serve themselves from the influence of such, the first great inquiry, respecting their own mental impressions, ought to be, are they facts, and on what evidence do they rest which can satisfy a sound understanding that they are so. On the other hand is to be avoided an error, not less dangerous than the wildest fancies of the enthusiast, and not less unworthy of a regulated mind. This consists in treating real and important truths as if they were visions of the imagination, and thus dismissing them, without examination, from the influence which they ought to produce upon the moral feelings. It is singular also to remark, how these two modifications of character may be traced to a condition of the reasoning powers essentially the same. The former receives a fiction of the imagination, and rests upon it as truth. The latter, acting upon some prejudice or mental impression, which has probably no better foundation, puts away real and important truths without any examination of the evidence on which they are founded. The misapplication of the reasoning powers is the same in both. It consists in proceeding upon a mere impression, without exercising the judg ment on the question of its evidence, or on the facts and considerations which are opposed to it. Two characters of a very opposite description thus meet in that mental condition, which draws them equally, though in different directions, astray from the truth.

When a truth has fully received the sanction of the judgment, the second office of faith is, by attention

Inquiry by which we may preserve ourselves from it? Another error, of which there is equal danger? Singularity in respect to the origin of these opposite errors? How may the two be shown to arise from the same source?

and conception, to keep it habitually before the mind so that it may produce its proper influence upon the character. This is to live by faith; and in this con sists that operation of the great principle, which effec tually distinguishes it from all pretended feelings ano impressions assuming its name. We speak, in commor. language, of a head-knowledge which does not affect the heart; and of a man who is sound in his creed while he shows little of its influence upon his conduct. The mental condition of such a man presents a subject of intense interest. His alleged belief, it is probable, consists merely in words, or in arguing ingeniously on points to which he attaches no real value. These may have been impressed upon him by education; they may constitute the creed of a party to which he has devoted himself; and he may argue in support of them with all the energy of party zeal. In the same manner, a man may contend warmly in favor of compassion, whose conduct shows a cold and barren selfishness: but this is not benevolence; and the other is not faith. Both are empty professions of a belief in certain truths, which have never fixed themselves in the mind, so as to become regulating principles or moral causes in the mental constitution. We may indeed suppose another character, slightly removed from this, in which the truths have really received the approbation of the judgment, and yet fail to produce their proper influ ence. This arises from distorted moral habits, and a vitiated state of the moral faculties, which have de

The second great office of faith? Practical value of this principle as a test? Nature of mere "dead" belief? In what does it probably consist? Zeal which may be manifested in such a case? Is this real faith? case in which truth, really apprehended, may fail of controlling the character?

Another

stroyed the healthy balance of the whole economy of the n.ind. The consequence is, that the man perceives and approves of truths, without feeling their tendencies, and without manifesting their power.

Intimately connected with this subject, also, is a remarkable principle in our mental constitution, formerly referred to; namely, the relation between certain facts or truths, and certain moral emotions, which naturally arise from them, according to the chain of sequences which has been established in the economy of the mind. A close connection thus exists between our intellectual habits and our moral feelings, which leads to consequences of the utmost practical moment. Though we have little immediate voluntary power over our moral emotions, we have a power over the intellectual processes with which these are associated. We can direct the mind to truths, and we can cherish trains of thought, which are calculated to produce correct moral feelings; and we can avoid or banish mental images or trains of thought, which have an opposite tendency. This is the power over the succession of our thoughts, the due exercise of which forms so important a feature of a well-regulated mind, in regard to intellectual culture: its influence upon us as moral beings is of still higher and more vital importance.

The sound exercise of that mental condition which we call faith consists, therefore, in the reception of certain truths by the judgment, the proper direction of the attention to their moral tendencies, and the habitual

Important principle in the mental constitution connected with this subject? How is it that a power over our moral feelings arises by means of this prinexple? Recapitulation of the nature of faith?

influence of them upon the feelings and the conduct. When the sacred writers tell us that without faith it is impossible to please God, and when they speak of a man being saved by faith, it is not to a mere admission of certain truths as part of his creed that they ascribe Consequences so important; but to a state in which these truths are uniformly followed out to certain resu.., which they are calculated to produce, according to the usual course of sequences, in every sound mind. This principle is strikingly illustrated by one of these writers, by reference to a simple narrative. During the invasion of Canaan by the armies of Israel, two men were sent forward as spies to bring a report concerning the city of Jericho. The persons engaged in this mission were received in a friendly manner by a woman whose house was upon the wall of the city; when their presence was discovered, she hid them from their pursuers; and finally enabled them to escape, by letting them down by a cord from a window. Before taking leave of them, she expressed her firm conviction, that the army to which they belonged was soon to take possession of Jericho, and of the whole country; and she made them swear to her, that, when this should take place, they would show mercy to her father's house. The engagement was strictly fulfilled. When the city was taken, and the other inhabitants destroyed, the woman was preserved, with all her kindred. In this very simple occurrence, the woman is represented, by the sacred writer, as having been saved by faith.

Importance attched to faith in the Scriptures? In what sense is it used m the Scriptures Narrative referred to in illustration? Repeat the naria

cive.

The object of her faith was the event which she confidently expected,-that the city of Jericho was to be destroyed. The ground of her faith was the rapid manner in which the most powerful nations had already fallen before the armies of Israel, led, as she believed, by a divine power. Acting upon this conviction, in the manner in which a belief so deeply affecting her personal safety was likely to influence any sound mind, she took means for her preservation, by making friends of the spies. Her faith saved her, because without it she would not have made this provision; but, unless she had followed out her belief to the measure which was calculated to effect this object, the mere belief of the event would have availed her nothing. When we therefore ascribe important results to faith, or to any other mental operation, we ascribe them not to the operation itself, but to this followed out to the consequences which it naturally produces, according to the constitution of the human mind. In the same manner, we may speak of one man, in a certain state of danger or difficulty, being saved by his wisdom, and another by his strength. In doing so, we ascribe such results not to the mere possession of these qualities, but to the efforts which naturally arose from them, in the circumstances in which the individual was placed. And when the inspired writer says, that without faith it is impossible to please God, he certainly refers to no mere mental impression, and to no barren system of opinions: but to the reception of certain truths, which, in

The object of this woman's faith? The ground of it? Its efficiency in governing her conduct? What was it which gave her faith all its power and value? To what, in all cases, are the important results of faith to be as ribed? Analogies illustrating this principle?