[262]

sufficient publication to bring a letter within | Statute on which this indictment was
the Statute, as is held to be the case in an action
of slander and libel.

The reply to this is, that the Statute prohibits
the conveyance by mail of matter which is a
publication before it is mailed, and not such as
becomes a publication by reason of its being
mailed.

why did Congress consider it necessa sert the specific word to designate 1888? It must be that that body did the construction on the prior Statute in behalf of the United States, else we doing a useless and vain act. Bu Amendment of 1888 is not involved case, no opinion is expressed as to whe term "letter," as used therein, can, proper construction of that Statute, be include a strictly private sealed letter.

1

With reference to the argument word "writing" occurs, in the legisla this subject, as an amendment, we ha to remark that the entire history of the lation, so far from forming a basis for ent construction of this Act, confirms i

For the reasons above given our an: the first question certitied is in the n This being decisive, we need not consi second question; and the third, as basi peatedly held, is too general to be the of a certificate of division.

Another argument on which indictments of this character have been sustained by some of the circuit courts is, that a reasonable construction must be given the Statute, and, it being evident that Congress intended to exclude anything of an obscene character from the mails, it is immaterial whether the thing prohibited is inside or outside of an envelope, and therefore unreasonable to hold that Congress intended not to allow a decent writing in an obscene envelope, but at the same time to allow obscene writing in a proper envelope. We recognize the value of the rule of construing statutes with reference to the evil they were designed to suppress as an important aid in ascertaining the meaning of language in them which is ambiguous and equally susceptible of conflicting constructions. But this court has repeatedly held that this rule does not apply to instances which are not embraced in the language employed in the statute, or implied from a fair interpretation of its context, even though they may involve the same mischief which the statute was designed to suppress. United States v. Sheldon, 15 U. S. 2 Wheat. 119 [4: 199]; United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. 5 Wheat. Power to remove police officer — notice — 76, 95 [5: 37, 42]; United States v. Morris, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 464, 475 [10:543, 548]; United States v. Hartwell, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 385 [18: 8301; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 [23: 563].

1.

2.

ADOLPHUS ECKLOFF, Plff. in 1

1878.

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 240-244.)

The commissioners of the District of Col have power to remove a police officer w charges, notice or hearing.

The grant of a general power to remove with it the right to remove at any time or manner deemed best, with or without notic

3. The Act of 1878 is an Organic Act, inten dispose of the whole question of a govern for the District of Columbia.

But we cannot concede that the policy of the
Statute was so sweeping as the argument as-
sumes. We think that its purpose was to
purge the mails of obscene and indecent matter
as far as was consistent with the rights reserved
to the people, and with a due regard to the se-
curity of private correspondence from exami-
nation. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 [24: Submitted March 27, 1890. Decided Apr
877]. This object seems to have been accom-
plished by forbidding the use of the mails to
books, pamphlets, pictures, papers, writings

and prints, and other publications of an inde-
cent nature, and also to private letters and
postal cards whereon the indecent matter is
exposed to the inspection of others than the
person to whom the letter is written.

[No. 244.]

1890.

District of Columbia to review a judg

TN ERROR to the Supreme Court o

at general term reversing a judgment at sp term for salary of a lieutenant of the p force of the District of Columbia. Affir The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. C. C. Cole and W. L. Cole plaintiff in error:

(

Repeal by implication is not favored by court. When there are two Acts upon the s subject, the rule is to give effect to both.

Ashurst, J., said in Jones v. Smart, 1 T. R. 51: "It is safer to adopt what the legislature have actually said than to suppose what they meant to say." In the Queensberry Leases, 1 Bligh, 497, Lord Redesdale said: "The proper mode of disposing of difficulties arising from a liberal construction is by an Act of Parliament, and not by the decision of court." Congress seems to have acted upon this idea; and if further argument were needed in support of our view it will be found, we think, in the fact that in an Amendment to this Statute passed September 26, 1888 (25 Stat. 496), for the first time in the history of the postal service the word "letter" was included in the list of articles made non-mailable by reason of their obscene, lewd, lascivious or otherwise improper|(28: 996). character. If letters were embraced in the The construction of a statute by those char

Beals v. Hale, 45 U. S. 4 How. 37 (11:3 U. S. v. Tynen, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 92 (20: Mc Cartee v. Orphan Asylum Society, 9 437; State v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620; Robinso Rippey, 111 Ind. 112; Dugan v. Gitting Gill, 138; People v. Gustin, 57 Mich. State v. Stoll, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 431 (21: 6 Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. (22: 437); Red Rock v. Henry, 106_U. S. (27: 253); Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. (27: 428); Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S.

with the execution of it is entitled to great | of 1878; that repeals by implication are not weight.

