Heic, ego, video inquam, quæ sit vel felicitas vel miseria in ipsis proborum atque improborum meritis constituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari, &c. THIS I see (qnod I) either what blisfulnesse, or els❘ what vnselines is established in the desertes of good menne, and of shrewes.

But in this ilke fortune of the people, I see somewhat of good, and somwhat of euill. For no wiseman had not leuer bee exiled poore and nedie, and namelesse, than for to dwellen in his citee, and flouren of richesse, and bee redoutable of honoure, and strong of power. For in this wise more clearly and witnesfully, is the office of wise menne treated, than the blisfulnesse of power, and gouernours, is as it were shad emonges the people, that bee neighbors and subiectes, sith that namely prison, lawe, and these other tourmentes of lawfull paines, bee rather owed to felonous citezeins: for the whiche felonous citezeins, the paines bee established, more than for good people.

Boecius. Than I maruaile greatly (quod I) why that the thinges be so misse enterchaunged, that tourmentes of felonies, pressen and confounden good people, and shrewes rauisshen medes of vertue, and been in honours, and greate estates. And I desire eke for to weten of thee, what semeth thee to be the reason of this so wrongfull a conclusion. For I would wonder wel the lasse, if that I trowed that all thinges wer medled with fortunous hap. But now crepeth and encreaseth myne astoniynges, God gouernour of thyngs, that so as God yeueth oft times to good menne, goodes and mirthes, and to shrewes, euil and aspre thynges: and yeueth ayen to good folk hardnesse, and to shrewes he graunteth hem hir wille, and that thei desiren. What difference maie there bee, betwene that that God doeth, and happe of fortune, if menne knowe not the cause why it is.

Philosophie. Ne it is no marueile (quod she) though that men wenen, that there be somewhat foolishe and confuse, whan the reason of the order is vnknowen: but although that thou, ne knowe not the cause of so greate a disposicion, nathelesse, for as moche as God the good gouernour, attempreth and gouerneth the worlde, ne doubte thee not, but all thynges been doen a right.

Si quis Arcturi sidera nescit, Propinqua summo cardine labi, Cur regat tardus plaustra Bootes, Mergatque seras æquore flammas, Cum nimis celeres explicet ortus, &c.

WHO so that knowe not the sterres Arcture, tourned to the soueraine centure or poinct, that is to saine, tourned nigh to the soueraine pole of the firmamente, and wote not why the sterre Bootes passeth, or gathereth his waines, and drencheth his late flambes in the sea, and why that Bootes the sterre, vnfoldeth his ouerswifte arisynges, than shall he wondren of the lawe of the high aire. And eke, if that he ne knowe not why, that the hornes of the full Moone waxen pale and infecte, by the boundes of the darke night, and how the Moone darcke and confuse, discouereth the sterres, that she had couered by her clere visage.

The common erroure moueth folkes, and maketh wearie hir basius of brasse by thilke strokes, that

is to saie, that there is a maner people, that hight Coribantes, that wenen, that whan the Moone is in the eclipse, that it bee enchaunted, and therefore for to rescue the Moone, thei beaten hir basins with the ilke strokes. Ne no man ne wondreth whan the blastes of the winde Chorus beaten the strondes of the sea, by quakyng floodes. Ne no man ne wondreth, whan the weight of the snowe, harded by the cold, is resolued by the brennyng heate of Phebus the Soonne, for here seene menne readily the causes. But the causes ihidde, that is to sain in Heauen, troublen the breastes of men. The mouable people, is astonied of all thynges, that comen selde and sodainlie in our age, but the troublie errour of our ignoraunce, departeth fro vs, so that if thei wisten the cause, why that soche thynges betiden, certes thei shoulden cease to seme wonders.

