internal, and the other external; one the being which is conscious of resistance, and the other the being which it resists. We experience a resistance, and infer from it both a resisting and resited being. Resistance would not be possible if there was nothing for us to resist. Both the resisted and resisting being are conceived of as concurring in every case of resistance, and resistance is not conceivable or possible on any other hypothesis. Blank vacancy can neither make resistance, nor feel resistance; and a being capable of appreciating resistance, cannot experience it, except from a resisting object.

§ 281. The mind thus ascends from sensations and ideas, to ideas of things of a different order, considered as the subjective causes of these phenomena. Sensations and ideas are transient and variable, but from them the mind forms ideas of beings which are permanent and essentially the same in all successive periods of time. This is the true origin of ideas of causes and effects, which have so much puzzled philosophers, and which have been accounted for so differently. It has been common to attribute the ideas of cause and effect, universally entertained by the human mind, to the succession of events, and especially to related orders of succession. This was generally done previous to the time of Hume; and that acute reasoner clearly perceived and demonstrated the fallacy of such a deduction, aud proved, that on this hypothesis, no such relation could possibly be established. Notwithstanding the unanswerable objections of Hume, and the more profound investigations of Kant, indicating the true sources of human knowledge on this subject, the great mass of English and American metaphysicians still cling to the exploded doctrine of the origin of ideas of causation in the succession of events, and not in the nature of events. But succession of events is not causation; and does not give causation. If this therefore, were our only source of information, in regard to this subject, the skepticism of Hume would be the only sound philosophy. No matter in what stated orders events may succeed each other; all that we can derive from this source is orders of succession, regular or irregular, according to the facts. But what we cannot derive from the succession of events, we can derive from the nature of events; and it Is from the nature of events, that we infer by an original exercise of reason the existence of causes which operate and

are revealed in their production. This has not been done by philosophers only, but by the human mind in all the different stages of its development, in all countries, and in all ages, and in the most constant and uniform manner. How philosophy could so far and so long have overlooked it, is not a little surprising. But so it has been, and so it still is to a very considerable extent; and it has happened on this subject, as on many others, that the speculative theory of men has been one thing, and their practical theory another; and that the former has been wrong, and the latter right. In practical philosophy, every man deduces his ideas of causes from events, not from their succession in orders, either stated or occasional.

§ 282. Things of every kind may be successive without possessing causality or dependence. Periods of time are successive, but preceding portions of it do not produce those which follow. Night succeeds day, and day night, and all the phenomena, both of mind and matter, are more or less successive. It is impossible, therefore, that mere succession should give us the least idea of causality or dependence. But when we contemplate actions and words, not as successive, but as actions and words, we are compelled to resolve the action into the thing which acts, and the state or condition of that thing, which constitutes its action; and the event into the thing to which the event appertains, and the state or condition of the thing, which constitutes the event. This resolution has the appearance of being an analysis, but it is really a deduction, by which we infer an agent from an action, and a subject to which an event appertains from an

event.

§ 283. If it is asked why we infer an agent from an action, and a subject to which an event appertains from an event, the answer is, that such a supposition is required by the very conceptions of actions and events, as much as the suppositions of time and space are required to the conceptions of bodies and of successive stages of action. Time and space are the essential conditions of bodies, and successive states of bodies, considered in respect to quantity; and causes or subjects are the essential conditions of actions and events, considered with respect to reality. We discover bodies, and infer the existence of space as the essential condition of the existence of bodies; we discover successive states and conditions, both of bodies and minds, and infer

the existence of time as the essential condition of their successive states and conditions; and we discover actions and events; and infer the existence of agents which perform actions, or subjects to which events appertain. Our perceptions of causes, therefore, are judgments of the same nature as our perceptions of space and time, and are equally certain. We know the existence of space and time, and we know with equal certainty and on similar grounds, the existence of causes, and the relations of causes and effects.

§284. Minds and bodies are known as causes of certain operations in which they are concerned. Having discovered causes, we classify and divide them on the same principle as other objects. The principal classifications of them are the following:

1. Subjective and objective; 2. Immediate and remote; 3. Concurring and exclusive; 4. Ultimate and final or rational.

Subjective and Objective Causes.