[244]

apparatus to a similar or analogous s no change in the manner of applicat result distinct in its nature, will no patent, although the new form of resu have before been contemplated.

2. Competent knowledge and skill of an

mechanic would have enabled him to the revolving billiard-cue rack in ques out calling the inventive faculty into p

The patent, No. 72,969, granted to B

January 7, 1868, for a revolving cue rad
for want of novelty.
•

Argued April 11, 1890. Decided April
No. 257.]

board has the same plenary power in respect to
this new department, and is not hampered by
limitations attached to the board which there-
tofore had control of it. The presumption
against implied repeal obtaining in the con-
struction of ordinary statutes yields to the in-
ferences arising from the subject matter of leg-
islation. Plenary powers having been found
by experience valuable in the management of
affairs already under the control of the board,
the transfer of another department to the same
control carries with it a strong implication that
the added department is subject to the same
plenary powers. The primary thought is not
a mere transfer of authority, but the bringing
of the added department within the control o APPEAL from a decree of the Circu
of the United States for the Di
the general supervising board. It is unity of California in favor of complainant fo
administration and not change of commission.fringement of letters-patent. Reversed
But our conclusions are not controlled by
this construction alone. The court below placed Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Full
its decision on what we conceive to be the true This was a bill filed by Emanuel Bru
significance of the Act of 1878. As said by against Ferdinand de St. Germain in
that court, it is to be regarded as an Organic cuit Court of the United States for the
Act, intended to dispose of the whole question of California, October 25, 1880, for an
of a government for this District. It is, as it infringement of letters-patent No. 72,969
were, a constitution for the District. It is de-ed to Brunswick January 7, 1868, for a
clared by its title to be an Act to provide "a ing cue rack.
permanent form of government for the Dis-
trict." The word "permanent" is suggestive.
It implies that prior systems had been tempora-
ry and provisional. As permanent it is com-
plete in itself. It is the system of government.
The powers which are conferred are organic
powers. We look to the Act itself for their ex-
tent and limitations. It is not one Act in a
series of legislation, and to be made to fit into
the provisions of the prior legislation; but is a
single complete Act, the outcome of previous
experiments, and the final judgment of Con-
gress as to the system of government which
should obtain. It is the constitution of the
District, and its grants of power are to be taken
as new and independent grants, and expressing
in themselves both their extent and limitations.
Such was the view taken by the court below;
and such we believe is the true view to be taken
of the Statute. Regarded in this light, but one
interpretation can be placed upon the section
quoted. The power to remove is a power with-
out limitations. The power is granted in gen-
eral terms, as well as the authority to adopt such
provisions as may be necessary to carry it into
execution. Full authority is given to the com-
mission; and in the absence of rules and regu-
lations directing a different procedure, its act
of summary dismissal cannot be challenged.

The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant demurred to the bill Fe 16, 1881, and among other causes of de assigned that "the said complaint does scribe or set forth any new or useful inv or discovery, or any invention or dis patentable under the Patent Laws of the States, but, on the contrary, the descri of the alleged inventions contained in sai plaint show that the same is not patent The demurrer was overruled, whereupo defendant answered, denying, among things, that the alleged invention was o utility or value. Replication having been proofs were taken, and an interlocutory d was entered on the 12th of May, 1884, in of the complainant, sustaining the patent, ing that there had been infringement, referring the case to a master to take and an account of the gains and profits, and the damages. The master subsequently ported that the defendant had realized $1 profits from the manufacture and sale of cue rack, but that no damages had been tained by complainant, by reason of resp ent's sales, over and above the profits. Ex tions were filed by both complainant and fendant and were overruled by the court, on the 27th of May, 1886, a final decre complainant's favor was entered in the c for the amount reported by the master, interest and costs, and an appeal duly take this court by the defendant.

erred in holding that the said letters-pat The first error assigned is, "that the co were valid.' The specification, drawings a

claim are as follows:

"Be it known that I, E. Brunswick, of City of Chicago, in the County of Cook, S of Illinois, have invented new and useful i by declare that the following is a full and provements in billiard-cue racks, and I do he

1. The application of an old process or machine or
NOTE.-For what patents are granted; when de-act description thereof, reference being had

clared void. See note to Evans v. Eaton, 4: 433.
As to patentability of inventions, see note to
Thompson v. Boisselier, 29: 76; also note to Corning
v. Burden, 14: 683.

