imagination, and the affections, in an arbitrary manner, it is their constant and obedient servant, doing their whole bidding, to the extent of its powers, and never attempting more. Such it must ever continue. In every possible condition of human nature, the will must be in accordance with the other mental exercises; the mind judging at each successive moment what is to be chosen, purposed, and done, and indicating both the ends to be sought, and the means for their attainment; and choosing, purposing, and doing accordingly. Our capacity of doing good to ourselves and others by voluntary action, of creating happiness and averting misery, involving the formation of judgments, in respect to the modes in which we can accomplish these ends, is a high and valuable endowment; and adapts us to the circumstances of our being, as subjects of God's moral government. We are impelled to action by the prospect of suffering, and invited to it by that of pleasure. All voluntary action is in pursuit of pleasure, and in escape from pain. This is the case now, and must ever be, in every possible condition of voluntary agents. If we should ever be placed in such a condition, that action would afford us no pleasure of any kind, and inaction expose us to no pain, voluntary action would be impossible. The suspension of our pleasures and pains, upon our voluntary action, is necessary to the production of such action. It must prevail, therefore, in respect to all voluntary agents, not excepting God himself. God's happiness is the consequence of his right voluntary action. In proportion as we are assimilated in character and conduct to him, we enjoy a similar felicity. There can be no voluntary action, without some degree of the exercise of reason, indicating the mode of action to be performed, and the ends to be gained by it. The idea of ends

to be gained, suggests that of means for their attainment; and that of means, suggests ends; and the idea of an action to be performed, and of some of the consequences to flow from performing it, tends to suggest all that we ought to consider, in order to act wisely.

§ 488. God's moral government is administered by the dispensation of good and evil, as the consequence of right and wrong actions, so as to harmonize the interests of all holy beings. It consists of rewards and punishments, and of happiness and misery, resulting from moral actions, and courses of action, both in time and eternity. The less perfect go

vernment of families and states, is administered on the same principle. It encourages certain actions, by the bestow ment of rewards, and discourages others, by the infliction of punishments; and thus appeals to the will of the subject, through the medium of the susceptibilities of happiness and misery, and through the exercise of reason, estimating the consequences of different actions, in different relations and conditions.

Considered in relation to the Divine government, all the happiness which results from well-doing, is of the nature of rewards; and all the misery that results from sin, is retributive or rimitive. Divine revelation greatly increases our knowledge of moral actions, both by its precepts and by its disclosures respecting their future and eternal consequences; and affords us essential benefit, by furnishing us definite and explicit rules of moral action; and by exhibiting the most important and weighty reasons for doing right in all cases.

§ 489. Our general judgment may be in opposition to a particular act, and we may regard it as on the whole undesirable and injurious; and yet, under the influence of temporary excitement, we may judge it desirable, and perform it. In this case, the excitement of the occasion perverts our judgment, and the perverted judgment misleads the will. Doing what we know to be wrong and injurious, under the influence of inordinate affections, admits of a similar explanation. Contemplated in some points of view, we judge such acts to be entirely undesirable and injurious; in other points of view, they are the subjects of vehement desire, and of favorable judgments. While we contemplate them in relation to the law of God, and to their future evil effects, we do not and cannot judge it best to pursue them. But when, even for a short time, we contemplate them simply with reference to our own inordinate passions, our desire for them becomes strong, and often decisive of our wills, to the prejudice of our highest known interests. It is thus that we see the right, and yet the wrong pursue." While the right is distinctly and prominently in our view, it determines our judgments, desires, and acts of will. But during the intervals, however short, in which it is left out of view, or made less prominent than it should be, perverted judgments are formed, inordinate desires spring up, and injurious acts of will are put forth. By the exercise of judgments

we form comparative estimates of different objects of pursuit and choice; of the different modes of action by which to secure the objects we choose; and of the times to act. According as we judge, we act. Our judgments, however, may be perfectly right, or imperfect, in different degrees; and our conduct will be proportionably wise, or unwise and injurious; and right or wrong.