Ita est, inquam. Sed cum tui muneris sit latentium rerum causas evolvere, velatusque caligine explicare rationes; quæso uti hinc decernas, &c. THUS it is (quod I) but so as thou haste yeuen or beheight me, to vnwrappe the hidde causes of thinges, and to discouer me the reasons, couered with darknesse I praie thee, that thou deuise and iudge me of this matter, and that thou do me to vnderstand it, for this miracle of this wonder, troubleth me right greatly. And than she a little what smiling said. tell that is greatest of all thinges, that mowen Thou clepest me (quod she) to been asked, and to that which question, vnneth there aught inough to lauen it, as who saieth, vnneth is there any thyng, to answere perfitlie to thy question, for the matter of it is soche, that whan o doubte is determined and cutte awaie, there waxen other doubtes without nomber, right as the heddes of Idre the serpente waxen, the whiche serpente Hercules slough: ne there ne were no manere, ne none ende, but if a wight constrained thought, that is to saine, by vigour and strength the doubtes, by a right liuely and quicke fire of of witte. For in this matter, men weren wonte to maken questions, of the simplicitie of the purueighaunce of God, and of the order of destinie, and of sodaine happe, and of knowing of predestinacion diuine. And of the libertie of freewill, the whiche thinges, thou thy self apperceiuedest wel, of what weight thei been. But for as moche as the knowynges of these thinges, is a maner porcion or medicine to thee, all bee it so, that I haue little tyme to dooen it, yet neuerthelesse, I would enforcen me to shewen somewhat of it: but although the nourishinges of ditee of musike deliteth the, thou muste sufferen and forbearen, a little of the ilke delite, while that I weue to the reasons knitte by order.

Boecius. As it liketh to thee (quod I) so doe. Philosophie. Tho spake she righte as by an other beginnyng, and said right thus. The engenderyng of all thynges (quod she) and all the progressions of mouable nature, and all that mouethe in any maner, taketh his causes, his order, and his formes, of the stablenesse of diuine thought: and the ilke diuine thought, that is sette, and putte in the toure, that is to saine, in the height of the simplicitie of God, stablisheth many maner gises, to the thynges that been to dooen, the

whiche maner, whan that menne looken it, in the | into vnmouabilitie, and it ceaseth to been shad,

pure cleanesse of the diuine intelligence, is cleaped purueighaunce.

But whan the ilke maner is referred by menne, to thynges that it moueth or disponeth, than of olde menne it was cleaped destinie, the whiche thynges, if that any wight looketh well in his thought, the strengthe of that one, and of that other, he shall lightlie mowe seen, that these twoo thynges been diuers, For purueighaunce is the ilke diuine reason, that is established in the soueraine prince of thinges, the which purueighaunce disponeth all thynges. But certes, destinie is the disposicion and the ordinaunce, cleauyng to mouable thynges, by the whiche disposicion, the purueighaunce knitteth al thinges in hir order: for purneighaunce embraseth all thynges to heape, although thei bee diuers, and although thei be infinite, but destine certaine, departeth and ordaineth all thinges singulerly, and deuideth in mouing, in places, in formes, and in tymes, as thus: let the vnfoldyng of temporell ordinaunce, assembled and oned in the lookyng of the diuine thoughte, bee cleaped purueighaunce, and thilke same assemblyng and oning, deuided and vnfolden, let that be called destinie. And all bee it so, that these thynges been diuers, yet neuerthelesse, hanged that one on that other, for why, the order destinably, procedeth of the simplicitie of purueighaunce.

