PART II.

OF THE WILL

WILL or Simple Volition is that state of mind which immediately precedes action;-we will a certain act; and the act follows, unless it be prevented either by external restraint, or by physical inability to perform it.

The actions thus produced arise out of the menta. emotions formerly treated of,—the desires, and the affections. We desire an object, or we experience one of the affections:-the next mental act, according to the regular course of a reflecting mind, is proposing to ourselves the question,-shall we gratify the desire,shall we exercise the affection? Then follows the process of considering or deliberating.-We perceive, perhaps, a variety of considerations or inducements, some of which are in favor of gratifying the desire or exercising the affection, others opposed to it. We therefore proceed to weigh the relative force of these opposing motives, with the view of determining which

Author's definition of Will? Connection between a volition and action? Mental process from the desire to the act.

of them we shall allow to regulate our decision. We, at length, make up our mind on this, and resolve, we shall suppose, to do the act; this is followed by the mental condition of willing or simple volition.

In the chain of mental operations which, in such a case, intervene between the desire and the volition, a class of agents is brought into view which act upon the mind as moral causes of its volitions; these are usually called motives, or principles of action. When treating of this subject as a branch of the philosophy of the intellectual powers, I endeavored to show the grounds on which we believe, that there are facts, truths, motives, or moral causes, which have a tendency thus to influence the determinations of the mind, with a uniformity similar to that which we observe in the operation of physical causes. For the due operation of moral causes, indeed, certain circumstances are required in the individual on whom they are expected to operate, and, without these, they may fail in thei operation. It is necessary that he should be fully informed in regard to them as truths addressed to his understanding, that he direct his attention to them with suitable intensity, and exercise his reasoning powers upon their tendencies, and that he be himself in a certain healthy state of moral feeling. In all our intercourse with mankind, accordingly, we proceed upon an absolute confidence in the uniformity of the opera

Describe the steps in full. What name is given that class of agents which act upon the mind to produce volition? Are moral causes, as well as physical causes, really uniform in their operation? Are they apparently as uniform and steady as physical causes? What circumstances are essentia! to their due operation? Do we confide in the uniformity of moral causes, in or vitercourse with mankind?

tion of these causes, provided we are acquainted with the moral condition of the individual. We can foretell, for example, the respective effects which a tale of distress will have upon a cold-hearted miser, and a man of active benevolence, with the same confidence with which we can predict the different actions of an acid upon an alkali and upon a metal; and there are individuals in regard to whose integrity and veracity, in any situation in which they can be placed, we have a confidence similar to that with which we rely on the course of nature. In this manner we gradually acquire, by experience, a knowledge of mankind; precisely as, by observation or experiment, we acquire a knowledge of the operation of physical agents. Thus we come to know that one man is absolutely to be relied on, in regard to a particular line of conduct in given circumstances; and that another is not to be relied on, if any thing should come in the way, affecting his own pleasure or interest. In endeavoring to excite various individuals to the same conduct in a particular case, we learn, that, in one, we have to appeal only to his sense of duty; in another, to his love of approbation; while, on a third, nothing will make any impression except what bears upon his interest or his pleasure. Again, when we find that, in a particular individual, certain motives or truths fail of the effects which we have observed them to produce in others, we endeavor to impress them upon his mind, and to rouse his attention to their bearings and tendencies; and this we do from the conviction, that these

Examples illustrative of this. Consequence of this uniformity in respect to our knowledge of mankind. Examples.

truths have a certain uniform tendency to influence the volitions of a moral being, provided he can be induced seriously to attend to them, and provided he is in that moral condition which is required for their efficiency.

In all such cases, which are familiar to every one, we recognise, therefore, a uniform relation between certain moral causes or motives, and the determinations of the human mind in willing certain acts. It is no objection to this, that men act in very different ways with the same motives before them; for this depends upon their own moral condition. When treating of the intellectual powers, I alluded to the metaphysical controversies connected with this subject, and I do not mean to recur to them here. Our present object is entirely of a practical nature, namely, to investigate the circumstances which are required for the due operation of motives or moral causes, and the manner in which the moral feelings may be so deranged, that these fail of producing their natural or proper effects.

Let us, then, suppose an individual deliberating in regard to the line of conduct he shall pursue in a particular case; the circumstances or impressions which are calculated to act upon him as moral causes in determining his volition, that is, in deciding his conduct, are chiefly the following. (1.) Self-love, which prompts him to seek his own ease, interest, or gratification. (2.) Certain affections which lead him to take

Apparent objection. Is this subject well settled among metaphysicians? Author's object in bringing forward the subject here. Case supposed. Moral causes operating upon a man, to produce volition-how many enume rated? What are they?

into view duties which he owes to other men; such as justice, benevolence, &c. (3.) The impression of moral rectitude or moral responsibility. This is derived from the great principle of conscience, aided by the truths of religious belief. (4.) We ought to add reason or judgment, which leads him to perceive certain tendencies of actions, apart from their moral aspect. Now, in deciding on his conduct in any particular instance, one man makes every thing bend to his own interest or pleasure, with little regard to the interests of others; unless in so far as the absolute requirements of justice are concerned, the infringement of which might expose him to loss of reputation, or even to punishment. Another surrenders a certain portion of his personal gratification to the advantage or comfort of others, purely as an exercise of feeling from which he experiences satisfaction; influenced, also, probably, in some measure, by a regard to character, or the love of approbation. In such a man, it becomes, in individual instances, a matter of calculation, what degree of the sacrifice of personal ease, interest, or feeling, is to be made to this principle of action. A third contemplates the case purely as one of duty or moral responsibility, and acts upon this principle, though it may involve a degree of personal exertion, or a sacrifice of personal feeling, in itself disagreeable or even injurious to him; that is, though the strongest personal motives would lead to a different conduct. Let the case, again, refer to one of the desires, bearing no immediate relation to the interests of other men. One man goes directly into

Do all decide alike in respect to these claims? First kind of decision mentioned? Second kind? Third kind?