ject of attraction and repulsion in one case, we call matter; the subjects of similar phenomena in other cases, we call by similar names. Such is the origin of all common names. We observe an object in one case, and give it a name; we observe other similar objects, and designate them by similar names. These names are common to all the different objects to which they are applied; and when applied to particular objects, represent them only as the subjects of common properties. Common names are applied to particular objects, as the subjects of similar properties, and they represent them as possessing those properties, considered without respect to others. Matter, mind, animal, man, and vegetable, are of this description. Man denotes a being possessing certain properties. It is applicable to thousands of individuals, but it denotes them considered merely as possessing common properties. Different objects possessing common properties, and called by common names, constitute genera. Men constitute one genus; beasts, birds, minerals, ideas, affections, and all objects which are the subjects of common properties, and which are called by common names, others.

§ 163. Objects are named with reference to those properties which are considered particularly important; generally with reference to those which are obvious, or which are capable of being easily ascertained. All properties, however, which belong to them in common, are the grounds of common appellatives and predicates, and of corresponding classifications.

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The properties of objects which are the foundation of common names, are more or less general. Names which denote objects, considered only as subjects of the most general properties, are applicable to all objects which possess properties. Those which denote them, considered the subjects of less general properties, are applicable to all objects which possess those less general properties. Thus the name, being, is applicable to any object which exists, either material or spiritual; man is applicable to any individual of the human race, either old or young, male or female; wise man, to any man of the particular character denoted by this compound appellative.

Names describe objects as the subjects of certain properties, but they do not describe all their properties. Those which are common to the greatest variety of objects, embrace the fewest properties, and those which are restricted

to the smallest variety of objects, the greatest number of properties. Being is applicable to a greater variety of objects than man, or animal; and denotes them, considered as the subjects of proportionably fewer properties.

Proper names denote objects, as individuals, without reference to any properties which they possess in common with others, except individuality. When particular proper names, however, are appropriated to objects of particular classes, to the exclusion of others, they designate them, not merely as individual objects of thought, but individuals of particular classes.

§ 164. Those objects which agree in the possession of common properties, and which are called by common names, constitute one genus or species. Beings are one genus, men another, ideas another. When the objects which constitute a genus are distinguished from each other by common names and common properties, they are denominated subordinate genera or species. Thus spirits and bodies both belong to the genus of beings, and constitute subordinate genera or species of beings.

Genera which comprehend other subordinate ones, are denominated higher or superior, and those which they comprehend, lower or inferior. The highest genus is distinguished from all others, under the title of ultimate. Those which are next in order to any other genus, are denominated proximate, and proximate inferior or superior Thus the genus of spirits is proximate inferior to that of beings, and the genus of beings proximate superior to those of spirits and bodies.

Species is generally used to denote an inferior genus, and does not differ from genus in any other respect. The same class of objects is often called a species, considered with reference to the individual objects which it embraces, and a genus, considered with reference to subordinate species or genera.

Generic appellations and predicates, denote objects as individuals, but as individuals possessing certain properties in common with other individuals of the same class. Those of the highest orders denote objects to which they are applied, considered as possessing only the properties common to all objects of those orders; those of the lower orders denote objects, considered as possessing all the properties of the superior orders, together with additional ones. Generic

appellatoins of the highest order denote objects, considered as possessing certain properties; those of the proximate inferior orders denote them, considered as possessing all the properties denoted by those of the superior order, together with some additional ones, and so on; appellations of each successive inferior order denote objects, considered as possessing all the properties of the next superior one, together with some additional ones. The highest genus comprehends every thing in one class. This is divided into different subordinate genera, and those into others still, and so on, till we arrive at the lowest order of things.

§ 165. All names or appellatives, which are applicable to more than one object, are of a generic character, and denote objects as possessing properties which are common to a class of objects. The same is true of all the predicates which are affirmed or denied of subjects in propositions. Common predicates, of every kind, are similar to common names.

Having formed ideas of individual objects, as possessing generic properties, we form ideas of genera, as consisting of a number of such objects; and the idea of a single object, as possessing properties which are common to several, is the element of the idea of a genus.