and flit diuersly. Right so by semblable reason, thilke thing that departeth furthereste, fro the firste thought of God, it is vnfolden, and also submitted to greater bondes of destinie, and in so moche is the thing, more free and loce fro dignitie, as it asketh and holdeth nere to thilke centre of thinges, that is to saine, to God. And if the thyng cleaueth to the stedfastnesse of the thought of God, and bee without mouyng, certes it surmounteth the necessitie of destinie. Than soche comparison as is skilling to vnderstandyng, and of thinge that was engendred, to thinge that is of time to eternitie, and of the cercle to the centre, right so is the order of mouable destinie, to the stable simplicitie of purueighaunce. Thilke ordinaunce moueth the Heauen and the sterres, and attempreth the elementes togither emong hem self, and transformethe hem by enterchaungeable mutacion. And thilk same order neweth ayen, all things growing and falling adoune, by semblable progressions of seedes and of sexus, that is to saine, male and female: and this ilke order constraineth the fortunes, and the dedes of men, by a bonde of causes, not able to be vnbounden: the which destinable causes, whan thei passen out fro the beginnynges of vnmonable purueiaunce, it mote nedes be that thei ne be not mutable, as thus: be the things well gouerned, if that the simplicitie dwellyng in the For right as a werkman, perceiueth in his diuine thought, sheweth forth the order of causes, thoughte, the forme of thynge that he wolle make, vnable to be bowed. And this order constraineth and n.ouethe the effecte of the werke, and leadeth by the proper stabilitie, the mouable thinges, or that he had looked beforne in his thought, simplieels thei shulden flete folilie. For which it is, that and presentlie by corporall ordinaunce: certes, right so God in his purueighaunce, disponeth sin gulerlie and stably the thynges that bee to doen, but he administreth in maners, and in diuers tymes by destinie, the ilke same thynges that he hath disponed, than whether destinie bee exercised, either by some diuine spirites, seruauntes to the diuine purueighaunce, or elles by some soule, or els by all nature seruyng God, or els by the celes-hem, ne the order coming fro the poinct of souetiall mouynges of sterres, or els by the vertue of angelles, or els by diuers subteltie of diuelles, or els by any of hem, or elles by hem all, the destinable ordinaunce is wonen and accomplished. Certes, it is open thyng, that the purueighaunce, is an vnmouable and simple forme of thynges to dooen, and the mouable bonde, and the temporalle ordinaunce of thynges, whiche that the diuine simplicitie of purueiaunce bath ordained to doen, that is destinie. For whiche it is that al thinges that been put vnder destinie, been certes subiectes vnto purueiaunce, to which purueiaunce destinie it self is subiect and vnder but some thinges been put vnder purueiannce, that surmounten thordinaunce of destinie: and tho been thilke that stablie been fixed nigh to the first godhed, thei surmounten the order of destinable mouabilitie. For right as cercles turnen about a same centre, or about a poinct, thilke cercle that is innerest or moste within, he ioyneth to the simplesse of the middle, and is as it wer a centre or a poinct to that other cercles, that turnen aboute him: and thilke that is vtterest, compassed by larger enuironning, is vnfolde by larger spaces, in so moche as it is ferthereste fro the middeleste simplititie of the pomete. And if there bee any thyng that knitteth and felowshippeth himself, to thilke middle poincte, it is constrained into simplicitie, that is to saie,

thinges semen confuse, and troublie to vs men, for we ne mowen not consider thilk ordinaunce. Neuerthelesse, the proper maner of euery thing dressyng hym to good, disponeth hem all, for there nis nothynge dooen for euill, for thilke thyng that is dooen by wicked folke, nis not doen for euil. The whiche shrewes, as I haue shewed full plenteously seke good, but wicked errour mistourneth

raine good, ne enclineth not fro his beginnyng. But thou maiest saie, what vnrest maie been a worse confusion, than that good men haue somtyme aduersitie, and somtyme prosperitie: and shrewes haue now also thinges that thei desiren, and now thinges that thei haten. Whether men liue nowe in soche holinesse of thought, as who saith be men now so wise, that soche folke as thei demen to be good folke or shrewes, that it mote nedes be, that folk be soche as thei wenen. But in this maner domes of men discorden, that thilke men that some folke demen worthie of mede, other folke deme hem worthy of turment, but let vs graunt: I suppose that some man maie well deme or knowe the good people, and the bad, maie he than knowe and see thilke innerest attemperaunce of courage, as it hath bee wont to be said of bodies, as who saith: maie a man speaken of complexions, and attemperaunce of bodies, ne it ne is not, as who saith but it is like a meruaile or a miracle, to hem that ne knowe it not, why that swete thinges bee couenable to sum bodies, that been hole, and to sum people bitter things be couenable: and also why sum people ben holpen with light medicines, and some people been holpen with bitter medicines: but nathelesse tho that knowen the maner, and the temperaunce of heale and of malady, ne marueileth it nothing. But what other thing semeth helth

eth parauenture that the blisfulnesse, of whiche the vsage ioyfull to hym, that the lesyng of thilk blisfulnesse, ne bee not sorowful to hym, and therefore he would chaunge his maners: and for he dredeth to lese his fortune, he forleteth his wickednesse. To other folkes welefulnes is yeuen vnworthilie, the whiche ouerthroweth hem into destruccion, that thei han deserued, and to some other folke, is yeuen power to punishen, for that it shall bee cause of continuacion, and exercisyng to good folkes, and cause of tourmente to shrewes.

