in social affairs, he is neither an optimist, nor a pessimist, but a "meliorist"; recognising, with Leibnitz, the present as, in its essential features, the child of the past and parent of the future, he wishes for such a gradual progress as shall be "the development of order." For the regeneration of society, to which he looks forward, sentiments and opinions, in his view, must come first; then habits of action; and lastly institutions, which may be prematurely, as well as too tardily, created. In his judgments respecting historical acts and institutions, he cultivates the same tendency to relativity, regarding them in the light of the character and circumstances of the times to which they belonged; but he does not approve them indiscriminately.

These modes of thinking have their most important application with respect to Religion. Knowing that there is an ascertained law of ordered change in men's opinions, by which, in process of time, they regularly move from their primitive state towards the final Positive synthesis, he recognises the natural relation of the religions of the past to the contemporary and local civilizations, and therefore, instead of condemning them, seeks to understand and explain them, and to appreciate their real, though only transitory, usefulness. But he

gratefully acknowledges the progress which has taken place in passing from the earlier to the maturer systems, and proclaims the inferiority of all the preparatory syntheses to the final, which is alone adapted to the stage of civilization now attained by the most advanced communities.

The relative character of Positivism is very clearly seen in its system of commemoration, as exhibited in the Historic Calendar constructed by Comte. In this, all who have from the earliest times made important contributions of whatever kind to the progress of Society, find their appropriate places, none being excluded on the ground of their religious doctrines.* Such a comprehensive glorification of services rendered to Humanity was impossible under any of the theological creeds, and especially so under Monotheism, the most absolute of them all.

* Even those who are not Positivists will find this Calendar most valuable as a concrete representation of the course of history, and may be advised to adopt its system of dates, in conjunction with that in present general use, as bringing frequently before their minds the immense benefits bequeathed to us by the Heroes, Saints, and Sages of the past.