In the neck of which followed that long and cruel Peloponnesian war, whereof I have gathered this brief following; the same contention taking beginning fifty years after the flight of Xerxes out of Greece. But because there was no city thereof, which either in the beginning of this war or in the continuance of it, was not drawn into the quarrel, I hold it convenient now at the first to shew briefly the estate of the country at that time, and especially the condition of those two great cities, Athens and Sparta, upon which all the rest had most dependance.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Peloponnesian war.

SECT. I.

Upon what terms the two principal cities of Greece, Athens and Sparta, stood, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

GREECE

was never united under the government of any one prince or estate, until Philip of Macedon, and after him Alexander, brought them rather to a union and league against the Persian, whereof they were captains, than into any absolute subjection. For every estate held their own, and were governed by laws far different, and by their own magistrates, notwithstanding the power of the Macedonians, to whom they did yield obedience no otherwise than as to such, who were (perforce) their leaders in the Persian war, (deemed the general quarrel of Greece,) and took the profit and honour of the victory to their own use and increase of greatness. But the kings, which afterwards reigned in Macedonia, did so far enlarge their authority, that all Greece was by them brought under such obedience as differed little from servitude; very few excepted, who could hardly, sometimes with arms and sometimes with gifts, preserve their liberty; of whom the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were chief; which two people deserved best the plague of tyranny, having first given occasion thereunto by their great

ambition, which wearied and weakened all the country by perpetual war. For, until these two cities of Athens and Sparta distracted all Greece, drawing every state into the quarrel on the one or other side, and so gave beginning to the Peloponnesian war, (the effects whereof, in true estimation, ceased not before the time that Philip had overmastered all, forasmuch as every conclusion of one war afforded henceforth matter to some new distraction of the whole country,) the wars, commenced between one city of Greece and another, were neither great nor of long continuance. All controversies were soon decided, either by the authority of the Amphictyons, who were the general council of Greece, or by the power of the Lacedæmonians, whose aid was commonly held as good as the assurance of victory.

These Lacedæmonians had lived about four hundred years under one form of government, when the Peloponnesian war began. Their education was only to practise feats of arms, wherein they so excelled, that a very few of them were thought equal to very great numbers of any other people. They were poor, and cared not much for wealth; every one had an equal portion of the common field, which sufficed to maintain him in such a manner of life as they used. For bravery they had none, and curious building or apparel they regarded not. Their diet was simple, their feasts and ordinary meals being in common halls, where all fared alike. They used money of iron, whereof they could not be covetous nor great hoarders. Briefly, they lived Utopian-like, save that they used no other occupation than war, placing all their felicity in the glory of their valour. Hereby it came to pass, that in all enterprises whereof they were partakers, the leading and high command was granted to them, and all Greece followed their conduct. But the Athenians were in all points contrary to this; for they sought wealth, and measured the honours of their victories by the profit; they used mercenary soldiers in their wars, and exacted great tribute of their subjects, which were for the most part islanders, compelled to obey them, because the Athenian fleet was great.

As in form of policy and in course of life, so in conditions natural, the difference between these two people was very much. The Athenians were eager and violent, sudden in their conclusions, and as hasty in the execution; the Lacedæmonians very slow in their deliberations, full of gravity, but very resolute, and such as would in cold blood perform what the Athenians did usually in flagrant. Whereby it came to pass that the Lacedæmonians had all the estates of Greece depending upon them, as on men firm and assured, that sought honour, and not riches; whereas the Athenians were followed by such as obeyed them perforce, being held in strait subjection. But the seigniory of the Athenians was nothing large, until such time as the Persian Xerxes had invaded Greece, pretending only a quarrel to Athens. For then the citizens, perceiving well that the town of Athens could not be defended against his great army of one million seven hundred thousand men, bestowed all their wealth upon a navy, and (assisted by the other Grecians) overthrew the fleet of Xerxes, whose land forces were soon after discomfited by them and the Greeks, who all served under conduct of the Spartans. After these victories, the Athenians, being now very mighty in fleet, reduced all the islands of the Greekish seas under their obedience, imposing upon them a hard tribute for maintenance (as they pretended) of war against the Persian; though indeed they employed their forces chiefly to the conquest of such islands and haven towns of their own countrymen as stood out against them. All which was easily suffered by the Lacedæmonians, who were inlanders, and men that delighted not in expeditions to be made far from home. But afterwards perceiving the power of the Athenians to grow great, they held them in much jealousy, and were very apt to quarrel with them; but much more willing to breed contention between them and other estates. Wherefore at such time as the Thebans would have oppressed the Plateans, when they of Platea repaired to Sparta for succour, they found there no other aid than this advice, That they should seek help at Athens. Hereby it was thought, that the