of corages but bountie, and what other thing sem- that thei haue deserued it, and that thei been of eth maladie of courage but vices? who is els keper wicked merite. Of whiche shrewes, the tourmente of good, and driuer awaie of euill, but God the go-agasteth sometyme other to doen felonies: and uernor and leader of thoughtes: the whiche God, sometyme it amendeth hem, that suffereth the whan he hath beholden from the high toure of his tourmentes. And the prosperitie that is yeuen to purueiaunce, he knoweth what is couenable to any shrewes, sheweth a greate argument to good peowight, and leaneth hem that he wot well that is co-ple, what thing thei should demen of thilk welefuluenable to hem. Lo, herof cometh and hereof is nesse, whiche prosperitie menne seen ofte, serue to doen this miracle of thorder destinable, whan God shrewes: in which thing, I trowe that God disthat all knoweth doth soche thing, of whiche thyng, penseth, for parauenture, the nature of some man vnknowing folke been astonied, but for to con- is so ouerthrowyng to euell, and so vncouenable, straine, as who saieth, but for to comprehende and that the nedy pouertie of his housholde, might ratell a fewe thinges of the diuine depenesse, the ther agreue hym to doen felonies, and to the mawhich that mannes reason maie vnderstand. Thilke ladie of hym, God putteth remeadie, to yeuen hym manne that thou wenest to been right iuste, and richesse. And some other manne beholdeth his right kepyng of equitie, the contrarie of that, conscience, defouled with synnes, and maketh comsemeth to the diuine purueighaunce that all wote.parison of this fortune, and of himself: and dredAnd Lucan my familier telleth, that the victorious cause liked to the goddes, and the causes ouercome, liketh to Caton. Than what so euer thou maieste seen, that is dooen in this worlde vnhoped, or els vnknowen, certes, it is the righte order of thynges, but as to thy wicked opinion, it is a confusion. But I suppose that some man be so welthewed, that the diuine judgement, and the iudgement of mankinde, accorden hem togider of hym: but he is so vnstedfast of courage, that.if any aduersitie come to hym, he woll forleten parauenture to continue innocence, by the whiche he ne maie not witholden fortune: than the wise dispensacion of God spareth hym, the whiche man aduersitie, might enpairen, for that God will not hym to trauaile, to whom that trauaile nis not couenable. An other manne is parfite in all vertues, and is an holy manne, and nigh to God, so that the purueighunce of God would deme, that it were a felonie, that he wer touched with any aduersities, so so that he would not suffre, that soche a man be with any bodily maladie moued. But so (as saied the philosopher) the more excellent is by me said in greate, that vertues haue edified the bodie of the holie manne. And oft tyme it betideth, that the somme of thinges, that been to doen is taken to gouerne to good folke, for that the malice habundant of shrewes, should been abated. And God yeueth and departeth to other folke, prosperitees and aduersities, medled to heape, after the qualitie of hir courages, and remordeth some folke by aduersities, for thei ne should not waxen proude, by long welfulnesse. And other folke he suffereth, to bee trauailed with hard thyngs, for that thei should confermen the vertues of courage, by the exercitation of vsage of pacience. And other folk dreden more than thei oughten, the whiche thei mighten well bearen, and some dispise, that thei mowe not beare, and thilke folke God leadeth into experience of hemself, by aspre and sorowfull thynges. And many there folk haue boughte, honourable renome of this worlde, by the price of glorious death.

And some men that ne mowe not been ouercomen by tourment, haue yeuen ensample to other folke, that vertue maie not been ouercomen by aduersities. And of al these thinges there nis no doubt, that thei ne ben doen rightfullie and ordeinly, to the perfit good of hem, to whom we seen these thinges betiden. For certes, that aduersities cometh somtyme to shrewes, and somtyme that thei desiren, it cometh of these foresaid causes. And of sorowful thinges that betiden to shrewes, certes, no man ne wondreth, for all menne wene

men.