§ 285. Things are the subjective causes of all their own actions, states and conditions. Men are the subjective causes of their sensations, ideas, and affections; of all their exercises of muscular power, both voluntary and involuntary, and of every state and condition of which they can be the subjects. Bodies are the subjective causes of all the states and conditions in which they exist, and of all the actions which they perform.

Things are objective causes of all the states and conditions which they produce in other beings. Bodies are the objective causes of sensations, and of all the effects which they produce in other bodies. These two classes of causes concur in the production of a large proportion of the phenomena which come under our observation in the natural world; and in multitudes of cases, their relations to particular effects, are pefectly similar as in action and re-action, and in all mutual attractions and repulsions. The mutual attractions of the sun and earth, and of the earth and moon, are influences in which both the attracting bodies exercise an equal influence, and are subjective or objective causes of the phenomena, according to the relation in which they are contemplated.

Immediate and Remole Causes.

§ 286. Immediate causes are sub-divisions of the subjective and objective. An immediate cause is one which stands in immediate proximity to its effect; and which concurs subjectively or objectively in producing it. Remote causes produce their effects indirectly, by means of other intermediate ones. Thus, the sun is the immediate cause of the elliptical motion of the earth, and of the light and heat of day, and the remote cause of vegetation and animal life, by means of the temperature which it produces. Men and things are the immediate causes of their own present actions and conditions, and of all the actions and conditions which they produce directly in other beings, and are the remote causes of all their future actions and conditions dependent on their previous actions, and of all the actions and conditions of other beings which depend remotely on their actions. Remote causality is difficult, and in many cases impossible to be determined with precision. It can be traced, however, to a sufficient extent to make it an object of great practical importance in philosophical inquiries. A large part of our most valuable knowledge relates to this subject.

Concurring and Exclusive Causes.

§ 287. Concurring causes are those which co-operate with others in producing effects, and which are not capable of producing them alone. The sun and earth are concurring causes of the attraction which subsists between them; the sun, air, earth and water are concurring causes of vegetation; men and things are the concurring causes of the sensations, and other effects which they concur in producing. Most of the phenomena which things are concerned in producing, they produce as concurring causes.

Exclusive causes are those which produce their effects without any concurring agency of other causes; and comprehend the absolute conditions of their effects. The only absolute, exclusive cause is God. A variety of subordinate causes, however, may be considered exclusive, in respect to others supposed to be capable of concurring with them in producing particular effects. Many causes are relatively exclusive, without being absolutely so.

Ultimate and Final Causes.

§ 288. Ultimate causes are the most remote to which effects can be traced. Men are the ultimate causes of those effects which originate in human agency; animals of those which originate in the agency of animals; and material objects of those which originate in their agency; and God is the ultimate cause of all events which originate in his agency. Inasmuch, however, as all created beings have derived their existence, and all the conditions of their existence from him, God is the sole, absolute, ultimate cause of all other causes, and through them, and by his own direct agency, of all effects whatever.

Final causes have respect to voluntary beings who act for the accomplishment of certain ends, and denote the ends of voluntary action. They concur in producing all the voluntary action that takes place, and are necessary to its production. All the voluntary action of God, men and animals is performed in pursuance of certain ends, and these ends are as necessary conditions of its performance, as agents are of actions, of any kind whatever, or as space is of bodies.

These causes admit of being subdivided into many different classes, the most important of which are physical and voluntary.

§ 289. The capacity of causes to produce effects is called powers; and different causes have different powers, corresponding to the effects which they are capable of producing. Minds have powers of one kind; bodies of another; and all the different species of minds and bodies are distinguished by some peculiarities in respect to their powers.

Nature and Classification of Effects.

§ 290. The nature of causes, considered as the essential conditions of actions and states of being, determines the nature of effects. An effect is a state or action of a cause, and the division and classification of effects is similar to that of causes. A knowledge of causes, however, involves that of effects; and a knowledge of effects, that of causes; and all knowledge terminates in that of causes, and the laws of causation. All effects may be generalized in two classes.