felt the valour of the Greeks by land, his navy likewise made a sorrowful proof of their skill and courage at sea. The Grecian fleet lay at that time at Artemisium, in the straits of Euboea, where the Persians, thinking to encompass them, sent two hundred sail about the island to fall upon them behind, using a like stratagem to that which their king did practise against Leonidas, in a case not unlike, but with far different success. For that narrow channel of the sea which divideth Euboea from the main, was in the same sort held by a navy of two hundred and seventy-one sail against the huge Persian armada, as the straits of Thermopylæ had formerly been maintained by Leonidas, till he was so circumvented, as this navy might have been, but was not. The departure of those two hundred ships, that were sent about the island, and the cause of their voyage, was too well known in the Persian fleet, and soon enough disclosed to the Greeks, who setting sail by night, met them with a counter-surprise, taking and sinking thirty vessels, enforcing the rest to take the sea; where, being overtaken with foul weather, they were driven upon the rocks, and all cast away. Contrariwise, the navy of the Greeks was increased by the arrival of fifty-three Athenian ships and one Lemnian, which came to their party in the last fight. As these new forces encouraged the one side, so the fear of Xerxes' displeasure stirred up the other to redeem their loss with some notable exploit. Wherefore setting aside their unfortunate policy, they resolved in plain fight to repair their honour, and casting themselves into the form of a crescent, thought so to enclose the Greeks, who readily did present them battle at Artemisium.

The fight endured from noon till night, and ended with equal loss to both parts. For though more of the Persians ships were sunk and taken, yet the lesser loss fell altogether as heavy upon the Greekish fleet, which, being small, could worse bear it. Herein only the Barbarians may seem to have had the worse, that they forsook the place of fight, leaving the wreck and spoils to the enemy, who nevertheless

were fain to abandon presently even the passage which they had undertaken to defend; both for that many of their ships were sorely crushed in the battle, and especially because they had received advertisement of the death of Leonidas at Thermopyla. Before they weighed anchors, Themistocles, general of the Athenians, engraved upon stone at the watering-place an exhortation to the Ionians, that either they should revolt unto the Greeks, or stand neutral; which persuasion, he hoped, would either take some place with them, or at the least make them suspected by the Persians.

SECT. IV.

The attempt of Xerxes upon Apollo's temple; and his taking of Athens.

WHEN Xerxes had passed the straits of Thermopylæ, he wasted the country of the Phocians, and the regions adjoining; as for the inhabitants, they chose rather to fly, and reserve themselves to a day of battle, than to adventure their lives into his hands, upon hope of saving their wealth, by making proffer unto him of their service. Part of his army he sent to spoil the temple of Delphi, which was exceeding rich by means of many offerings that had there been made by divers kings and great personages; of all which riches it was thought that Xerxes had a better inventory than of the goods left in his own palace. To make relation of a great astonishment that fell upon the companies which arrived at the temple to have sacked it, and of two rocks, that, breaking from the mount Parnassus, overwhelmed many of the Barbarians, it were peradventure somewhat superstitious. Yet Herodotus, who lived not long after, saith, that the broken rocks remained even to his memory in the temple of Minerva, whither they rolled in their fall. And surely this attempt of Xerxes was impious; for seeing he believed that Apollo was a god, he should not have dared to entertain a covetous desire of enriching himself by committing sacrilege upon his temple. Wherefore it may possibly be true, that license to chastise his impiety, in such manner as

is reported, was granted unto the Devil, by that holy One, who saith, Will a man spoil his gods? and elsewhere, a Hath any nation changed their gods, which yet are no gods? Go to the isles of Kittim, and behold, and send to Kedar, and take diligent heed, and see whether there be any such things. Now this impiety of Xerxes was the more inexcusable, for that the Persians alleged the burning of Cybele's temple by the Athenians, when they set fire on the city of Sardis in Asia, to be the ground and cause of the waste which they made in burnings of cities and temples in Greece. Whereas indeed, in the enterprise against Delphos, this visor of holy and zealous revenge falling off, discovered the face of covetousness so much the more ugly, by how much the more themselves had professed a detestation of the offence which the Athenians had committed in that kind by mere mischance.