For so as there nis none aliaunce betwene good folkes, and shrewes, ne shrewes ne mowen not accorden emong hem self: and why not? For that shrewes discorden of hemself, by hir vices, the whiche vices, all to renden hir consciences, and dooen oft tyme thynges, the whiche thinges, whan thei haue doen hem, thei deme that tho things, ne shuld not haue be doen, for which thing the souerain purueiaunce, hath maked oft time miracle: so that shrewes haue maked shrewes, to been good For whan that some shrewes seen, that thei suffre wrongfully, felonies of other shrewes, thei waxen eschaufed into hate of hem, that anoied hem, and retournen to the fruict of vertue. Than thei studien to be vnlike to hem that thei haue hated. Certes onely is this the diuine might, to the which might iuels been than good, whan it vseth the iuelles couenablie, and draweth out the effecte of any good, as who saieth, that iuell is good onely to the might of God, for the might of God ordeineth thilke iuell to good: for one order embraceth all things, so that what wight departeth from the reason of thilke order, that is assigned to him, algates yet he slideth into an other order so that nothing is lefull to folie, in the realm of diuine purueighaunce, as who saieth, nothyng is without ordinaunce, in the realme of diuine purueighaunce, sith that the right strong God, gouerneth all thynges in this worlde, for it is not leful for men comprehende by wit, ne vnfolden by woorde, all the subtell ordinaunce, and the disposicion of the diuine entent, for onely it ought to suffice, to haue loked that God himself, maker of al natures, ordaineth al thinges to good, while that he hasteth to withholde the thyuges, that he hath maked into his semblaunce, that is to say, for to with holden the thinges into good, for he hymself is good. He chaseth out all iuells fro the bonde of his cominalties, by thorder of the necessitie destinable: for whiche it followeth, that if thou loke the purueiaunce, ordeinyng the thinges, that men wenen be outragious, or haboundant in yerthes, thou shalt

not seen in no place, nothyng of iuell. But I see now that thou art charged, with the weighte of the question, and wearie with lengthe of my reason, and that thou abidest some swetenesse of song, take than this draught, and whan thou art wel refreshed and refect, thou shalt be more stedfaste to stie, into higher questions or thinges.

Jam ne igitur vides, quid hæc omnia quæ diximus consequantur. Quid nam? inquam. Omnem,inquit, &c.

SEEST thou not than, what thyng followeth all the thynges that I haue saied. Boecius. What thyng (quod I). Philosophie. Certes (quod she) all vtterlie, that all fortune is good. Boecius. And how maie that bee (quod I). Philosophie. Now vnderstande (quod she). So as all fortune, wheder so it be ioyfull fortune, or aspre fortune, is yeuen

Si vis celsi jura tonantis Pura sollers cernere mente, either bicause of guerdonyng, or elles of exercis

Adspice summi culmina cœli.

If thou wise wolt demen, in thy pure thought, the rightes or the lawes of the hie thonder, that is to sain of God, looke thou and beholde the heightes of the soueraine Heauen: there kepen the sterres, by rightfull aliaunce of thyngs hir old peace: the Sonne imoued by his roddie fire, ne distourbeth not the colde cercle of the Mone, ne the sterre icleped the Bere, that enclineth his rauishing courses, abouten the soueraine height of this worlde. Ne the same sterre Ursa, nis neuer mo washen in the depe westren sea, ne coueteth not to dien his flambes, in the sea of the occian, although it see other sterres, iplonged in the sea: and Hesperus the sterre boodeth, and telleth alwaie the late nightes and Lucifer the sterre bringeth ayen the cleare daie.

ing of good folkes, or els bicause to punishen, or els chastisen shrewes: than is al fortune good, the which fortune is certain, that it be either rightfull, or els profitable.

Boecius. Forsothe this is a full verie reason (quod I) and if I consider the purueighaunce and the destinie that thou oughtest me a litle here beforn, this sentence is susteined by stedfaste reasons. But if it like vnto thee, let vs nombren hem emonges the ilke thynges, of whiche thou saidest a little here beforne, that thei ne wer not able to been wened to the people. Philosophi. Why so (quod she). Boecius. For that the common word of men (quod I) misuseth this maner speache of fortune, and same ofte tymes, that the fortune of some wight is wicked. Philosophie. Wilte thou than (quod she) that I approche a little to the wordes of the people so that it seme not to ben, And thus maketh loue enterchaungeable, the that I be ouermoche departed, as fro the vsage of perdurable courses, and thus is discordable bat- mankinde. Boecius. As thou wolt (quod I). Phitaile, iputte out of the countrey of the sterres. losophie. Menest thou not (quod she) that all This accordaunce attempreth by euenlike maners thyng that profiteth is good. Boecius. Yes (quod the elementes, that the moiste thynges, strinyng 1). Philosop. Certes all thyng that exerceth or with the drie thynges, yeuen place by stoundes: corrigeth, it profiteth. Boecius. I confesse well and that the colde thynges ioynen hem by faithe, (quod I). Philoso. Than is it good (quod she). to the hote thynges, and that the light fire, ariseth Boecius. Why not (quod I). Philosophie. But into height, and the heauie yearthes, auailen by this is the fortune (quod she) of hem that either hir weightes: by the same causes, the flourie yere be putte in vertue, and battailen against aspre yeldeth swete smelles, in the first sommer season thynges, or elles of hem that enclinen, and dewarmynge, and the hotte sommer drieth the cornes,clinen fro vices, and taken the waie of vertue. and autumpne cometh ayen of heauie apples, and Boecius. This ne maie I not denie (quod I). Phithe fleetyng raine bedeweth the winter, this at-losophie. But what saiest thou of the merie fortempraunce nourisheth, and bryngeth forthe all tune, that is yeuen to good people in guerdon, thynges, that beareth life in this worlde, and the demeth ofte the people that it be wicked? ilke same attempraunce rauishyng, hideth, benimeth, and drencheth vnder the laste death, all thynges iborne.

