money, and means to raise more, were able to secure themselves by a strong fleet from any great harm that the Peloponnesians, wanting wherewith to maintain a navy, could do unto them; yea, as masters of the sea, to weary them out, as in effect already they had done. As for the confederates of Sparta, they could now endure neither war nor peace, their daily travails and many losses had so wearied and incensed them. Wherefore the Lacedæmonians were glad to use the occasion, which the inclination of their enemies did then afford, of making a final peace, which with much ado they procured, as seemed equal and easy, but was indeed impossible to be performed, and therefore all their travail was little effectual.

The restitution of prisoners and places taken being agreed upon, it fell out by lot that the Lacedæmonians should restore first. These had won more towns upon the continent from the Athenians, than the Athenians had from them; but what they had won, they had not won absolutely. For they had restored some towns to such of their allies from whom the state of Athens had taken them; some, and those the most, they had set at liberty, (as reason required,) which had opened their gates unto them, as to their friends and deliverers, and not compelled them to break in as enemies. Now concerning the towns which were not in their own hands, but had been rendered unto their confederates, the Spartans found means to give some satisfaction, by permitting the Athenians to retain others which they had gotten in the war; as for the rest, they promised more than afterwards they could perform. The cities which they had taken into protection could not endure to hear of being abandoned; neither would they by any means yield themselves into the hands of their old lords the Athenians, whom they had offended by revolting, notwithstanding whatsoever articles were drawn and concluded for their security and betterance in time to come. This dull performance of conditions on the side of the Spartans made the Athenians become as backward in doing those things which on their part were required; so that restoring only the pri

soners which they had, they deferred the rest until such time as they might receive the full satisfaction according to the agreement. But before such time as these difficulties brake out into matter of open quarrel, the Lacedæmonians entered into a more strait alliance with the Athenians, making a league offensive and defensive with them. Hereunto they were moved by the backwardness of the Argives, who being (as they thought) likely to have sued for peace at their hands, as soon as things were once compounded between Athens and Sparta, did shew themselves plainly unwilling to give ear to any such motion. Thinking therefore, that by cutting from Argos all hope of Athenian succour, they should make sure work, the Spartans regarded not the affections of other states, whom they had either bound unto them by well-deserving in the late war, or found so troublesome, that their enmity (if perhaps they durst let it appear) were little worse than friendship. It bred great jealousy in all the cities of Greece, to perceive such a conjunction between two so powerful seigniories, especially one clause threatening every one, that was any thing apt to fear, with a secret intent that might be harboured in their proud conceits of subduing the whole country, and taking each what they could lay hold on. For, besides the other articles, it was agreed that they might by mutual consent add new conditions, or alter the old at their own pleasures. This impression wrought so strongly in the Corinthians, Thebans, and other ancient confederates of Sparta, that the hate which they had borne to the Athenians, their professed enemies, was violently thrown upon the Lacedæmonians, their unjust friends; whereby it came to pass, that they who had lately borne chief sway in Greece might have been abandoned to the discretion of their enemies, as already in effect they were, had the enemies wisely used the advantage.

SECT. VI.

Of the negociations and practices held between many states of Greece, by occasion of the peace that was concluded.

THE admiration wherein all Greece held the valour of

Sparta as unresistible, and able to make way through all impediments, had been so excessive, that when by some sinister accidents that city was compelled to take and seek peace, upon terms not sounding very honourable, this common opinion was not only abated, but (as happens usually in things extreme) was changed into much contempt. For it was never thought that any Lacedæmonian would have endured to lay down his weapons, and yield himself prisoner; nor that any misfortune could have been so great, as should have drawn that city to relieve itself otherwise than by force of arms. But when once it had appeared that many of their citizens, among whom were some of especial mark, being overlaid by enemies in the island before Pylus, had rather chosen to live in captivity than to die in fight; and that Pylus itself, sticking as a thorn in the foot of Laconia, had bred such anguish in that estate, as utterly wearying the accustomed Spartan resolution, had made it sit down, and seek to refresh itself by dishonourable ease; then did not only the Corinthians and Thebans begin to conceive basely of those men which were virtuous, though unfortunate, but other lesser cities, joining with these in the same opinion, did cast their eyes upon the rich and great city of Argos, of whose ability to do much they conceived a strong belief, because of long time it had done nothing. Such is the base condition which through foolish envy is become almost natural in the greater part of mankind. We curiously search into their vices, in whom, had they kept some distance, we should have discerned only the virtues, and comparing injuriously our best parts with their worst, are justly plagued with a false opinion of that good in strangers which we know to be wanting in ourselves.