A number of similar objects, such as inches, feet, men, and beings, is just as legitimate an object of conception, as a single object of the same kind; and is one thing consisting of individuals more or less numerous, all of which have certain properties in common. The power of forming such ideas is mysterious, but no more so than that of forming any ideas at all. Ideas of several objects, considered as constituting one class, are of the same nature as ideas of single objects, considered as possessing different properties, or of an object possessing only a single property, if any such exists.

Generic appellatives and predicates correspond to generic properties and phenomena. Language is the creature of ideas, and is neither more nor less than they make it. Ideas which embrace common elements, or which relate to objects having common properties, are represented by common names and predicates. Common names and predicates are the principal vehicles of verbal communication, into which nearly all discourses may be resolved, as their only essential elements.

CHAPTER XII.

NATURE AND VARIETIES OF MEMORY.

§ 166. Memory is a department of the generic faculty of knowledge which is exercised in repeating our past ideas, under conditions different from those on which they origi nally depended. We see a man to-day, and remember to have seen him yesterday, or years ago. Our sight of him to-day is a perception; our remembrance of having seen him before, and our ideas of him derived from that source, are ideas of memory. Both these classes of ideas may exist to some extent contemporaneously, and may accompany ⚫ each other in succession, but they have a different origin. Perceptions depend on sensations, and direct judgments, on previous ideas considered as conditions of judgment; but ideas of memory are perceptions of the objects of past ideas depending on those past ideas. We infer the existence of a material object from our sensations; and from ideas of that object, we form ideas of it as an object which we saw yesterday, or years ago. In the same manner, from perceptions of one object we form ideas of another, which was formerly an object of our perceptions. From perceptions of things we form ideas of their possessors as we have previously known them; and from perceptions of beings of any one order, we form ideas of beings of other orders which have been the objects of our previous thought. I saw a man yesterday; to-day, on seeing his card, his name, or any object that belonged to him, I remember him, and remember to have seen him.

§ 167. On a strict analysis, ideas of memory are found to consist of ideas of objects which we have formerly thought of, accompanied with a reference of those ideas to the conditions of previous ideas of those objects, as their proper cause. We think of a man whom we saw yesterday, and refer our ideas of him to the conditions of our previous ideas of him as their proper cause. The essential distinction, therefore, which the mind makes between its original ideas and its ideas derived from memory, is, that its original ideas are based upon existing conditions from which they are directly inferred, and its ideas of memory are based on the

conditions of the similar previous ideas, as they formerly existed.

The faculty of knowledge may be resolved into two faculties; that of repeating ideas from original grounds of inference, with increased facility; and that of repeating ideas from past conditions of thought. Knowledge consists, to a greal extent, of ideas which are repeated with increased facility from original grounds of judgment; and we are said to know sciences, not because we can repeat ideas of their various objects from memory, but because we can repeat them promptly and accurately, by inferring them from their appropriate conditions in regular orders of succession. A highly valuable and extensive part of our knowledge is of this description, and enters largely in all the sciences. But there is a portion of human knowledge which cannot be resolved in this manner, the generic source of which is denoted by memory.

§ 168. All the sciences and arts embrace ideas which are derived from memory, as well as those which depend on the increased development of the powers of judgment. Memory is a power supplementary to judgment, and furnishes us with numerous valuable ideas from our past experience, which simple judgment could not grasp.

All ideas of the objects of our previous thoughts depending directly on those thoughts as their cause, are ideas of memory. Remembrance may be resolved into ideas of the objects of our past thoughts; and accompanying ideas of them as having been the objects of our past thought.

§ 169. The qualities of memory are capacity, permanence, and accuracy. Capacity has respect to the number and variety of objects remembered in given circumstances and conditions; permanence, to the length of time during which recollections occur; and accuracy, to the correspondence of ideas of memory to the original ideas on which they depend. Every thing which is an object of thought, may be an object of memory.

Memories may be either direct or indirect, complete or incomplete, correct or erroneous. We remember directly, when existing ideas suggest an object of our past perceptions without the intervention of any other idea. We remember indirectly, when existing ideas suggest the objects of our past perceptions through intermediate ideas. Remembrances are complete, when they embrace all the elements