V.

TH

'STATICAL' AND 'DYNAMICAL.'

HESE words are of course borrowed from Mechanical Science, and have relation primarily to the states of equilibrium and motion of a body or system of bodies. As applied in Biology, they indicate respectively the facts of organisation (Anatomy) and the phenomena of Life (Physiology). By Comte their use was extended to Sociology, Social Statics being the title of that portion of the Science which describes the conditions of existence common to all human societies, and persisting throughout the course of their development, or, in other words, the Theory of Order; and Social Dynamics, the name of that portion which ascertains the laws of the evolution of Societies, or, in other words, the Theory of Progress. Both these studies are necessary for the constitution of a Positive Sociology.

They are far from being absolutely independent of each other. As, in Mechanics, Dynamics is essentially connected with Statics; as, in Biology,

the doctrine of growth implies that of healthy existence; so Social Statics and Social Dynamics are bound together by the general fact enunciated by Comte that " Progress is the development of

Order."*

In fact, in each of these Sciences the two points of view, while clearly distinguished, must be habitually combined.

But here arises a question which cannot be overlooked. In the study of Society there are plainly three distinct subjects to be considered-first, its constitution as regards the several social forces coexisting and working in it at a given time; secondly, the play of these forces amongst themselves, their mutual action and counter-action; and, thirdly, the changes which take place from time to time, whether by way of normal development or of degeneration, in either the organs of the Society or the functions of those organs. Do, then, Social Statics and Dynamics, taken together, cover the whole of this ground? Ought not the division of Sociology to be, not binary, but ternary? Should Social Statics be regarded as dealing exclusively with structure, as the analogy of Anatomy might seem to indicate? Is the name of " "Dynamical Laws" of Society to be applied only to those changes by which it passes to a higher or lower plane, and not also to those of the inter-action of

* This may be regarded as analogous to D'Alembert's Principle in Mechanics.

H

social elements in which its daily life at any period. consists? Comte, whom no question of method escaped, saw that this doubt arose, and gave it a definite solution.* "With regard to every living being," he says, "we must introduce, between the connected ideas of organisation and life, an intermediate idea, hitherto too vaguely conceived, for which we must reserve the special name of 'existence.' Applicable to all real substances, this word expresses always their proper and continuous activity. In Biology it corresponds to what is radically permanent in each system of vital phenomena; so that the life' of a being consists in the series of modifications which its existence' successively undergoes in a series ending in death."

"In Sociology the term 'existence' expresses the fundamental economy of the great organism.”* Social Statics must comprise the study, not only of structure, but of existence-of the essential functions, which in fact conserve the structure, whilst Social Dynamics, on the other hand, deals with the life of a society in the large sense of that word the successive changes which in process of time modify, whether the social structure or the functions of the several organs composing that structure. These changes are indeed continually in progress, but in Social Statics, when considering the several elements of a Social state and their con

*Pol. Pos., II., chap. 6.

66

sensus, we abstract, as far as possible, from the fundamental movement which is perpetually modifying them all."

This conclusion as to Sociological method harmonises with the conception now universally accepted, that in Biology, Anatomy and ordinary Physiology should be kept in close relation, organ and function being thus studied combinedly; whilst the study of Development, not in the individual life alone, but in the animal series (whether we adopt or reject the Darwinian hypothesis), forms a second great division of the subject. And, carrying back the same conception into Mechanics, we see that quite similar is the division between the study of the structure and ordinary activity of a system of bodies on the one hand, and that of its general modifications on the other—as, in the Solar System, its constitution is in our view to be combined with its general movements regarded as permanent, whilst a separate study is made of the changes, whether constant or periodic, wrought in it by perturbations, and possibly in the past or the future. by, e.g., the cooling of the Sun or of the several planets.

VI.

FINAL CAUSES.

TH

HERE are strong expressions in the writings of the most eminent philosophers as to the worthlessness of the consideration of Final Causes. Bacon says, in often-quoted words, "Causarum finalium inquisitio sterilis est, et, tanquam virgo Deo consecrata, nihil parit" (De Aug. Sc., III. 5). And, under the head of Idola Tribus (Ib. v. 4), he notes as a grave error "quod homo fiat quasi norma et speculum naturæ; neque enim," he adds, "credibile est . quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio, hoc ipsum, inquam, quod putetur talia naturam facere qualia homo facit." And again, in Nov. Org., I. 48,-"Causas finales, quæ sunt plane ex natura hominis potius quam universi, atque ex hoc fonte philosophiam miris modis corruperunt." Similarly Descartes-"Let us never found any of our reasons concerning physical phenomena on the ends which we may imagine God or nature had in view in the