The first that published their dislike of Sparta were the Corinthians, at whose vehement entreaty (though moved rather by envy at the greatness of Athens daily increasing) the Lacedæmonians had entered into the present war. But these Corinthians did only murmur at the peace, alleging as grievances, that some towns of theirs were left in the Athenians' hands. The Mantinæans, who, during the time

of war, had procured some part of the Arcadians to become their followers, and forsake their dependency upon the state of Sparta, did more freely and readily discover themselves; fear of revenge to come working more effectually than indignation at things already past. The Argives feeling the gale of prosperous fortune that began to fill their sails, prepared themselves to take as much of it as they could stand under, giving for that purpose unto twelve of their citizens a full and absolute commission to make alliance between them and any free cities of Greece, (Athens and Sparta excepted,) without any further trouble of propounding every particular business to the multitude. When the gates of Argos were set thus open to all comers, the Mantinæans began to lead the way, and many cities of Peloponnesus following them entered into this new confederacy, some incited by private respects, others thinking it the wisest way to do as the most did. What inconvenience might arise to them by these courses, the Lacedæmonians easily discerned, and therefore sent ambassadors to stop the matter at Corinth, where they well perceived that the mischief had been hatched. These ambassadors found in the Corinthians a very rough disposition, with a gravity expressing the opinion which they had conceived of their present advantage over Sparta. They had caused all cities which had not entered yet into the alliance with Argos, to send their agents to them, in whose presence they gave audience to the Lacedæmonians; the purport of whose embassy was this: That the Corinthians, without breach of their oath, could not forsake the alliance which they had long since made with Sparta, and that reason did as well bind them to hold themselves contented with the peace lately made, as religion enforced them to continue in their ancient confederacy; forasmuch as it had been agreed between the Spartans and their associates, that the consent of the greater part (which had yielded unto peace with Athens) should bind the lesser number to perform what was concluded, if no divine impediment withstood them. Hereunto the Corinthians made answer, that the Spartans had first begun to do them open

wrong, in concluding the war wherein they had lost many places, without provision of restitution; and that the very clause alleged by the ambassadors did acquit from any necessity of subscribing unto the late peace, forasmuch as they had sworn unto those people whom they persuaded to rebel against Athens, that they would never abandon them, nor willingly suffer them to fall again into the tyrannous hands of the Athenians. Wherefore they held themselves bound, both in reason and religion, to use all means of upholding those, whom by common consent they had taken into protection; for that an oath was no less to be accounted a divine impediment, than were pestilence, tempest, or any the like accident, hindering the performance of things undertaken. As for the alliance with Argos, they said that they would do as they should find cause. Having dismissed the ambassadors with this answer, they made all haste to join themselves with Argos, and caused other states to do the like, so that Sparta and Athens were in a manner left to themselves, the Thebans and Megarians being also upon the point to have entered into this new confederacy. as the affections were diverse which caused this hasty confluence of sudden friends to Argos, it so likewise came to pass, that the friendship itself, such as it was, had much diversity both of sincerity and of continuance. For some there were that hated or feared the Lacedæmonians, as the Mantinæans and Eleans; these did firmly betake themselves to the Argives, in whom they knew the same affection to be inveterate; others did only hate the peace concluded, and these would rather have followed the Spartans than the Argives in war, yet rather the Argives in war than the Lacedæmonians in peace. Of this number were the Corinthians, who knowing that the Thebans were affected like unto themselves, dealt with them to enter into the society of the Argives, as they had done: but the different forms of government used in Thebes and Argos caused the Thebans to hold rather with Sparta, that was ruled by the principal men, than to incur the danger of innovation, by joining with such as committed the whole rule to the multitude.

But