Justice and the Genesis of WarCambridge University Press, 10/08/1995 - 356 من الصفحات Studies of the causes of wars generally presuppose a 'realist' account of motivation: when statesmen choose to wage war, they do so for purposes of self-preservation or self-aggrandizement. In this book, however, David Welch argues that humans are motivated by normative concerns, the pursuit of which may result in behaviour inconsistent with self-interest. He examines the effect of one particular type of normative motivation - the justice motive - in the outbreak of five Great Power wars: the Crimean war, the Franco-Prussian war, World War I, World War II, and the Falklands war. Realist theory would suggest that these wars would be among the least likely to be influenced by considerations other than power and interest, but the author demonstrates that the justice motive played an important role in the genesis of war, and that its neglect by theorists of international politics is a major oversight. |
المحتوى
THE JUSTICE MOTIVE AND WAR | 7 |
WAR AS A DECISIONMAKING PROBLEM | 9 |
REALISM AND MOTIVATION | 10 |
THE JUSTICE MOTIVE | 18 |
THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE JUSTICE MOTIVE TO DECISION THEORY | 22 |
SOME HYPOTHESES ON THE AGENCY OF THE JUSTICE MOTIVE | 30 |
PROBING THE AGENCY AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUSTICE MOTIVE | 32 |
SOME OBJECTIONS ANTICIPATED | 40 |
WORLD WAR II | 127 |
THE ROLE OF ADOLF HITLER | 129 |
HITLERS AIMS | 131 |
HITLERS RISE TO POWER | 135 |
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HITLERS PROGRAM | 139 |
THE LULLING EFFECT OF THE SENSE OF JUSTICE | 141 |
THE APPROACH TO WAR | 147 |
CONCLUSIONS | 153 |
THE CRIMEAN WAR | 48 |
BACKGROUND | 49 |
RUSSIAN MOTIVATIONS | 58 |
ALLIED MOTIVATIONS | 68 |
CONCLUSIONS | 73 |
THE FRANCOPRUSSIAN WAR | 76 |
THE SETTING | 77 |
THE COMING OF THE WAR | 81 |
FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN GOALS | 86 |
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT | 92 |
WORLD WAR I | 95 |
THE RISE OF GERMANY | 97 |
ALSACELORRAINE | 102 |
SERBIAN NATIONALISM | 106 |
SARAJEVO AND AFTER | 112 |
CONCLUSIONS | 125 |
THE FALKLANDSMALVINAS WAR | 155 |
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE | 156 |
THE ARGENTINE DECISION TO INVADE | 163 |
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS | 184 |
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT | 186 |
JUSTICE AND ORDER | 192 |
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL DIVERSITY | 194 |
JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION | 197 |
JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS | 200 |
TOWARD A JUST WORLD ORDER | 210 |
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS | 214 |
CONCLUSION | 217 |
NOTES | 220 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 309 |
328 | |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
Adolf Hitler Albertini Alsace-Lorraine Ambassador Argentine Austria Austria-Hungary Balkan behavior Bethmann Hollweg Bismarck Britain British cause claims cognitive conception of justice conflict considerations Crimea Crimean Crimean War crisis decision decision-making demands Diplomacy diplomatic economic England entitlements Europe European Falkland Islands Falkland Malvinas Falklands War Falklands/Malvinas Falklands/Malvinas war force Foreign Policy France France's Franco-Prussian Franco-Prussian War French Galtieri Geiss German Germany's Gooch H.C. Deb History Hitler Hohenzollern Hohenzollern Candidacy Ibid important interests international justice international politics international relations invasion issue July junta justice motive Kinglake leaders London Lord Malvinas March military Minister moral Napoleon negotiations Nicholas normative obligations Ollivier Origins Orthodox Ottoman Empire outbreak peace perceived perception of injustice principle question Quoted Realist regime role Russia self-determination sense of justice Serbia Slav Sovereignty Dispute Steefel strategic Sultan Temperley territory Theory of Justice trans Treaty Tsar Tsar's Turkey Turkish understanding Univ University Press Versailles wars York
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة viii - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.