by the thought of the present time; the practical need of metaphysics was strenuously enforced, as equipment for treating all manner of questions pertaining to religion and many pertaining to science, and it was urged that the study be fortified by complete mental philosophy.

E. Farquhar recalled the history of the term in its relation with the works of Aristotle, also the negative position of Hume in regard to the ego; Dr. Sterrett distinguished theology from metaphysics in its requirement of something always to be given as from outside, and justified scholasticism in its position on the subject; Mr. Steele considered the basis of the paper as dogmatism, regarding metaphysics as hitherto somewhat unprogressive and in need of a critical method.

January 22d.

Mrs. Hoyt presented in conversational way the "Analysis of a Present State of Mind," or of consciousness, as more frequently termed by the speaker. After expressing the opinion that no such analysis ever was complete, she proceeded to trace certain fundamental elements in every act of consciousness; objects, relations and unities. It was maintained that even infant consciousness generalizes, being by no means restricted to particulars. In like manner the absolute was found as invariably constituent in every such act. The present moment was resolved entirely into the past, or rather the general current, being merely an illusion as a separate period, although the future was held to be a reality even more dominant upon the mind. Knowledge was considered to be not an acquisition but an act, and any realization or retention of it simply a continuance of that act.

Maj. Powell approved the positions taken generally, and more especially that of all consciousness as act rather than state. E. Farquhar thought the presentation most incomplete on the side of emotion, and in the apparent assumption of consciousness as identical with cognition; also

that some of the elements might be rather the conditions established by subsequent reflection than the constituents of consciousness itself. Mrs. Hoyt claimed full recognition of emotion in her view.

Special Meeting, January 29th.

Dr. Sterrett exhibited the psychological philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, with their theories of knowledge resulting in the essential character of each, and in their relation with each other constituting the progress of philosophical thought in Great Britain for nearly a century. It was shown that a most important point of view from which to regard the work of these thinkers was its relation to psychology; that of Locke being imperfect and inconsistent, in that the mind was regarded as a blank surface in the earlier portion of his chief work, and in the later several varieties of knowledge were assigned to it other than results of sensation. Berkeley's negation of an external world was expounded with especial reference to his denial of "Substance" as a general substratum of matter; and Hume's of "cause" as a substantial principle of judgment, completed the position of philosophic scepticism as applied to all previous attainments, including the idea of personality. It was maintained, however, that no system of thought ever refuted a preceding one, or tended to destroy it except in the sense of fulfilling; as was thereafterwards to be supremely exemplified in the transition from Hume to Kant. Time not remaining for discussion, it was resolved that next meeting be devoted to the purpose.

Regular Meeting, February 5th.

Membership Committee reported the names of Rev. A. J. Graham, Miss Julia T. Ripley and Miss Julia P. Leavens, who were declared elected.

Mr. Powell expounded a system of purpose, which led to the cultural activities which may be designated as

pleasures, industries, institutions, languages and opinions, giving rise to the sciences of esthetology, technology, sociology, philology and philosophy.

Mr. Doolittle discussed the skepticism of Hume as being far from entirely negatory, and held with this thinker that much may be believed and even must be without absolute proof; a mode of mind which was described as neither logical nor illogical, but alogical.

Special Meeting, February 12th.

Mr. W. O. Partridge, of Milton, Mass., presented a paper, thrown together at very short notice by special request in absence of other program, on the "Psychological Basis of Art." The conditions of art in relation to other ideals were discussed, and it was regarded as in its true nature united almost to the degree of identity with morals and religion. Various false styles, as indicated by attributes of imitation and sensuality, were cited; and true art was announced as not a copy of eternal nature, but as something added by man to nature.

Special Meeting, February 19th.

E. S. Steele read a paper, entitled "The Better and Worse in Kant's Theory of Knowledge," consisting of an exposition of the earlier part of the Critique of the Pure Reason, together with criticisms of positions.

The point was made that time, in such a sense as it may be called a form of thought, is not the form of the inner sense, but the form of all perception of action or process, as directly of external as of internal process. Respecting the categories it was held that whether or not these notions have a place somewhere in the intellectual system, the fact that they have a material, as contrasted with a logical formal sense, precludes their having anything specially to do with the several forms of judgment. The doctrine of the "Synthetic Unity of Apperception" was judged to spring from a confusion of psychological conditions with

content of thought; however necessary that all the elements in a thought should be mine, the thought of the me does not form a part of the content of a thought of the external world. E. Farquhar questioned the last indictment; Dr. Sterrett claimed that the German mind of the present time, rather the scientific than the metaphysic, was returning to Kant. Maj. Powell asserted that all the content of his a priori, had been demolished by modern science; and Mr. Steele rejoined that if evolution could find no place for an a priori, it was so much the worse for evolution.

Special Meeting, February 26th.

The session was devoted to discussion of Mr. Steele's critique of Kant, now amplified a little by the author. Maj. Powell held that the categories of Kant were crude and imperfect, like his antinomies, these questions having all been been settled by science, especially under the category of evolution or becoming. Mr. Sewall contested the settlement, and the position of ignorance assigned to Kant, as also the very negative attitude in regard to religion ascribed to him by Mr. Steele.

Regular Meeting, March 5th.

Prof. F. H. Bigelow presented a paper on "Fichte's Idealism," which was commented on by Dr. Harris and Maj. Powell.

Special Meeting, March 12th.

Dr. E. A. Pace, of the Catholic University, read a paper in exposition of the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, more particularly that portion of it which deals with God and His relation to the world and to creation. Discussion followed by E. Farquhar, Dr. Harris and Mr. Sewall.

Special Meeting, March 19th.

Discussion of Prof. Bigelow's paper on Fichte.

In continuation of the meeting on the 5th, a discussion was held upon the teachings of Fichte. Maj. Powell was the principal speaker, Mr. Steele and Prof. Bigelow also partaking.

Special Meeting, March 26th.

Third meeting devoted to Fichte. Prof. Bigelow gave a running exposition of the "Vocation of Man," as the translation was called. Dr. Harris followed, giving fundamental characteristics and showing how largely the philosophy had been misunderstood, not only by the world, but by students.

Regular Meeting, April 2d.

The discourse was by Dr. Harris on the "Simple and the Complex in the Order of Knowing." It was shown that the notion of being, so often striven for as ultimate, was not a true but a spurious simple.

Remarks were made by Dr. Sterrett, Maj. Powell and Mr. Sewall. The last referred to Swedenborg's doctrine of the Infinite as affirmative instead of the usual negative, and preferred the basis of will in form of love to that of "reason."

Special Meeting, April 9th.

Dr. Harris, following to some extent the course of previous discussions, talked upon "Hegel's Categories of Relativity;" showing that all relation necessarily implies ultimate self-relation, all activity a self-activity, all distinction a self-distinction, all cause an ultimate causa sui.

Mr. Steele criticized Hegel's alleged identification of thought and being; Dr. Harris indicated the distinctions necessary for proper understanding of Hegel's teaching on this subject.

Special Meeting, April 16th.

Dr. Harris continued the exposition of Hegel, defining