Animals are, equally with men, subjects of choices, purposes, and volitions. They choose some objects in preference to others; purpose some future actions in preference to others; and put forth some volitions in preference to others. The laws of the animal, are similar to those of the human will. They are incapable, however, of forming ideas of actions as right or wrong, and of experiencing the affections and desires which these ideas are adapted to excite. Their knowledge, and the sphere of their emotions, are more limited than those of men; consequently they are incapable of many choices, purposes, and volitions, of which men, by reason of their higher endowments, are fully capable.

Liberty and Necessity.

§ 490. Actions which depend either immediately or remotely on the will, are distinguished from others under the title of free actions. Others are denominated necessary. All the actions of material agents are necessary; and those of men and animals are either free or necessary, according as they depend on the will of their subjects or not. The capacity of performing free actions, constitutes beings free agents; those of performing only necessary actions, necessary agents. Material objects are necessary agents, and men and animals free agents, considered with respect to all their free actions; and necessary agents, considered with respect to those which are not free. Freedom has respect to possible actions. Those which are possible at some times, may be impossible at others. In its greatest extension, human freedom relates to all those actions which are ever possible, and necessity is restricted to those which are never under our voluntary control. Actions which are never possible, we are not free to perform; and those which it is never in our power not to perform, we are not free to decline. In the sense above described, freedom and necessity are

applicable to choices, purposes, and volitions, equally with other human and animal actions.

Many choices are determined indirectly by previous choices, in the same manner as sensations, ideas, and emotions are. Many conceivable choices are never possible to individuals, and their non-attainment is therefore necessary. Freedom is limited or unlimited. It is limited when actions, which were free for a time, after that time become necessary; and is unlimited in respect to all actions which depend upon volitions. Freedom is limited in respect to all actions which are not immediately voluntary; but which depend on previous remote choices.

Actions

§ 491. Necessity is either relative or absolute. are absolutely necessary which their agents never had power not to perform, and the non-performance of actions is necessary, in respect to all agents who are never able to perform them. The actions of matter, and their non-performance of other actions, are absolutely necessary. Human and animal actions are the subjects of relative or limited necessity, when it is impossible for the agent to perform or not to perform them after particular times, though either was possible before. No moral actions can be absolutely necessary; and no absolutely necessary actions can be the objects of moral obligation.

All choices are free. The idea of a necessary choice is absurd and contradictory. There is no choice where there is no liberty, and voluntary actions are free, considered as proceeding from choice, and depending on it as an essential concurring cause. The freedom, however, of choices, is the opposite of physical necessity, not of dependence. Human and animal choices are dependent equally with other phenomena. They depend (1.) on subjective causes or agents; (2.) on objective causes; (3.) on previous choices and other previous exercises; (4.) on God as their ultimate

cause.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONDITIONALITY OF THE EXERCISES OF THE WILL.

§ 492. The exercises of the will are conditioned on ideas of possible good and evil, and are directed to attain good and repel evil. Nothing can be an object of our choice except in the character of something good, and no particular thing can be preferred to others, except in the character of something better than the things to which it is preferred. Examples illustrative of this, may be produced without number, and are as numerous as the exercises of choice. The principle of preferring good to evil, invclves necessarily that of preferring the greatest good; and we accordingly find that choice terminates on the greatest supposed good with as much uniformity and certainty as it terminates on good at all. The mind aims at accomplishing the best thing within its power, on the same principle that it aims at accomplishing good things, rather than evil; and this is not true of the wish and good only, but of all voluntary beings, both men and animals. The mind's ideas of possible good and evil are at every moment the conditions of its exercises of will, directed to attain the greatest possible good; the good and evil by which it is governed, is that of which it thinks at the time, and no other.

§ 493. According to this theory the will is subject to the control of ideas. Ideas may be correct or erroneous, adequate or inadequate, and may relate to the paramount objects of human regard; or to those which are of little importance; but on them, and on them alone, are the exercises of the will conditioned. That this is the fact, is proved by the universal experience of mankind; and on this fact, the whole government of voluntary beings is built. With ideas of honor and dishonor, men always choose honor; with those of wealth and poverty, they always choose wealth; with those of health and sickness, they always choose health; and so of other objects. Wrong choices are always founded in wrong judgments. In multitudes of cases, this is obvious, and undisputed. If any one doubts whether it is universal, let him examine himself on the matter, and produce if he can from his experience a single wrong choice