The remainder of that which Xerxes did may be expressed briefly thus: "He came to Athens, which finding "forsaken, he took, and burnt the citadel and temple which "was therein." The citadel indeed was defended a while by some of more courage than wisdom, who literally interpreting Apollo's oracle, "That Athens should be safe in "wooden walls," had fortified that place with boards and palisadoes; too weak to hold out long, though by their desperate valour so well maintained at the first assault, that they might have yielded it upon tolerable conditions, had they not vainly relied upon the prophecy; whereof (being somewhat obscure) it was wisely done of Themistocles, to make discretion the interpreter, applying rather the words to the present need, than fashioning the business to words.

SECT. V.

How Themistocles the Athenian drew the Greeks to fight at Salamis.

THE Athenians had, before the coming of Xerxes, removed their wives and children into Trazene, Ægina, and Salamis, not so highly prizing their houses and lands, as their freedom, and the common liberty of Greece. Never

theless this great zeal, which the Athenians did shew for the general good of their country, was ill requited by the other Greeks, who with much labour were hardly entreated to stay for them at Salamis, whilst they removed the wives and children out of the city. But when the city of Athens was taken, it was presently resolved upon, that they should forsake the isle of Salamis, and withdraw the fleet to Isthmus; which neck of land they did purpose to fortify against the Persians, and so to defend Peloponnesus by land and sea, leaving the rest of Greece, as indefensible, to the fury of the enemy. So should the islands of Salamis and Ægina have been abandoned, and the families of the Athenians (which were there bestowed as in places of security) have been given over into merciless bondage. Against this resolution Themistocles, admiral of the Athenian fleet, very strongly made opposition, but in vain. For the Peloponnesians were so possessed with fear of losing their own, which they would not hazard, that no persuasions could obtain of them to regard the estate of their distressed friends and allies. Many remonstrances Themistocles made unto them, to allure them to abide the enemy at Salamis; as first in private unto Eurybiades the Lacedæmonian, admiral of the whole fleet, That the selfsame fear which made them forsake those coasts of Greece, upon which they then anchored, would afterward (if it found no check at the first) cause them also to dissever the fleet, and every one of the confederates to withdraw himself to the defence of his own city and estate; then to the council of war, which Eurybiades upon this motion did call together, (forbearing to object what want of courage might work in them hereafter,) he shewed that the fight at Isthmus would be in an open sea, whereas it was more expedient for them, having the fewer ships, to determine the matter in the straits; and that, besides the safeguard of Egina, Megara, and Salamis, they should, by abiding where they then were, sufficiently defend Isthmus, which the Barbarians should not so much as once look upon, if the Greeks obtained victory by sea; which they could not so well hope for elsewhere, as in that present

place which gave them so good advantage. All this would not serve to retain the Peloponnesians, of whom one, unworthy of memory, upbraided Themistocles with the loss of Athens, blaming Eurybiades for suffering one to speak in the council that had no country of his own to inhabit. A base and shameful objection it was, to lay as a reproach that loss, which being voluntarily sustained for the common good, was in true estimation by so much the more honourable, by how much it was the greater. But this indignity did exasperate Themistocles, and put into his mouth a reply so sharp, as availed more than all his former persuasions. He told them all plainly, That the Athenians wanted not a fairer city than any nation of Greece could boast of, having well near two hundred good ships of war, the better part of the Grecian fleet, with which it was easy for them to transport their families and substance into any part of the world, and settle themselves in a more secure habitation, leaving those to shift as well as they might, who in their extremity had refused to stand by them. Herewithal he mentioned a town in Italy, belonging of old to the state of Athens, of which town he said an oracle had foretold, that the Athenians in process of time should build it anew, and there (quoth he) will we plant ourselves, leaving unto you a sorrowful remembrance of my words and of your own unthankfulness. The Peloponnesians, hearing thus much, began to enter into better consideration of the Athenians, whose affairs depended not, as they well perceived, upon so weak terms, that they should be driven to crouch to others; but rather were such as might enforce the rest to yield to them, and condescend even to the uttermost of their own demands.

For the Athenians, when they first embraced that heroical resolution of leaving their grounds and houses to fire and ruin, if necessity should enforce them so far for the preservation of their liberty, did employ the most of their private wealth, and all the common treasure, in building a great navy. By these means they hoped (which accordingly fell out) that no such calamity should befall them by land, as