122

the accompanying drawings, making part this specification, in which

"Drawing No. 1 represents the plain revol ing cue rack; and

"Drawing No. 2 represents the lock-up rack | hune v. Phillips, 99 U. S. 592 (25:293); Curtis, for private use.

Mr. M. A. Wheaton, for appellant: There is nothing described in the patent in this case except the idea of applying old devices to a new and analogous use, and the ex-patents for revolving dining tables and bottle ercise of the most ordinary kind of mechanical knowledge in making such application.

[230]

[231]

[245]

also authorized Robertson, in case it deemed advisable and to the interest o cerned that a sale of the property sh place, to sell and make titles to it, pro consent of the said Frances and Far guardian or guardians, should be first obtained.

to revolve about a common centre and bring
around dishes and decanters in that way, as de-
sired. The office performed was the same in
respect to dishes and decanters as that per-
formed by complainant's contrivance in respect
to cues. The difference between revolving and
stationary tables and casters and between re-
volving and stationary cue racks is the same. In March, 1879, Fanny Gardner filed
Those revolve and these do not. We think equity, in the Superior Court of R
that competent knowledge and skill in his call- County, Georgia, setting forth the pu
ing on the part of an intelligent mechanic the lot of land by Gardner from Ca
would have enabled him, on request, to con- $600, and the making of such deed; th
struct the revolving billiard-cue rack in ques-ner, who was her husband, and the fatl
tion, without calling the inventive faculty into
play.

The patent was void for want of novelty,
and the decree is reversed and the cause remanded,
with a direction to dismiss the bill.

former wife, of Frances Gardner, who termarried with one Beatty, died in 18 all of those persons were free persons o that, on the 3d of May, 1854, Gardner plaintiff and Frances took possessior property; that afterwards, Frances havi ried, Gardner divided the lot and er house on a part of it for Frances; t

FRANCES BEATTY ET AL., Pliffs. in Err., parties thus continued in the possession

ion of the court:

On the 3d of May, 1854, one Carrie executed and delivered to Elijah D. Robertson, a white man, a warranty deed of a lot of land in Augusta, Georgia, 82 feet 6 inches in width by 200 feet in depth. The consideration expressed in the deed was $600, and it conveyed to Robertson, his heirs and assigns forever, the lot in question, in trust nevertheless, to and for the sole use, benefit and behoof of the following free persons of color of Augusta, "to wit, Fanny Gardner, the wife of Thomas Gardner, and their daughter, Frances Gardner, and any future issue of the said Fanny by the said Thomas, and, in case of the death of the said Frances and Fanny, in trust for the next of kin of the said Thomas Gardner." The deed

NOTE.-Jurisdiction of United States Supreme Court; it is for state courts to construe their own statutes; supreme court will not review their decisions except when specially authorized by statute. See note to Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 12:169.

property until the death of Gardner; th that time Frances had remained in sion of the portion of the lot on whi house was erected for her use, and the p had occupied the remaining part of the l the deed to Robertson was void, beca that time all conveyances of real estate i gusta to or for the use of free persons o residing therein were prohibited by law the plaintiff acquired title to the prope cupied by her, by actual adverse possess the same for twenty years, and Franci acquired title in the same way to the pre occupied by her; that the plaintiff desi sell her part of the property, but could n so, because Frances claimed that unde terms of the trust deed she owned

mainder interest in the whole of the prop and the plaintiff had only a life estate th and that the property could not be sold e with the consent of Frances.

The bill prayed for a decree that the pla

owned a fee-simple title to the portion o lot so occupied by her; that the trust dee title of the plaintiff and of Frances was de canceled; that, if the court should hold tha from seven years' possession under the deed, as color of title, it would decree th terms of such deed did not bind the plaint tiff did not have a fee-simple title to the limit her title in the property; that, if the p in her possession, she and Frances migh decreed to be tenants in common of the e property, and the same might be divide commissioners, or be sold and the prod divided, share and share alike, between plaintiff and Frances; and for general relie

The bill was afterwards amended by inser Gardner at the time of the purchase one ha an allegation that the plaintiff furnished the purchase money of the property, the s being the proceeds of her labor as a free pe of color; and further that if the court held division of the lot by Gardner, in the part w the plaintiff acquired no legal interest unde he gave to her and on which she had since li then Gardner died in possession of all of and no interest that could ripen by prescript lot, leaving the plaintiff and Frances as only heirs; that such heirs had, by tacit sent, actually occupied, held and claimed