Athenians should be entangled in a long and tedious war with their neighbours of Thebes: but it proved otherwise, for their force was now so great, that all such occasions did only serve to increase their honour and puissance.

SECT. II.

How Sparta and Athens entered into war. NEVERTHELESS many estates of Greece were very ill affected to Athens, because that city grew very insolent upon sudden prosperity, and maintaining the weaker towns against the stronger, encroached apace upon their neighbours, taking their dependants from them. Especially the Corinthians were much enraged, because the people of the island Corcyra, their colony, which had rebelled against them, and given them a great overthrow by sea, was by the Athenians (who desired to increase their fleet by adjoining tat of Corcyra unto it) taken into protection, and the Corinthians thereby impeached of that revenge which else they would have taken. Now, howsoever it were so, that these dealings of the Athenians were not directly against the conditions of peace agreed upon among the Greeks, yet were the complaints made at Sparta so vehement, that (though with much ado) they concluded to redress by war the injuries done to their allies.

First therefore seeking religious pretences, they required the Athenians to expiate certain offences committed against the gods; whereto having for answer, that they themselves should expiate other the like offences committed in Sparta, they began to deal plainly, and required that the people of some towns, oppressed by the estate of Athens, should be set at liberty; and that a decree made against those of Megara, whereby they were forbidden to enter any port of the Athenians, should be reversed. This last point they so earnestly pressed, that if they might obtain it, they promised to absist from their purpose of making war.

This they desired, not as a matter of any great importance, (for it was a trifle,) but only that by seeming to have obtained somewhat, they might preserve their reputation

without entering into a war, which threatened them with greater difficulties apparent than they were very willing to undergo.

take notice, how Hereupon they that was needful

But the Athenians would yield to nothing; for it was their whole desire that all Greece should far they were from fear of any other city. prepared on both sides very strongly all to the war, wherein the Lacedæmonians were superior, both in number and quality, being assisted by most of the cities in Greece, and having the general favour, as men that pretended to set at liberty such as were oppressed; but the Athenians did as far exceed them in all provisions, of money, shipping, engines, and absolute power of command among their subjects; which they held, and afterwards found of greater use in such need, than the willing readiness of friends, who soon grow weary, and are not easily assembled.

SECT. III.

The beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

THE first and second years expedition was very grievous to the city of Athens. For the fields were wasted, the trees cut down, the country people driven to fly with their wives, children, and cattle into the town, whereby a most furious pestilence grew in the city, such as before they had neither felt nor heard of. Hereunto was added the revolt of the Mytilenians in the isle of Lesbos, and the siege of Platea their confederated city, which they durst not adventure to raise, besides some small overthrows received. The Lacedæmonians, assembling as great forces as they could raise out of Peloponnesus, did in the beginning of summer enter the country of Attica, and therein abide, until victuals began to fail, wasting and destroying all things round about. The governors of the Athenians would not suffer the people to issue into the field against them, for they knew the valour of their enemies, but used to send a fleet into Peloponnesus, which wasted as fast all the seacoast of their enemies, whilst they were making war in Attica. So the Peloponnesians, being the stronger by land,

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