Boecius. Naie for soth (quod I) but thei demen as it is sothe, that it is right good.

Philosophie. What saiest thou of the other fortune (quod she) that although that it bee aspre, and restraineth the shrewes by rightfull turment, weneth aught the people that it bee good?

Boecius. Naie (quod I) but the people demeth that it is moste wretched of all thynges, that maie be thought.

Emong these thinges, sitteth the high maker, kyng and lorde, weale and beginnyng, lawe and wise judge, to dooen equitee, and gouerneth and enclineth the bridels of thynges: and tho thinges that he sterreth, to gone by mouynge, he withdraweth and aresteth, and affirmeth the mouable or wanderynge thinges. For if that he ne called Philosophie. Ware now, and looke well (quod not ayen the right goyng of thynges. And if that she) leste wee in followyng the opinion of the peohe ne constrained hem not efte sones, into rounde-ple, haue confessed and concluded thing, whiche nesse enclined, the thynges that been nowe continued by stable ordinaunce, thei should departen from hir weale, that is to saine, from hir beginnyng and fallen, that is to saine, tournen into nought. This is the common loue to all thynges: and all thynges asken to been holden by the fine of good, for elles ne mighten thei not fasten, if thei ne come not eftsones ayen by loue, retourned to the cause, that hath yeuen hem beyng, that is to saine God.

that is vnable to been wened to the people. Boecius. What is that (quod I)? Phil. Certes (quod she) it followeth or cometh of thynges that been graunted, that all fortune what so euer it bee, of hem that been either in possession of vertue, or in thencrease of vertue, or els in the purchasyng of vertue, that thilke fortune is good, and that all fortune is right wicked, to hem that dwellen in shreudnesse, as who saith, and thus weneth not the people. Boec. That is sothe (quod I). Albeit so that no man dare confesse it, ne knowe it. Philosophie. Why so (quod she). For right as the

strong man, ne semeth not to abasshen or disdainen, as oft tyme as he heareth the noise of the battailine also it semeth not to the wiseman, to bearen it greuously, as oft as he is ledde into strief of fortune. For bothe to that one man, and eke to that other, the ilke difficultie is the matter, to that one man of encrease of his glorious renome, and to that other man, to conserue his sapience, that is to saie, to the asprenesse of his estate, for therefore is it called vertue, for that it susteineth and enforceth by his strengthes, so that it nis not ouercomen by aduersities. Ne certes, thou that art putte in encrease, or in the height of vertue, ne haste not comen to fleten with delices, and for to walken in bodily lust. Thou sowest or plantest a full eigre battaile in thy courage, ayenst euery fortune: for that the sorowfull fortune confounde thee not, ne that the merie fortune ne corrumpe thee not, occupie the meane by stedfast strengthes. For all that euer is vnder the meane, or all that ouerpasseth the meane, dispiseth welefulnes as who saieth, it is vicious, and ne hath no mede of his trauaile, for it is set in your hand, as who saieth, it lieth in your power, what fortune you is leueste, that is to saie, good or iuell, for all fortune that semeth sharpe of aspre, if it ne exercise not the good folke, ne chastise the wicked folke it punisheth.

