or ruining Morality, is the moft firm and irreverfible Bafis of both.

He proceeds further, and endeavours to prove, that the Religion which is neceffary and indifpenfible can have no other Ground; and that every particular Opinion, which is not connected therewith, does not belong to fuch a Religion at all.

This, as our Author fays, is a general Idea of the Work before us; and from what enfues we are inftructed in the Ufes of it.

It is obvious, he fays, that Men, while they are very folicitous, and in earnest about the Affairs of this World, are much lefs concerned in relation to thofe of Religion. Inquiring into the Cause thereof, he finds it to be, because they have an entire Certainty with regard to the former, and but very little with respect to the latter.

He examines whether no Expedient can be found for remedying this Inconvenience, whether Religion is not capable of Demonftration, and of fuch Evidence as is proper to moral Subjects. He obferves there is no Certitude but in thofe Things that are reducible to the fimpleft and most indubitable Principles; and as all true Principles are connected with fome one, it is from this one that we muft proceed, as from a Root, to that Trunk which fuftains all the Branches. Such a Principle is that of a selffufficient Being.

In general our Author's whole Syftem, as he tells us, arifes out of one Propofition, which Reason affents to, as foon as it is propofed: viz, That every Relation between two intelligent Beings, is neceffarily founded on their respective Natures: Now Religion is, effentially, nothing but the Relation between

+ The Word here render'd folicitous, is in the Original Conféquens, which, I think, is not French. Perhaps our Author thereby means confiftent: If fo, I think I have not deviated much, if at all, from his Ideas.

God

God and Man: It must therefore be founded in the Nature of the one and of the other. From hence he thinks he may warrantably conclude, that every Doctrine, every Opinion, which appears plainly oppofite to the divine or human Nature, is to be rejected as falfe, or, at leaft, as foreign from that Religion to which we are indifpenfibly obliged.

These Conclufions ferve as a Criterion, whereby the true and the false, in the different Subjects treated in the Course of this Work, are diftinguished.

Had the Author begun thefe Letters, with an Intention of publishing them, he would certainly have set out with this Propofition. It would have been, he fays, a Text very fruitful of Confequences, mighty convenient, and, as it were, at hand, to diffipate and caft off every thing which would not comply with the Rule aforefaid. But propofing at firft only to answer fuch Objections as had been made him, he has not taken fo direct a Road in the Profecution of his Point, as he had probably done, if he had previously laid down a methodical Plan.

However, he fays, altho' this Work is not fyftematically written, there may be discerned through the feeming Irregularity of it a real System, connected in all its Parts; and it is eafy alfo to perceive, that this Connexion is not forced or artificial, but altogether the natural Effect of the Unity and Simplicity of the Principles, or rather indeed of the Principle whereon it is constructed.

One of the firft Ideas of Religion, which incontestably follows the Principles here adopted, is, that it ought to be fuited to Mankind, and exactly adapted to the Capacity wherewith the Author of our Being has endued us. This being once fixed, the Inference immediately rifes, that the Religion effential to Man must be fimple, evident, and exempt from all Contradiction; that it muft exclude every thing falfe and imaginary; that it can re

31 quire nothing of Man which transcends his Ability, much less that is repugnant thereunto.

These are the Affertions maintained and illuftrated in these Epistles; wherein our Author is obliged to be at more Pains for detecting and combating Error, than for establishing Truth: Nor does he think this an imprudent or unprofitable Courfe; fince if the first be thoroughly fubdued, no great Labour is requifite in advancing the other.

