| heathen and profane passages, having but a shadow | gregate, and as he consisteth of body and spirit. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge, concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein if any man, considering the parts thereof, which I have enumerated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as matters of common sense or experience, he judgeth well: but as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, "You may not marvel, Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do differ, for he drinketh water, and I drink wine." And like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep, "Sunt geminæ somni portæ, quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris: Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, Sed falsa ad cœlum mittunt insomnia manes :" so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and the braver gate of ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams. But we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy, which contemplateth man se CIVIL Knowledge is conversant about a subject But the resolution of This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three summary actions of society, which are, Conversation, Negotiation, and Government. For man seeketh in society comfort, use, and protection: and they be three wisdoms of divers natures, which do often sever; wisdom of behaviour, wisdom of business, and wisdom of state. The wisdom of Conversation ought not to be over much affected, but much less despised: for it hath not only an honour in itself, but an influence also into business and government. The poet saith, "Nec vultu destrue verba tuo." A man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance: so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and easy access, "Nil interest ha- | advertisements, that have no proportion to the magbere ostium apertum, vultum clausum." It is no- nitude of this subject. For if books were written thing won to admit men with an open door, and to of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men, receive them with a shut and reserved countenance. with mean experience, would far excel men of long So, we see, Atticus, before the first interview be- experience, without learning, and outshoot them in tween Cæsar and Cicero, the war depending, did their own bow. seriously advise Cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to conversation: the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose; "Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum est alienæ libertatis obliti, alterum suæ:" "The sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of others." On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and then "Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre," to act a man's life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying," Amici, fures temporis;" so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of urbanity, please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue; whereas those that have defect in it, do seek comeliness by reputation; for where reputation is, almost every thing becometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of action, than an over-curious observance of decency, and the guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Solomon saith, "Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat; et qui respicit ad nubes, non metet:" a man must make his opportunity as oft as find it. To conclude; behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious; it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to be too strait, or restrained, for exercise or motion. But this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I cannot report it for deficient. Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowledge should be so variable, as it falleth not under precept; for it is much less infinite than science of government, which, we see, is laboured, and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it seemeth, some of the ancient Romans, in the saddest and wisest times, were professors; for Cicero reporteth, that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the place, and to give audience to those that would use their advice; and that the particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, or of an accusation, and every other occasion incident to man's life. So as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private cases, arising out of an universal insight into the affairs of the world; which is used indeed upon particular cases propounded, but is gathered by general observation of cases of like nature. For so we see in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to his brother, " De petitione consulatus," being the only book of business, that I know, written by the ancients, although it concerned a particular action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary, but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of whom the Scriptures testify, that his heart was as the sands of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters; we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions, precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions; whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some number of examples. "Sed et cunctis sermonibus, qui dicuntur, ne accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi." Here is recommended the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find: as it was judged great wisdom in Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius's papers unperused. "Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem." Here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself, which is such an engagement, as whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or howsoever he change copy, he can no ways quit himself well of it. The wisdom touching Negotiation or De negotiis Business hath not been hitherto colgerendis. lected into writing, to the great derogation of learning, and the professors of learning. For from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion, which by us is expressed in adage to this effect; that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom. For of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of behaviour, it is by learned men for the most part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation; for wisdom of government, they acquit themselves well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to few: but for the wisdom of business, wherein man's life is most conversant, there be no books of it, except some few scatteredfulness. "Qui delicatè a pueritiâ nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem." Here is signified, that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthank "Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo ? coram regibus stabit, nec erit inter ignobiles." Here is observed, that of all virtues for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient, but ready and diligent. "Vidi cunctos viventes, qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente secundo, qui consurgit pro eo." Here is expressed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius: "Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occidentem vel meridianum." "Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima.” Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the unfittest; for a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth himself of means to make them better. "Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri; venit contra eam rex magnus, et vadavit eam, instruxitque munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio; inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam, et nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis." Here the corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it. "Mollis responsio frangit iram." Here is noted, that silence or rough answer exasperateth; but an answer present and temperate pacifieth. “Iter pigrorum, quasi sepes spinarum." Here is livelily represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when things are deferred to the last instant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every step findeth a brier or an impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth. "Melior est finis orationis, quam principium." Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of speech. "Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit; iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem." Here is noted, that a judge were better be a briber, than a respecter of persons; for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile. "Vir pauper calumnians pauperes, similis est imbri vehementi, in quo paratur fames." Here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horse-leech. "Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram impio." Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance. “Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii." Here is noted, that whereas men in wronging their best friends, use to extenuate their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth it from injury to impiety. "Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso." Here caution is given, that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient, as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels. "Qui conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum." Here is noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and contentment, but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to wind. “Filius sapiens lætificat patrem: filius vero stultus mœstitia est matri suæ." Here is distinguished, that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little discerning of virtue, but of fortune. "Qui celat delictum, quærit amicitiam; sed qui altero sermone repetit, separat foederatos." Here caution is given, that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over that which is past, than by apologies and excusations. "In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas." Here is noted, that words and discourse abound most, where there is idleness and want. "Primus in sua causa justus; sed venit altera pars, et inquirit in eum." Here is observed that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in such sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected. "Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris." Here is distinguished, that flattery and insinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far; but that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and simplicity. “Qui erudit derisorem, ipse sibi injuriam facit; et qui arguit impium, sibi maculam generat." Here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to return it. "Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia." Here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which is but verbal, and swimming only to conceit; for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other is amazed and confused. "Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus." Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented, from which representation proceedeth that application, "Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit." Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example, led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent a precedent; and have also attended them with brief observations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divine use but it is allowed even in divinity, that some interpretations, yea and some writings, have more of the eagle than others; but taking them as instructions for life, they might have received large discourse, if I would have broken them and illus- | Athenian; who having done many great services to trated them by deducements and examples. Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, | but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times; that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and express it in parable, or aphorism, or fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark is alive. And therefore the form of writing, which of all others is the fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions, is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely, discourse upon histories or examples: for knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the disFor this is no point of order, as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the example is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake, are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect toward the discourse which they are brought in to make good. course. But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that as history of times is the best ground for discourse of government, such as Machiavel handleth, so history of lives is the most proper for discourse of business, because it is more conversant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is discourse upon letters; such as are wise and weighty, as many are of Cicero " ad Atticum," and others. For letters have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching negotiation, which we note to be deficient. the estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “and in this Fortune had no part." And it came so to pass that he never prospered in any thing he took in hand afterwards; for this is too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, "Dicis, Fluvius est meus, et ego feci memetipsum;" or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares;" and that which the poet expresseth, 66 "Dextra mihi Deus, et telum, quod missile libro, Nunc adsint." For these confidences were ever unhallowed and unblessed and therefore those that were great politicians indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity, and not to their skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus: so Cæsar said to the master of the ship, "Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus." But yet nevertheless these positions, "Faber quisque fortunæ suæ ; Sapiens dominabitur astris ; Invia virtuti nulla est via ;" and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for presumption or outward declaration, have been ever thought sound and good, and are, no question, imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion, as they can scarce contain it within: as we see in Augustus Cæsar, who was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior in virtue, how when he died, he desired his friends about him to give him a Plaudite, as if he were conscient to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage. This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And therefore lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it. ambitu vitæ. Wherein it may appear at the first Faber fortua new and unwonted argument to næ, sive de teach men how to raise and make their fortune: a doctrine, wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple till he seeth difficulty; for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politician, as to be truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and in substance: in honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount, But yet there is another part of this part, which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken, as sapere and sibi sapere; the one moving as it were to the circumference, the other to the centre for there is a wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune, and they do sometimes meet, and often sever; for many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did take much knowledge of: "Nam pol sapiens," saith the comical poet,and sing, and please herself, and nothing else; but "fingit fortunam sibi ;" and it grew to an adage, "Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ:" and Livy attributeth it to Cato the first," in hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur." may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey in substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, "that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal, or form;" that is, that there be not any thing in being and action, which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune, otherwise than as of an inferior work for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects; but nevertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and merit, deserveth the consideration. First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus did require; who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, and dependences; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their moods and times, "Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras;" their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this not only of persons but of actions, what are on foot from time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous; for men change with the actions, and whilst they are in pursuit they are one, and when they return to their nature, they are another. These informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism, for no excellency of observations, which are as the major propositions, can suffice to ground a conclusion if there be error and mistaking in the minors. That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith, "Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud:" and although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept, because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may. gracious and popular, he saith, that in other things he was "velut eluctantium verborum:" but then again, "Solutius vero loquebatur quando subveniret." So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance, vultus jussus, that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and hardly. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: "Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat:" and the Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used than he was wont to be, without manifest cause. For small favours, they do but lull men asleep both as to caution and as to industry, and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, "Alimenta socordiæ." So again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced many of the friends of Antonius: "simul amicis ejus præfecturas et tribunatus largitur: " " wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from his dependences. As for words, though they be, like waters to physicians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised, especially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation, when he said, "You are hurt because you do not reign;" of which Tacitus saith, "Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere, correptamque Græco versu admonuit: ideo lædi, quia non regnaret." And therefore the poet doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that urge men to confess their secrets : "Vino tortus et ira." And experience showeth, there are few men so true to themselves, and so settled, but that sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open themselves; especially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to the proverb of Spain, “ Di mentira, y sacaras verdad," "Tell a lie, and find a truth." We will begin therefore with this precept, according to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said, Fronti, nulla fides; which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, "the gate of the mind." None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, "Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat." So again, noting the differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his fashion, wherein he carried his speech of Germanicus, thus; "Magis in speciem adornatismesticis emanat." verbis, quam ut penitus sentire videretur;" but of Drusus thus, "Paucioribus, sed intentior, et fida oratione:" and in another place speaking of his character of speech when he did any thing that was As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from reports; men's weakness and faults are best known from their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such, men are more masked, " Verior fama e do But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by their natures and ends; wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both |