the venim. And Achileus the flood defouled in his forehedde, dreint his shamefast visage in his stroundes, that is to saie, that Achileus could transfigure himself, into diuers likenes, and as he faught with Hercules, at last he tourned hym into a bull, and Hercules brake one of his hornes: and he for shame hid hym in his riuer. And ouer that, he Hercules caste adoune Antheus the giaunt, in the stroudes of Libie. And Cacus appeised the wrathes of Euander, that is to saie, that Hercules slough the monster Cacus and apeised with that death, the wrath of Euander. And the bristled bore, marked with vomes, the shoulder of Hercules, the whiche shulders, the hie cercle of Heauen should thirst. And the last of his labors was, that he susteined the Heauen, vpon his neck vnbowed, and he deserued eftsones, the Heauen to be the last ende of trauaile. Goeth nowe then ye strong men, there as the greate ensample leadeth you. O nice menne, why make ye your backes, as who saieth: O ye slowe and delicate men, why se ye aduersities, and ne fight not ayenst hem by vertue, to winnen the mede of Heauen: for the mede ouercomen, yeueth the sterres, that is to sain, that whan that yearthly lust is ouer comen, a man is maked worthy to the Heauen.

HERE ENDETH THE FOWERTH BOOKE OF BOECK.

Bella bis quinis operatus annis, Ultor Atrides, Phrygiæ ruinis, &c.

BOOKE V.

Dixerat, orationisque cursum ad alia quædam tractanda atque expedienda vertebat. B. Tum ego, recta quidem, inquam, &c.

SHE had saied, and turned the course of her reason, to some other thynges, to be treated and to be sped. Boecius. Than saied I, certes rightful is thine amonesting and full digne by aucthoritee. But that thou saidest whilom, that the question of the diuine purueighaunce, is enlaced with many other questions, I vnderstande well and proue it, by the same thing. But I aske, if that thou wenest, that hap bee any thyng, in any waies, and if thou wenest, that happe be any thyng, what is it? Philosophie. Than (quod she) I haste me to yelden and assoilen, to the debte of my behest, and to shewen and open the waie, by which waie, thou maiest come ayen to thy countree: but albeit so that the thinges, whiche that thou askest, been right profitable to knowe, yet been thei diuers, som what fro the pathe of my purpose, and it is to doubte, that thou ne bee maked wearie by misse waies, so that thou ne maieste not suffice, to measure the right waie.

THE werker Atrides, that is to sain Agamemnon, that wrought and continued the battailes by x. yere recovered and purged in wreking by the disstruceion of Troie, the loste chambers of mariage in his brother, that is to saie, that Agamemnon wan ayen Heleine, that was Menelaus wife, his brother. In the meane while that thilke Agamemnon, desired to yeuen sailes to the Grekes nauie, and brought ayen the windes by bloode: he vnclothed hym of pitee of father, and the sorie priest yeueth in sacrifiyng, the wretched cuttyng of the throte of the doughter, that is to saie, that Agamemnon let cut the throte of his doughter by the priest, to maken aliaunce with his goddes, and for to haue wind, with whiche he might wenden to Troie. Itacus, that is to saie Ulixes, bewept his fellowes ylorne, the whiche felowes, the feirs Poliphemus, liggyng in his great caue, had fretten and dreinte in his emptie wombe: but nathelesse Poliphemus woode for his blind visage yeld to Ulixes ioy, by his sorowful teares, that is to saie, that Ulixes smote out the iye of Poliphemus, that stode in the forehed, for whiche Ulixes had ioye, whan he sawe Poliphemus weping and blind. Hercules is celebrable for his hard trauaile, he daunted the proude Centaurus, halfe horse, halfe man, and biraft the dispoiling fro the cruell lion, that is to saie, he slough the lion, and birafte him his skin. He smote the birdes that hight Arpies, with certaine arowes. He rauished apples, fro the waking dragon: and his hande was the more heauie, for the golden metall. He drough Cerberus the hound Philosophie. Than (saied she) that maner woll of Hel, by the triple chaines. He ouercomer, as I dooen to thee, and beganne to speaken right it is saied, hath put an vnmeke lord, fodder to his thus. Certes (quod she) if any wight definishe cruell horse, that is to saie, Hercules slough Di-hap in this maner, that is to saine, that hap is beomerles, and made his horse to fretten him: and tidyng ibrought foorthe, by foolishe mouing, and he Hercules slough Idra the serpente, and brente by no knitting of causes, I confirme that hap nis

Boecius. Ne doubt thee thereof nothyng (quod I). For to knowen thilke thinges togider, in the whiche thynges delite me greatlie, that shall been to me in stede of rest, sith it nis not to doubten of the thynges folowing, whan euery thynge of thy disputacion, shall hauen been stedfast to me, by vndoubtous faithe.