We may easily imagine, he fays, that fuch an Idea of Religion as he has now defined, must meet with great Oppofition from thofe Prejudices and Opinions which the Vulgar have imbibed. This furnishes an Occafion for feveral Difquifitions and Researches, which effential Religion has nothing to do with. When People ftray from the right Path, they ufually take a great many Circuits; and one muft follow them in all their Excurfions, to reduce them. The Method our Author has taken in fo doing is as follows:

He supposes a Perfon who has had no Tutor in Matters of Religion; who has confulted himself only to discover from whence he came, and whither he is going, and who by fuch an Enquiry is led to the Exiftence of a first Being, a fupreme Caufe: This Perfon is then introduced into Society, and turns his Attention on the Subjects whereof it is compofed. The Medley of Good and Evil, the Confufion that he every where encounters, adminifter new Remarks and Conclufions of a different kind. Next he confiders how this Perfon is to be engaged to receive Christianity, and finds it can be in no other Way but that of Examination. The Topicks of this are, if, the external, and 2dly, the internal Evidence of Revelation. The former of these is liable, he obferves, to many Inconveniences, and affords Room for infurmountable Objections, to thofe who are inclined to cavil. He is hereupon deter

mined for the latter, and begins with demonftrating the Poffibility of a divine Relation. He then inquires of what Ufe it is, and points out feveral of its Benefits; and then examines, whether the Contents of that Book which we call Scripture, can be of any real Advantage to Mankind.

For the Refolution of this Question he diftinguishes them into divers kinds: 1. Historical, or Relations of Facts. 2. Plain and undeniable Truths, fuch as common Senfe immediately affents to. 3. Things altogether obfcure, or, as we usually call them, Mysteries.

As for the Historical Part of Scripture, he paffes it over flightly. He infifts very briefly alfo on the fecond Head; not only because little is to be faid about plain and undeniable Truths, but because they are the fole Foundation of his whole Work, and he has perpetual Occafions of Recourse to them. It is the third Clafs on which he beftows the closest and longest Examination. By the Things there defined he intends, all that fome affect to call Evangelical Councils; which have a fevere Afpect, the Compliance with which is very grievous, and of which one cannot presently difcern either the Juftice or Utility.

In the Profecution of this Point our Author (we may fanfy in the Person of his Inquirer) recurs to a Principle he has before established, viz. That it is incompatible with the free and intelligent Nature of Mankind, which is a divine Conftitution, to approve of any thing that appears inequitable. From whence he infers, that unlefs thefe Evangelical Councils can be acquitted of the foregoing Charge, nothing can be more unreasonable, than to expect us to acquiefce in them. It is what, he pofitively affirms, God can never require at our hands; that to do so, would be to counteract his own Appointment, and to render the most excellent Faculties he has given us useless.

He

He then enters into an Examination of those Precepts of Jefus Chrift, which bear hardest on our moft favourite Appetites, and attack our fenfual Enjoyments, our Love of Riches, Honour, &c. It is not denied, he says, that fuch Maxims as our Saviour has delivered with relation to these, appear too rigorous; and when we join with them, those which propose our taking up the Crofs, and undergoing Perfecution, it may reasonably be demanded, what Pleasure a Being of abfolute Sovereignty and infinite Goodness can find, not only in prohibiting his Creatures the sweetest Satisfactions in Life, but in loading them with real Miseries.

Hitherto there is no difcovering the Juftice of fuch a Conduct. He proceeds therefore to a more particular Examination. He recollects an Obfervation afore made on the Use of Revelation, which is, that it may be of the fame, with regard to Men, as Education is to Children. This fuggefts another Remark, viz. that Education has a far greater Refpect to what is to come of Life, than to the prefent Season of it; that with this View it includes a vaft many painful and difficult Exercises, which curb the Inclinations of Youth, which tame their unruly Paffions, and of which they are very far from perceiving the Ufe or Equity.

This Obfervation fuggefts fome Ground for fuppofing it may not be impoffible to vindicate the Evangelical Councils in Question. For if it can be shewn that they are relative to another State, and to a Period of Existence of more Importance to Mankind than the prefent, they will be no longer unaccountable.

It is in the nice Difcuffion of this Point that our Author employs the IXth, Xth, XIth, and XIIth of his Letters; and he fuppofes his Difquifition will be agreeable to Perfons of good Tafte, and who prefer what is ufeful to that which only amufes.